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recognised in their own practice. When an "ordinance of man" required them to forbear the promulgation of the new religion, they refused obedience, and urged the befitting expostulation-"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." So, too, with the filial relationship: Children, obey your parents in all things." 2. But a parent may require his child to lie or steal; and therefore when a parent requires obedience in such things, his authority ceases, and the obligation to obedience is taken away by the moral law itself. The precept, so far as the present ground of exception applies, is virtually this Obey your parents in all things, unless disobedience is required by the Will of God. Or the subject might be illustrated thus: The Author of Christianity reprobates those who love father or mother more than Himself. The paramount love to God is to be manifested by obedience.3 So, then, we are to obey the commands of God in preference to those of our parents. "All human authority ceases at the point where obedience becomes criminal."

"4

78. Of some precepts, it is evident that they were designed to be understood conditionally. "When thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret." This precept is conditional. I doubt not that it is consistent with His will that the greater number of the supplications which man offers at His throne shall be offered in secret; yet, that the precept does not exclude the exercise of public prayer, is evident from this consideration, if from no other, that Christ and His apostles themselves practised it.

79. Some precepts are figurative, and describe the spirit and temper that should govern us, rather than the particular actions that we should perform. Of this there is an example in, "Whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.”6 In promulgating some precepts, a principal object appears to have been to supply sanctions. Thus in the case of Civil Obedience, we are to obey because the Deity authorises the institution of Civil Government—because the magistrate is the minister of God for good; and, accordingly, we are to obey not from considerations or necessity only, but of duty; "not only for wrath, but for conscience sake."7 One precept, if we accepted it literally, would enjoin us to "hate" our parents; and this acceptation Milton appears actually to have adopted. One would enjoin us to accumulate no pro

perty: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth."1 Such rules are seldom mistaken in practice; and, it may be observed, that this is an indication of their practical wisdom, and their practical adaptation to the needs of man. It is not an easy thing to pronounce, as occasions arise, a large number of moral precepts in unconditional language, and yet to secure them from the probability of even great misconstructions. Let the reader make the experiment. Occasionally, but it is only occasionally, a sincere Christian, in his anxiety to conform to the moral law, accepts such precepts in a more literal sense than that in which they appear to have been designed to be applied. I once saw a book that endeavoured to prove the unlawfulness of accumulating any property, upon the authority, primarily, of this last quoted precept. The principle upon which the writer proceeded was just and right— that it is necessary to conform, unconditionally, to the expressed Will of God. The defect was in the criticism; that is to say, in ascertaining what that Will did actually require.

Not

80. Another obviously legitimate ground of limiting the application of absolute precepts is afforded us in just biblical criticism. that critical disquisitions are often necessary to the upright man who seeks for the knowledge of his duties. God has not left the knowledge of His moral law so remote from the sincere seekers of His Will. But in deducing public rules as authoritative upon mankind, it is needful to take into account those considerations which criticism supplies. The construction of the original languages and their peculiar phraseology, the habits, manners, and prevailing opinions of the times, and the circumstances under which a precept was delivered, are evidently amongst these considerations. And literary criticism is so much the more needed, because the great majority of mankind have access to Scripture only through the medium of translations.

81. But in applying all these limitations to the absolute precepts of Scripture, it is to be remembered that we are not subjecting their authority to inferior principles. We are not violating the principle upon which these essays proceed, that the expression of the Divine Will is our ultimate law. We are only ascertaining what that expression is. If, after just and authorised examination, any precept should still appear to stand imperative in its absolute form, we accept it as obligatory in that form. Many such precepts there are; and being such, we allow no considerations of convenience, nor of expediency,

1. Matt. vi. 19..

82. One great use of such inquiries as these is to vindicate to the apprehensions of men the authority of the precepts themselves. It is very likely to happen, and to some negligent inquirers it does happen, that seeing a precept couched in unconditional language, which yet cannot be unconditionally obeyed, they call in question its general obligation. Their minds fix upon the idea of some consequences which would result from a literal obedience, and feeling assured that those consequences ought not to be undertaken, they set aside the precept itself. They are at little pains to inquire what the proper requisitions of the precept are glad, perhaps, of a specious excuse for not regarding The careless reader, perceiving that a literal compliance with the precept to give the cloak to him who takes a coat, would be neither proper nor right, rejects the whole precept of which it forms an illustration; and in doing this, rejects one of the most beautiful, and important, and sacred requisitions of the Christian law.1

it at all.

83. There are two modes in which moral obligations are imposed in Scripture-by particular precepts and by general rules. The one prescribes a duty upon one subject, the other upon very many. The applicability of general rules is nearly similar to that of what is usually called the spirit of the Gospel, the spirit of the moral law: which spirit is of very wide embrace in its application to the purposes of life. "In estimating the value of a moral rule, we are to have regard not only to the particular duty, but the general spirit; not only to what it directs us to do, but to the character which a compliance with its direction is likely to form in us." 2 In this manner, some particular precepts become, in fact, general rules; and the duty that results from these rules, from this spirit, is as obligatory as that which is imposed by a specific injunction. Christianity requires us to maintain universal benevolence towards mankind; and he who, in his conduct towards another, disregards this benevolence, is as truly, and sometimes as flagrantly, a violator of the moral law, as if he had transgressed the command, "Thou shalt not steal." This doctrine is indeed recommended by a degree of utility that makes its adoption almost a necessity; because no number of specific precepts would be sufficient for the purposes of moral instruction: so that, if we were destitute of this species of general rules, we should frequently be destitute, so far as external precepts are concerned, of any. It

1 Matt. v. 38. 2 Evidences of Christianity, p. 2, C. 2.

been cited, that in the Mussulman code, which proceeds upon the system of a precise rule for a precise question, there have been I regard the wide practical applicability of promulgated seventy-five thousand precepts. some of the Christian precepts as an arguduties in few words; or rather, they convey ment of great wisdom. They impose many a great mass of moral instruction within a sentence that all may remember and that few would that men should do to you, do ye can mistake. "All things whatsoever ye even so to them," 1 is of greater utility in the practice of life, and is applicable to more circumstances, than a hundred rules which assistance that should be afforded in prepresented the exact degree of kindness or scribed cases.

garded, conveyed many clear expositions of human duty; yet the quibbling and captious scribes of old found, in the literalities of that law, more plausible grounds for evading its duties than can be found in the precepts of the Christian Scriptures.

The Mosaic law, rightly re

84. There are a few precepts of which the application is so extensive in human affairs that I would, in conformity with some of the preceding remarks, briefly inquire into their practical obligation. Of these, that which has just been quoted for another purpose, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," is perhaps cited and recommended more frequently than any other. The difficulty of applying this precept has induced some to reject it as containing a moral maxim which is not sound: but perhaps it will be found that the deficiency is not in the rule, but in the non-applicability of the cases to which it has often been applied. It is not applicable when the act which another would that we should do to him is in itself unlawful or adverse to some other portion of the moral law. If I seize a thief in the act of picking a pocket, he undoubtedly would" that I should let him go; and I, if our situations were exchanged, should wish it too. But I am not therefore to release him; because, since it is a Christian obligation upon the magistrate to punish offenders, the obligation descends to me to secure them for punishment. Besides, in every such case I must do as I would be done unto with respect to all parties concerned—the public as well as the thief. The precept, again, is not applicable when the desire of the second party is such as a Christian cannot lawfully indulge. An idle and profligate man asks me to give him money. It would be wrong to indulge such a man's desire, and therefore the precept does not apply.

1 Matt. vii. 12.

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2 Ibid.

85. The reader will perhaps say, that a person's duties in such cases are sufficiently obvious without the gravity of illustration. Well, but are the principles upon which the duties are ascertained thus obvious? This is the important point. In the affairs of life, many cases arise in which a person has to refer to such principles as these, and in which, if he does not apply the right principles, he will transgress the Christian law. The law appears to be in effect this, Do as you would be done unto, except in those instances in which to act otherwise is permitted by Christianity. Inferior grounds of limitation are often applied; and they are always wrong; because they always subject the moral law to suspension by inferior authorities. To do this, is to reject the authority of the Divine Will, and to place this beautiful expression of that Will at the mercy of every

man's inclination.

ducting our intercourse with men. He who habitually maintains his allegiance to religion and to purity, who is moderate and chastised in all his pursuits, and who always makes the prospects of the future predominate over the temptations of the present, is one of the most efficacious recommenders of goodness, one of the most impressive "preachers of righteousness," and by consequence, one of the most efficient promoters of the glory of God.

87. By a part of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, it appears that he and his coadjutors had been reported to hold the doctrine, that it is lawful "to do evil that good may come." 1 This report he declares is slanderous; and expresses his reprobation of those who act upon the doctrine, by the short and emphatic declaration-their condemnation is just. This is not critically a prohibition, but it is a pro

heard of the members of some dinner club

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who had been recommended to consider this precept, and who, in their discussions over the bottle, thought perhaps that they were arguing soundly when they held language like this: Am I, in lifting this glass to my mouth, to do it for the purpose of bringing glory to God? Is that to be my motive in buying a horse or shooting a pheasant ?" From such moralists much sagacity of discrimination was not to be expected; and these questions delighted and probably convinced the club. The mistake of these persons, and perhaps of some others, is, that they misunderstand the rule. The promotion of the Divine glory is not to be the motive and purpose of all our actions, but, having actions to perform, we are so to perform them that this glory shall be advanced. The precept is in effect, Let your actions and the motives of them be such, that others

shall have reason to honour God: 2—and a precept like this is a very sensitive test of the purity of our conduct. I know not whether there is a single rule of Christianity of which the use is so constant and the application so universal. To do as we would be done by, refers to relative duties; Not to do evil that good may come, refers to particular circumstances: but, To do all things so that the Deity may be honoured, refers to almost every action of a man's life. Happily the Divine glory is thus promoted by some men even in trifling affairs-almost whether they eat or drink, or whatsoever thing they do. There is, in truth, scarcely a more efficacious means of honouring the Deity, than the observing a constant Christian manner of con

that it was so flagitious that it needed very the doctrine is reprobated, induces the belief little inquiry or thought in the writer's idea of the doctrine to the punishment of mind the transition is immediate, from the those who adopt it.

is, anything and all things discordant with 88. Now the "evil" which is thus prohibited, the Divine Will; so that the unsophisticated meaning of the rule is, that nothing which is contrary to the Christian law may be done for the sake of attaining a beneficial end. ductive of more mischief than of this. That Perhaps the breach of no moral rule is pro

the end justifies the means is a maxim which many, who condemn it as a maxim, affairs it is not only habitually adopted, but adopt in their practice and in political is indirectly, if not openly, defended as right. If a senator were to object to some measure of apparent public expediency, that it was not consistent with the Moral Law, he would probably be laughed at as a fanatic or a fool : yet perhaps some who are flippant with this charge of fanaticism and folly may be in perplexity for a proof. If the expressed Will of God is our paramount law, no proof can be brought; and in truth it is not often that it is candidly attempted. I have not been amongst the least diligent inquirers into the moral reasonings of men, but honest and manly reasoning against this portion of Scrip

ture I have never found.

Of the rule, “not to do evil that good may come," Dr. Paley says, that it “is, for the most part, a salutary caution." A person might as well say that the rule "not to commit murder" is a salutary caution. There is no caution in the matter, but an imperative law. But he proceeds :— Strictly speaking,

1 Rom. iii. 8.

2