An Illustration of the Theory.

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any apparent notice on his own part-that a new element has been introduced. The sentence presents us with an example by which we may test his theory, and we are glad to have such an advantage given. "I see a piece of white paper on a table. I go into another room, and though I have ceased to see it, I am persuaded that the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations which it gave me; but I believe that when I again place myself in the circumstances in which I had those sensations, that is, when I go again into the room, I shall again have them; and further, that there has been no intervening movement at which this would not have been the case" (p. 192). This example, it will be seen refers to sensations experienced, and to the possibility of their recurrence in consciousness. Further, to avoid misunderstanding, we notice that when it is said that the person places himself in the circumstances in which he had the sensations, it is meant simply that he goes into the room again, and not anything more. Now let us look at the example. Those steps are involved in it: (1.) "I see a piece of paper;" (2.) "I have ceased to see it." (3.) On this account, I"no longer have the sensations" which I had; and (4.) "I believe I shall again have the sensations," if I go into the room. All the steps are clear, save the last, which is the only one which can be of any service for Mr Mill's purpose. We see a piece of paper, and have certain sensations while we see it. We cease to see the paper, and with the sight, the sensations cease. But is it true, when we go into another room, and leave the paper on the table, that we are persuaded that the paper is still there? Having once seen an object, do we thenceforth believe that it continues where we saw it, and that we shall find it when we go back? Such a persuasion or belief is not involved in our perception. In leaving the room, we may not have any such persuasion. There may be many things which lead to an opposite conviction, such as the fact of rapidly closing the door of the room, or leaving the window wide open. This fourth element, which is a belief, must therefore be thrown out of account, as not essential to our act of perception, and if it be thrown out, Mr Mill loses what he needs in order to make up his theory. Nay more, even if there be in any case such a persuasion as he describes, it is a belief that there is not any disturbing cause in operation, likely to affect the position of the perceived object, and such a belief must rest on grounds quite distinct from the act of perception, and not on the perception itself. The perception and persuasion are so distinct from each other, that even though the one follows the other, it cannot be shewn that the

second is a consequence of the first, and once more the example fails to serve the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Thus, accepting the example as given, we say, first, the belief is not essential to the perception; and, secondly, when the belief exists, it is not even a consequence of it, far less a component part of it. Mr Mill has failed to make good a single step towards the formation of a theory, and this "belief" here introduced must be added to the stock of facts to be accounted for at a subsequent stage of inquiry.

We wish that we could now step on a few paces into the next chapter, where our author treats of belief in the existence of mind, but we must forbear. We have indicated the method which we would employ in dealing with the statements of our author, and we must wait for another opportunity of prosecuting our criticism. What we have brought under review will be sufficient to suggest towards what conclusion Mr Mill is attempting to work. We wish greatly that we could have traced his efforts one by one, until the grand result is proclaimed in this brief but wonderful sentence: "Matter may be defined, a permanent possibility of sensation!" (p. 198.) Sensation, a possibility of sensation,-a permanent possibility of sensation. This is matter! Where is this possibility? Does it belong to us who are distinct from the object, or to the object which is distinct from us? Is the possibility of sensation not characteristic of mind? Then, this is not a definition of matter. But, is the possibility of sensation also characteristic of matter? Then matter is not distinct from mind. What confusion have we here! Philosophy has a poor history appointed for it in our land for some time to come, if such theorising as this can pass under the honoured name, and be upheld with personal satisfaction by a writer of such eminent ability as Mr John Stuart Mill. We do not account the constructive part of this volume as altogether worthless, but we consider that its main worth, after supplying the intuitional school with abundant material for the exercise of logical acuteness, consists in shewing how hopeless it is to expect to have a complete philosophy reared on a sensational basis.

We have not left ourselves space for more than a brief reference to the work of Dr M'Cosh, which is recently published, and is a valuable contribution to the philosophical controversy now being waged. The battle must be one of psychology, rather than of speculation, and Dr M'Cosh shews himself a skilful psychologist. We can assure our readers that they will find in the "Examination of Mr Mill's Philosophy," a most thorough scrutiny of the teaching which the champion of sensationalism would place

Dr M'Cosh's Examination of Mr Mill.

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in the room of the teaching of Reid, and Stewart, and Hamilton. After a very candid view, sketched in true philosophical spirit, of the position of Hamilton and Mill as philosophers, there is an admirable chapter on the method of investigation. Then comes another very interesting preliminary chapter, entitled, "Mr Mill's Admissions." Any one who has read with care the writings of Mr Mill must have been disturbed with the uneasy sense of an element of assumption flowing in, as a quiet streamlet, on the main current of thought. Dr M'Cosh has subjected the current at various stages of its course to fresh tests, and has given us the results. And here we have a large number of admissions which look exceedingly singular when we remember the source from which they have been drawn. It would afford matter for no ordinary curiosity to those interested in philosophical investigation, to see by what means Mr Mill would attempt to vindicate himself, or in what form he would offer explanations. Dr M'Cosh here shews great acqaintance with the writings of Mr Mill, and this volume is not to be considered as a mere review of one work, but a critical examination of Mr Mill's philosophy as a whole, including his psychology, and logic, and moral philosophy.

What is the general result our readers may judge from the following extract, which we specially introduce for the purpose of affording a glimpse of the range of consequences connected with Mr Mill's philosophy, stretching beyond those which we have been able to bring under review.

"We now see the issues in which the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, as held by Mr Mill, lands us. The geometrical demonstrations of Euclid, and Apolonius, and Newton may hold good only within our experience, and 'a reasonable distance beyond.' The mathematics taught in Cambridge may differ in their fundamental principles from those taught in the corresponding university of the planet Jupiter; where two and two may make five, where two straight lines may enclose a space, and where the three angles of a triangle are more than two right angles. Mr Mill is exceedingly indignant at Dr Mansel for maintaining that the divine morality is not to be measured by human morality, declaring that 'it is simply the most morally pernicious doctrine now current.' But I can discover no grounds on which the rebuker can stand, in nouncing such a judgment on Dr Mansel's application of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. Any one with half the acuteness of Dr Mansel could shew that if two and two make five, it is supposable that lying may be virtue, and veracity a vice, in other words; and that God (if there be a God) may commend deceit in the constellation of the Plough, even as he encourages truthfulness in our world."-(P. 354.)

pro

Dr M'Cosh does not in this passage too strongly colour

the ultimate results of such a system of philosophy as that propounded by Mr J. S. Mill. Beginning with sensations alone, and making these the only guarantee of certainty, it is impossible to go far in a legitimate course of philosophising. Attempts to step beyond what is warranted by the sensations with which we start, will lead to the utmost confusion of thought; the unauthorised use of natural beliefs will tend to throw discredit on them all; while, at the same time, the claims of exclusive philosophical authority for sensations will end in dishonour to philosophy itself. Most important service we reckon it to the cause of philosophy at the present time, to subject to searching scrutiny the teachings of the sincere admirers and singularly able upholders of sensationalism. Dr M'Cosh has done his part well, though at times we have thought that it might have been with more destructive effect. A most ungracious task it is which falls to the hands of a philosopher, when he is called to assail the theories of another, but ofttimes a most necessary work. And for the most part, such a task, if done in philosophic earnestness and fairness, yields important results to the good of all interested in the issue; for we have no faith in the superficial view of the history of philosophy which represents it as the record of uniform action and reaction between the same extremes of thought. Neither in mental science, nor in physical, is human thought in vain ; in neither is the conflict of opinion to be regarded as disturbance, and nothing more. Mr Mill has assailed the theories of Hamilton; and Dr M'Cosh, without directly attempting the defence of Hamilton, has, with still greater success, as we think, assailed the theories of Mr Mill. We are under a debt of gratitude to both. Philosophy is, beyond doubt, a gainer. According to our thinking, the intuitional philosophy, even with serious odds against it, is more secure of its sway than at any previous period. We are satisfied that this age will repudiate a philosophy which tells us that "matter is a permanent possibility of sensations;" that mind is "nothing but the series of our sensations,"" a series of feelings, with a background of possibilities of feeling;" that truth may vary as sensations change; and that morality must be content to seek its authority among the variable feelings, claiming no more to be accounted eternal and immutable. This professed philosophy is doomed to lose what little credit it has, because it is based on a psychology so insufficient, that but a few experiments are enough to expose its philosophic narrowness.

Prospectus of the Ante-Nicene Fathers.

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X.-BIBLICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

INTELLIGENCE.

Prospectus of the Ante-Nicene Christian Fathers.

WE beg to call the special attention of our readers to this Prospectus, lately issued by Messrs Clark of Edinburgh, the enterprising publishers of the Foreign Theological Library. In a great many of the questions which now agitate the churches, references are perpetually being made by the contending parties to the testimonies of the Christian Fathers, especially the Ante-Nicene, or those of them who flourished before the famous council of Nice. People, however, will no longer be content to accept these citations at second hand inquirers, clerical or laic, if intelligent and independent minds desire to consult the writings so often appealed to for themselves; and these have hitherto been to the Christian public almost wholly sealed books, written for the most part in cramp Latin or crabbed Greek, abounding with obscurities and inaccuracies which puzzle even the scholar, and placed entirely beyond the reach of the ordinary reader. Several translations of these primitive fathers, indeed, have appeared, selected for ecclesiastical purposes; but a complete library of their writings, undertaken by parties at once competent and important, is still a desideratum. This great want is now to be supplied; and when we state that the collection is to be published under the editorship of the Rev. ALEXANDER ROBERTS, D.D., author of "Discussions on the Gospels," &c., and JAMES DONALDSON, LL.D., author of "A Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine from the Death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council," we have said enough to give assurance to our readers that the task will be executed with a fidelity on which they can place full reliance, and with a ripe and liberal scholarship which will commend the whole as a standard work. The following extract from the Prospectus, to which we refer intending subscribers to this series, will shew what they may expect:

"All the Christian writings antecedent to the Nicene Council have been put into the hands of competent translators. These will make it their first and principal aim to produce translations as faithful as possible, uncoloured by any bias, dogmatic or ecclesiastical. They will also endeavour, in brief notes, to place the English reader in the position of those acquainted with the original languages. They will indicate important variations in the text; they will give different translations of the same passage where more than one have been proposed; they will note the various meanings attributed to the words in ecclesiastical controversies; and when the ancient documents appear in widely different forms, the various forms will be presented. At the same time, they will strive to combine with this strict accuracy and faithfulness as much elegance as may be consistent with the main aim. Short biographical and explanatory notices will be prefixed to D d

VOL. XV.-NO. LVI.