it will be this which is the practicable good, and if there are several such ends it will be these. As it appears that there are more ends than one, and some of these, e.g., wealth, flutes, and instruments generally, we desire as means to something else, it is evident that they are not all final ends. But the highest good is clearly something final. Hence, if there is only one final end, this will be the object of which we are in search, and if there are more than one, it will be the most final of them. We speak of that which is sought after for its own sake as more final than that which is sought after as a means to something else; we speak of that which is never desired as a means to something else as more final than the things which are desired both in themselves and as a means to something else; and we speak of a thing as absolutely final, if it is always desired in itself and never as a means to something else."1

Let us see how this question of the highest good was answered in the past.

The question usually receives one of two answers: (1) According to one school, pleasure is the highest

1 Bk. I, chap. v, Welldon's translation. Compare with this Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. i: "Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good?" See also Hume, Principles of Morals, Appendix I, v., quoted in note on p. 141.

good, end, or purpose; (2) according to another, it is action, or preservation, or perfection, or reason. We shall discuss the different theories in what follows, under the heads of hedonism and energism.1

3. The Cyrenaics. - Aristippus of Cyrene, who lived in the third century before Christ and founded the Cyrenaic school,2 regards pleasure (dový) as the ultimate aim of life, for all normal beings desire it. "We are from childhood attracted to it without any deliberate choice of our own; and when we have obtained it, we do not seek anything further, and there is nothing which we avoid so much as its opposite, which is pain."3 By pleasure he means the positive enjoyment of the moment (ýdový év kivýσei), not merely repose of spirit, "a sort of undisturbedness," or permanent state of happiness. The chief good is a particular pleasure. Only the present is ours, the past is gone, the future uncertain. Therefore,

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Carpe diem," "Gather the rosebuds while ye may,' "Eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow you die."

But shall the pleasure be bodily or mental? Well, bodily pleasures are superior to mental ones,

1 See chap. iv, § 6.

2 See Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Bk. II; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math., Bk. VII, 191– 192; Ritter and Preller, Historia Philosophiæ Græcæ, pp. 207 ff.; Mullach, Fragments, Vol. II, 397 ff.; the histories of ethics, etc., mentioned under chap. ii, especially Paulsen, Seth, Sidgwick, Hyslop, Lecky, chap i. For fuller bibliographies on the thinkers mentioned in this chapter, see the histories of philosophy, especially English translation of Weber's History of Philosophy.

8 Diogenes Laertius, translated in Bohn's Library, p. 89.

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and bodily sufferings worse than mental. Still, every pleasant feeling (durácia), whether it be physical or spiritual, is pleasure. Every pleasure as such is a good. But some pleasures are bought with great pain and are to be avoided. A man should exercise his judgment, be prudent in the choice of his pleasures. "The best thing," says Aristippus, "is to possess pleasures without being their slave, not to be devoid of pleasures."

Theodorus, a member of the same school, declares that, since you cannot always enjoy, you should try to reach a happy frame of mind (xapá). Prudence will enable a man to obtain the pleasant and avoid the unpleasant. Pleasure, then, is the end; prudence or insight or reflection (Opóvnσis), the means of getting the most pleasure out of life.

Hegesias, called πaiσilávaτos (persuader to die), the pessimist, admits that we all desire happiness, but holds that complete happiness cannot exist. Hence the chief good is to be free from all trouble and pain, and this end is best attained by those who look upon the efficient causes of pleasure as indifferent. Indeed, death is preferable to life, for death takes us out of the reach of pain.1 Anniceris, too, considers pleasure as the chief good, and the deprivation of it as an evil. Still, a man has natural feelings of benevolence, and ought therefore to submit voluntarily to this deprivation out of regard for his friends and his country.

1 See Cicero, Tusc., 34.

4. Epicurus. According to Epicurus,1 a later advocate of hedonism, pleasure is the highest good, pain the greatest evil,2 not, however, the positive or active pleasure of the Cyrenaics, pleasure in motion (ἡδονὴ κινητική), but quiet pleasure (ἡδονὴ καταστημаTIKń), repose of spirit (arapağía), freedom from pain (aπovía). The latter pleasures, which Epicurus calls pleasures of the soul, are greater than the former, those of the body; just as the pains of the soul are worse than those of the body. For the flesh is only sensible to present joy and affliction, but the soul feels the past, the present, and the future. Physical pleasure does not last as such; only the recollection of it endures. Hence, mental pleasure, i.e., the remembrance of bodily pleasure, which is free from the pains accompanying physical enjoyment, is higher than physical pleasure.

Now how shall we reach the chief good? Although no pleasure is intrinsically bad, we do not choose. every pleasure, for many pleasures are followed by greater pains, and many pains are followed by greater pleasures. We must exercise our judgment, we must have prudence or insight (povnois) to

1 340-270 B. C. Diogenes Laertius, X; Cicero, De finibus, I; Lucretius, De rerum natura; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math., XI; Ritter and Preller, pp. 373 ff. See my translation of Weber, History of Philosophy, p. 134, note 1.

2They say that there are two passions, pleasure and pain, which affect everything alive, and that the one is natural, and the other foreign to our nature; with reference to which all objects of choice and avoidance are judged of." Diogenes Laertius, English translation, p. 436; see also p. 470.

guide us in our choice of pleasures and in our avoid ance of pains. "When therefore we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those who lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish and other such things as a costly table supplies, that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which examines the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul." "The wise man, the man of insight, understands the causes of things, and will, therefore, be free from prejudice, superstition, fear of death, all of which render one unhappy and hinder the attainment of peace of mind."

In order to be happy, then, you must be prudent, honest, and just. "It is not possible to live pleasantly unless one also lives prudently, and honorably, and justly; and one cannot live prudently, and honestly, and justly, without living pleasantly; for the virtues are connate with living agreeably, and living agreeably is inseparable from the virtues.”1

We see how this school develops from a crass hedonism to a somewhat more refined form of it.

1 D. L., pp. 471 f.

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