of the nature, plans, purposes, and requirements of an Infinite God, we may well distrust the ability of our finite powers to grapple with such subjects, and positively and authoritatively to pronounce upon their truth or propriety. We may, however, inquire into the historical evidence that the Bible is a revelation from God; for this is a subject wholly within the scope of our powers.

11. Conscience, then, is supreme within its sphere. Conscience, as a perceptive faculty, as we have already seen, is only another name for the highest forms of our intelligence. It is our perceptive and rational faculties in their highest and most responsible exercise. As the capacity of knowing the right, as the clearest and strongest light within us,-seconded, as it is, by the most urgent and authoritative feelings, it is the natural guide of our lives. It points to the path in which we should walk, and illuminates it as we advance. Of course, from the very nature of the case, we are bound to follow the strongest light

within us, and not to turn aside into darkness, which would be sheer folly and perverscness. That we have such faculties is evidence that it was intended we should exercise them. And, if we do exercise them, we must follow them, unless we prefer darkness to light. Every thought or feeling prompting to word or deed can be rightfully allowed only as it is pronounced right and good by our highest intelligence. Even piety, or the sentiment of reverence for the Supreme Being, becomes wild, fantastic, and cruel, as liable to be directed

to a false as to the true God, unless it be under the control of intelligence.

CHAPTER V.

RIGHT ACTS MUST BE GROUNDED IN THE NATURE OF THINGS.

Different theories as to the ground of right and wrong. Different theories have been held as to the ground of right and wrong; but they all resolve themselves into three, viz. : that this ground exists either, I. In the nature of man; or, II. In the nature or will of God; or, III. In the nature of things.* It is the design of this chapter to examine these differ

I omit here, as evidently only partial grounds of right, the views- quite celebrated, indeed, in the history of morals-that acts are right only as they tend to our own good, or to the good of others. These are really only the grounds of the particular virtues of prudence and benevolence, and will, therefore, be considered under those heals.

ent theories with the view of ascertaining, if possible, which is true.

I. THE GROUND OF RIGHT NOT IN THE NATURE

OF MAN.

1. What is here meant by “ground.” The ground of any thing is that in which it inheres, and where it is found or perceived. Thus matter is the ground of its properties. And hence, in a secondary or derived sense, the ground of any thing is that upon which it rests, and which supports it; as where we speak of the ground color in painting or embroidery, or the grounds of an argument, complaint, and the like. It is in this latter sense that the term is here used. The ground of right, then, is that upon which it is found to rest, when it is traced back as far as our powers can trace it; or it is the source whence we draw our reasons for it and defences of it. As the ground of a complaint is the reasons for it, so the ground of right is the reasons for that. Hence the ground here spoken of is either

that which supplies the reason for our perceiving the right, or that which furnishes the reason for its existence.

Hence,

2. Difference between the ground of knowing and the ground of being. The doctrine of "sufficient reason," as it has been called, teach es that nothing exists, or is known, without a competent reason the one being called the reason or principle of a thing's existing, (ratio essendi,) the other the reason or principle of our knowing it, (ratio cognoscendi.) in regard to right, as in regard to every thing else, we may inquire either for the ground of its existence or for the ground of our perception of it. We cannot doubt that, if our faculties were competent, we should find a reason for each. We are sure that our faculties are competent to the inquiry in the latter of these two forms, whether they are to the other or not. Besides, this is the only view of the question which is of any practical importance to us, although the other is the one which has been the most argued by moralists. In treat