this account. Of course, then, when his purpose once becomes evident, we judge of his acts accordingly, and as all the more unworthy be cause accompanied with deception, and deccption, too, at the expense of virtue itself. So, if one should kill a mad dog at large in the streets, he would seem to have done a good deed; but should we ascertain that what he really intended, or what in fact moved him to discharge the missile or gun by which the dog was killed, was that he might, under this pretext, kill some other animal belonging to a neighbor, which the dog was passing by, we should condemn the act as wrong.

9. Intentions and intended acts. We thus see that the real act is internal, and that the external act, whether the natural expression of the internal purpose or not, is none the less the carrying out of that purpose, and hence is to be wholly interpreted by it. So, too, if there be only the purpose of some act, provided that purpose be settled and deliberate, and no external act; as where one lies in wait

to murder or rob another, and finds no oppor tunity of doing the deed, we hold him as guilty as though he had accomplished his purpose. The actual performance of the act does, in deed, bring it home to us with greater vividness, and make us realize it more fully; but, when we calmly consider the case, we are unable to distinguish between the guilt of an evil act deliberately purposed, but accidentally prevented, and the same act carried into effect. But if the evil purpose be but half entertained, or only a transient thought passing through the mind, we hold the individual guilty only as he voluntarily retains and cherishes it. The least dallying with evil thoughts is reprehensible, and always tends to become habitual.

10. Character as right or wrong. Char acter, meaning literally an engraved outline, is, if I may so speak, the particular form of each individual mind, the state and attitude of its active principles at any given time. A principle of action is that which prompts us to act; and the particular relation and subor

dination of such principles in each mind con stitute the individual's character. Knowing any one's controlling principles, we know his character; and knowing his character, we know how he will act under given circumstances. Principles of action, then, considered as ten dencies to certain kinds of conduct, are naturally judged of as right or wrong, while the sum of them in any individual (i. e., his character) leads us to approve or disapprove him as a moral agent. We consider every one a good or a bad man according to his character, not only as shown in his acts, but as embracing certain principles of action. Hence the com plete object-matter of ethics is action, including the intention or motive, as showing the real nature of an act, and active principles or character, as leading to such and such acts.

CHAPTER II.

ACTION PRESUPPOSES ACTIVE PRINCIPLES.

1. Human acts are conscious acts. Action, as we have seen, proceeds from within, and hence presupposes active principles. Our acts are our own, self-caused and independent, and not merely the result of action in other things. Human acts are conscious acts, springing from and guided by internal principles. A machine acts blindly, from the influence of some impulse external to itself; but man acts only as he thinks, and feels, and wills, and in consequence of his thoughts, and feelings, and volitions. For each of these classes of mental energies, as we shall see, is concerned in action.

2. How our powers of knowing are con

cerned in action. - By experience we learn. what is agreeable, wholesome, good, and are so constituted that we can but desire and strive after what we have found to be such. But, at the same time, we are capable of experience at all only through knowledge. We move among objects, and test or try their qualities only as we know them. We are pleased or displeased with objects only as our senses are employed in perceiving them, or our thoughts in dwelling upon them. Gratification is but the reflex of the natural and healthy action of our various conscious powers. The first impulse to action, therefore, presupposes knowledge. At the same time, the whole conception of an act, as well as of its bearings, and of the probable conditions of its success, is en tirely a matter of knowledge. It is only through knowledge, also, that we understand the acts of others. Hence knowledge, though not the moving impulse to action, is an indispensable condition to that impulse, and plays a prime part in every act.