145. I am, however, disposed here to notice the objections that may be founded upon national derelictions of portions of the Moral Law. "There is," says Locke, "scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others."-And Paley: "There is scarcely a single vice which, in some age or country of the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion: in one country it is esteemed an office of piety in children to sustain their aged parents, in another to despatch them out of the way: suicide in one age of the world has been heroism, in another felony; theft, which is punished by most laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently rewarded: you shall hear duelling alternately reprobated and applauded according to the sex, age, or station of the person you converse with: the forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magnanimity, by another meanness.' รร 2 146. Upon all which I observe, that to whatever purpose these reasonings are directed, they are defective in an essential point. They show us indeed what the external actions of men have been, but give no proof that these actions were conformable with the secret internal judgment: and this last is the only important point. That a rule of virtue is "slighted and condemned by the general fashion," is no sort of evidence that those who joined in this general fashion did not still know that it was a rule of virtue. There are many duties which, in the present day, are slighted by the general fashion, and yet no man will stand up and say that they are not duties. "There is scarcely a single vice which has not been countenanced by public opinion;" but where is the proof that it has been approved by private and secret judgment? There is a great deal of difference between those sentiments which men seem to entertain respecting their duties when they give expression to ". 'public opinion," and when they rest their heads on their pillows in calm reflection. "Suicide in one age of the world has been heroism, in another felony;" but it is not every action which a man says is heroic, that he believes is right. Forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magnanimity, by another meanness ;" and yet they who thus vulgarly employ the word meanness, do not imagine that forbearance and placability are really wrong. 1 Not urged specifically, perhaps, against the Divine Guidance; but they will equally afford an illustration of the truth. 2 Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. 1, c. 5. 147. I have met with an example which serves to confirm me in the judgment, that public notions or rather public actions are a very equivocal evidence of the real sentiments of mankind. "Can there be greater barbarity than to hurt an infant? Its helplessness, its innocence, its amiableness, call forth the compassion even of an enemy. What then should we imagine must be the heart of a parent who would injure that weakness which a furious enemy is afraid to violate? Yet the exposition, that is, the murder of newborn infants, was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilised Athenians." This seems a strong case against us. But what were the grounds upon which this atrocity was defended?" Philosophers, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility.”1 148. By far-fetched considerations of public utility! Why had they recourse to such arguments as these? Because they found that the custom could not be reconciled with direct and acknowledged rules of virtue : because they felt and knew that it was wrong. The very circumstance that they had recourse to "far-fetched" arguments, is evidence that they were conscious that clearer and more immediate arguments were against them. They knew that infanticide was an immoral act. 149. I attach some importance to the indications which this class of reasoning affords of the comparative uniformity of human opinion, even when it is nominally discordant. One other illustration may be offered from more private life. Boswell, in his Life of Johnson, says that he proposed the question to the moralist, "Whether duelling was contrary to the laws of Christianity?" Let the reader notice the essence of the reply: "Sir, as men become in a high degree refined, various causes of offence arise which are considered to be of such importance that life must be staked to atone for them, though in reality they are not so. In a state of highly-polished society, an affront is held to be a serious injury. It must therefore be resented, or rather a duel must be fought upon it, as men have agreed to banish from their society one who puts up with an affront without fighting a duel. Now, sir, it is never unlawful to fight in self-defence. He then who fights a duel, does not fight from passion against his antagonist, but out of self-defence, to avert the stigma of the world, and to prevent himself from being driven from society.--While such notions prevail, no doubt a man may lawfully fight a duel." The question was, the consistency of duelling with the laws of 1 Theory Mor. Sent., p. 5, c. 2. Christianity; and there is not a word about Christianity in the reply. Why? Because its laws can never be shown to allow duelling; and Johnson doubtless knew this. Accordingly, like the philosophers who tried to justify the kindred crime of infanticide, he had recourse to "far-fetched considerations," -to the high polish of society,-to the stigma of the world, to the notions_that prevail. Now, whilst the readers of Boswell commonly think they have Johnson's authority in favour of duelling, I think they have his authority against it. I think that the mode in which he justified duelling, evinced his consciousness that it was not compatible with the Moral Law. 150. And thus it is, that with respect to Public Opinions, and general fashions, and thence descending to private life, we shall find that men very usually know the requisitions of the Moral Law better than they seem to know them; and that he who estimates the moral knowledge of societies or individuals by their common language, refers to an uncertain and fallacious standard. 151. After all, the uniformity of human opinion respecting the great laws of morality is very remarkable. Sir James Mackintosh speaks of Grotius, who had cited poets, orators, historians, &c., and says, He quotes them as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race, on the great rules of duty and fundamental principles of morals."1 152. From poets and orators we may turn to savage life. In 1683, that is, soon after the colonisation of Pennsylvania, the founder of the colony held a “council and consultation" with some of the Indians. In the course of the interview it appeared that these savages believed in a state of future retribution; and they described their simple ideas of the respective states of the good and bad. The vices that they enumerated as those which 1 Disc. on Study of Law of Nature and Nations. would consign them to punishment are remarkable, inasmuch as they so nearly correspond to similar enumerations in the Christian Scriptures. They were "theft, swearing, lying, whoring, murder, and the like;"1 and the New Testament affirms that those who are guilty of adultery, fornication, lying, theft, murder, &c., shall not inherit the kingdom of God. The same writer having on his travels met with some Indians, stopped and gave them some good and serious advices. "They wept," says he, “and tears ran down their naked bodies. They smote their hands upon their breasts and said, 'The Good Man here told them what I said was all good.""" 153. But reasonings such as these are in reality not necessary to the support of the truth of the Immediate Communication of the Will of God; because, if the variations in men's notions of right and wrong were greater than they are, they would not impeach the existence of that communication. In the first place, we never affirm that the Deity communicates all His law to every man and in the second place, it is sufficiently certain that multitudes know His laws, and yet neglect to fulfil them. 154. If, in conclusion, it should be asked, What assistance can be yielded, in the investigation of publicly authorised rules of virtue, by the discussions of the present chapter? we answer, Very little. But when it is asked, Of what importance are they as illustrating the Principles of Morality? we answer, Very much. If there be two sources from which it has pleased God to enable mankind to know His Will,-a law written externally, and a law communicated to the heart,—it is evident that both must be regarded as Principles of Morality, and that, in a work like the present, both should be illustrated as such. It is incidental to the latter mode of moral guidance, that it is little adapted to the formation of external rules; but it is of high and solemn importance to our species for the secret direction of the individual man. ESSAY I.-PART II. SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING THE CHAPTER I. The Law of the Land. DIVINE WILL. Its authority-Limits to its authority-Morality sometimes prohibits what the law permits. 1. The authority of civil government as a director of individual conduct, is explicitly asserted in the Christian Scriptures :-"Be subject to principalities and powers,-Obey magistrates,"1 ,"1_Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well."" 2. By this general sanction of civil government, a multitude of questions respecting human duty are at once decided. In ordinary cases, he upon whom the magistrate imposes a law, needs not to seek for knowledge of his duty upon the subject from a higher source. The Divine Will is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the magistrate commands. Obedience to the law is obedience to the expressed Will of God. He who, in the payment of a tax to support the just exercise of government, conforms to the law of the land, as truly obeys the Divine Will, as if the Deity had regulated questions of taxation by express rules. in the Christian Scriptures, are especially worthy of regard. "Submit for the Lord's sake." "Be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake." Submission for wrath's sake, that is, from fear of penalty, implies a very inferior motive to submission upon grounds of principle and duty; and as to practical excellence, who cannot perceive that he who regulates his obedience by the motives of Christianity, acts more worthily, and honourably, and consistently, than he who is influenced only by fear of penalties? The man who obeys the laws for conscience' sake, will obey always; alike when disobedience would be unpunished and unknown, as when it would be detected the next hour. The magistrate has a security for such a man's fidelity, which no other motive can supply. A smuggler will inport his kegs if there is no danger of a seizure—a Christian will not buy the brandy though no one knows it but himself. 5. It is to be observed, that the obligation of civil obedience is enforced, whether the particular command of the law is in itself sanctioned by morality or not. Antecedently to the existence of the law of the magistrate respecting the importation of brandy, it was of no consequence in the view of morality whether brandy was imported or not; but the prohibition of the magistrate involves a moral obligation to refrain. Other doctrine 3. In thus founding the authority of civil has been held; and it has been asserted, government upon the precepts of revelation, that unless the particular law is enforced by we refer to the ultimate, and for that reason morality, it does not become obligatory by to the most proper sanction. Not, indeed, the command of the state.1 But if this were that if revelation had been silent, the obliga-true-if no law was obligatory that was not tion of obedience might not have been deduced from other considerations. The utility of government-its tendency to promote the order and happiness of society-powerfully recommend its authority; so powerfully, indeed, that it is probable that the worst government which ever existed was incomparably better than none; and we shall hereafter have occasion to see that considerations of Utility involve actual moral obligation. previously enjoined by morality, no moral obligation would result from the law of the land. Such a question is surely set at rest by, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man." 6. But the authority of civil government is a subordinate authority. If, from any cause, the magistrate enjoins that which is prohibited by the Moral Law, the duty of obedience is withdrawn. All human authority ceases at the point where obedience becomes criminal." The reason is simple; that 66 1 See Godwin's Political Justice. when the magistrate enjoins what is criminal, a man may be entitled by law to privileges he has exceeded his power: "the minister which morality forbids him to exercise, or to of God" has gone beyond his commission. possessions which morality forbids him to There is, in our day, no such thing as a moral plenipotentiary. 1 enjoy. 11. As to the possession, for example, of 7. Upon these principles, the first teachers property: the general foundation of the right of Christianity acted when the rulers "called to property is the Law of the Land. But as the them, and commanded them not to speak | law of the land is itself subordinate, it is maniat all nor teach in the name of Jesus."- fest that the right to property must be subor"Whether," they replied, "it be right in the dinate also, and must be held in subjection sight of God, to hearken unto you more than to the Moral Law. A man who has a wife unto God, judge ye." They accordingly and two sons, and who is worth fifteen hun"entered into the temple early in the morn-dred pounds, dies without a will. The widow ing and taught:" and when, subsequently, possesses no separate property, but the sons they were again brought before the council have received from another quarter ten thouand interrogated, they replied, "We ought to sand pounds apiece. Now, of the fifteen obey God rather than men ;" and notwith- hundred pounds which the intestate left, the standing the renewed command of the coun- law assigns five hundred to the mother, and cil, "daily in the temple and in every house, five hundred to each son. Are these sons they ceased not to teach and preach Jesus morally permitted to take each his five hunChrist." -Nor let any one suppose that dred pounds, and to leave their parent with there is anything religious in the motives only five hundred for her support? Every of the apostles, which involved a peculiar man I hope will answer, No: and the reason obligation upon them to refuse obedience: is this; that the Moral Law, which is supewe have already seen that the obligation to rior to the Law of the Land, forbids them to conform to religious duty and to moral duty, avail themselves of their legal rights. The is one. Moral Law requires justice and benevolence, and a due consideration for the wants and necessities of others; and if justice and benevolence would be violated by availing ourselves of legal permissions, those permissions are not sufficient authorities to direct our conduct. 8. To disobey the civil magistrate is, however, not a light thing. When the Christian conceives that the requisitions of government and of a higher law are conflicting, it is needful that he exercise a strict scrutiny into the principles of his conduct. But if, upon such scrutiny, the contrariety of requisitions appears real, no room is left for doubt respecting his duty, or for hesitation in performing it. With the consideration of consequences he has then no concern: whatever they may be, his path is plain before him. 9. It is sufficiently evident that these doctrines respect non-compliance only. It is one thing not to comply with laws, and another to resist those who make or enforce them. He who thinks the payment of tithes unchristian, ought to decline to pay them; but he would act upon strange principles of morality, if, when an officer came to distrain upon his property, he forcibly resisted his authority.3 10. If there are cases in which the positive injunctions of the law may be disobeyed, it is manifest that the mere permission of the law to do a given action, conveys no sufficient authority to perform it. There are, perhaps, no disquisitions connected with the present subject, which are of greater practical utility than those which show, that not everything which is legally right is morally right; that 12. It has been laid down, that "so long as we keep within the design and intention of a law, that law will justify us, in foro conscientiæ as in foro humano, whatever be the equity or expediency of the law itself."1 From the example which has been offered, I think it sufficiently appears that this maxim is utterly unsound: at any rate, its unsoundness will appear from a brief historical fact. During the Revolutionary war in America, the Virginian Legislature passed a law, by which it was enacted, that all merchants and planters in Virginia who owed money to British merchants, should be exonerated from their debts, if they paid the money due into the public treasury instead of sending it to Great Britain; and all such as stood indebted, were invited to come forward and give their money, in this manner, towards the support of the contest in which America was then engaged." Now, according to the principles of Paley, these Virginian planters would have been justified, in foro conscientia, in defrauding the British merchants of the money which was their due. It is quite clear that the "design and intention of the law" was to allow the fraud-the planters were even invited to commit it; and yet the heart 1 Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. iii. p. 1, c. 4. of every reader will tell him, that to have availed themselves of the legal permission, would have been an act of flagitious dishonesty. The conclusion is therefore distinct --that legal decisions respecting property are not always a sufficient warrant for individual conduct. To the extreme disgrace of these planters it should be told, that although at first, when they would have gained little by the fraud, few of them paid their debts into the treasury, yet afterwards many large sums were paid. The Legislature offered to take the American paper money; and as this paper money, in consequence of its depreciation, was not worth an hundredth part of its value in specie, the planters, in thus paying their debts to their own government, paid but one pound instead of a hundred, and kept the remaining ninety-nine in their own pockets! Profligate as these planters and as this Legislature were, it is pleasant for the sake of America to add, that in 1796, after the Supreme Court of the United States had been erected, the British merchants brought the affair before it; and the judges directed that every one of these debts should again be paid to the rightful creditors. subsequently arise, it happens that the literal application of a law sometimes frustrates the intention of the legislator, and violates the obligations of justice. Whatever be the cause, it is found in practice, that courts of law usually regard the letter of a statute rather than its general intention; and hence it happens that many duties devolve upon individuals in the application of the laws in their own affairs. If legal courts usually decide by the letter, and if decision by the letter often defeats the objects of the legislator and the claims of justice, how shall these claims be satisfied except by the conscientious and forbearing integrity of private men? Of the cases in which this integrity should be brought into exercise, several examples will be offered in the early part of the next Essay. Its CHAPTER II. The Law of Nature. authority-Limits to its authority-Obligations resulting from the Rights of Nature- Incorrect ideas attached to the word Nature. 15. Wehere use the term, the Law of Nature, as a convenient title under which to advert to the authority, in moral affairs, of what are called Natural Instincts and Natural Rights. 13. It might be almost imagined that the moral philosopher designed to justify such conduct as that of the planters. He says, when a man "refuses to pay a debt of the reality of which he is conscious, he cannot plead the intention of the statute, unless he could show that the law intended to inter-ginal impulses of our nature, rightly contend pose its supreme authority to acquit men of debts of the existence and justice of which they were themselves sensible."1 Now the planters could show that this was the intention of the law, and yet they were not justified in availing themselves of it. The error of the moralist is founded in the assumption, that there is "supreme authority" in the law. Make that authority, as it really is, subordinate, and the error, and the fallacious rule which is founded upon it, will be alike cor rected. 14. In applying to the Law of the Land as a moral guide, it is of importance to distinguish its intention from its letter. The intention is not, indeed, as we have seen, a final consideration, but the design of a legislature is evidently of greater import, and consequent obligation, than the literal interpretation of the words in which that design is proposed to be expressed. The want of a sufficient attention to this simple rule occasions many snares to private virtue, and the commission of much practical injustice. In consequence, partly of the inadequacy of all language, and partly of the inability of those who frame laws, accurately to provide for cases which 1 Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. 3, p. I, c. 4. 16. "They who rank Pity amongst the ori-, that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates the divine intention and our duty. Indeed, the same conclusion is deducible from the existence of the passion, whatever account be given of its origin. Whether it be an instinct or a habit, it is in fact a property of our nature which God appointed.” 1 1 17. I should reason similarly respecting Natural Rights-the right to life-to personal liberty-to a share of the productions of the earth. The fact that life is given us by our Creator-that our personal powers and mental dispositions are adapted by Him to personal liberty-and that He has constituted our bodies so as to need the productions of the earth, are satisfactory indications of the Divine Will, and of human duty. 18. So that we conclude the general proposition is true-that a regard to the Law of Nature, in estimating human duty, is accordant with the Will of God. There is little necessity for formally insisting on the authority of the Law of Nature, because few are disposed to dispute that authority, at least when their own interests are served by appealing. 1 Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. 3. p. 2, c. 5, |