living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside of ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly. Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavor to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason desire for themselves nothing which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honorable in their conduct."1 Now, "in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment 1 Ethics, Part IV, prop. xviii note. سا of the spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of His nature."1 "The mind's highest good is the knowl-i edge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God." 2 9. Cumberland. - Both Richard Cumberland and Lord Shaftesbury also place the highest good in welfare, not in the welfare of the individual, however, but in the common good, by which they mean not pleasure, but perfection.3 Cumberland says: "The endeavor, to the utmost of our power, of promoting the common good of the whole system of rational agents, conduces, as far as in us lies, to the good of every part, in which our own happiness, as that of a part, is contained. But contrary action produces contrary effects, and consequently our own misery, as well as that of others." 4 "The greatest possible benevolence of every rational agent toward all the rest constitutes the happiest state of each and all, so far as depends on their own power, and is necessarily required for their happiness; accordingly com 1 Ethics, Part IV, Appendix iv. 2 Ib., Part IV, prop. xxviii. Translations taken from Bohn's Library Edition. 8 Richard Cumberland, 1632-1719, De legibus naturæ, 1672; translated into English by Jean Maxwell, 1727. See E. Albee, "The Ethical System of Richard Cumberland," Philosophical Review, 1895. For Shaftesbury, see chap. ii, § 4 (1). 4 See Albee, "The Ethical System of Richard Cumberland." mon good will be the supreme law." Again, "The happiness of each individual . . . is derived from the best state of the whole system, as the nourishment of each member of an animal depends upon the nourishment of the whole mass of blood diffused through the whole." The common good being the end, "such actions as take the shortest way to this effect... are naturally called right,' because of their natural resemblance to a right line, which is the shortest that can be drawn between any two given points, .. but the rule itself is called right, as pointing out the shortest way to the end." 10. Shaftesbury. — Shaftesbury 1 finds in man two kinds of impulses: "selfish or private affections,' and "natural, kind, or social affections." The selfish affections are directed toward the individual welfare or preservation, "private good"; the social affections, toward common welfare, the preservation of the system of which the individual forms a part, "public good." Just as the health or perfection of a bodily organism consists in the harmonious coöperation of all its organs, so the health or perfection of the soul consists in the harmonious coöperation of the selfish and social affections. An individual is good or virtuous when all his inclinations and affections conduce to the welfare of his species or the system of which he is a part. Virtue is the proper balance or harmony between the two impulses. 1 See chap. ii, § 4 (1). But how can we tell whether our impulses are properly balanced? By means of the moral sense, as we have already seen,1 the sense of right and wrong, the rational affections. The moral sense is original or innate, like the other affections. Just as the contemplation of works of art arouses feelings of disinterested approbation and disapprobation, so the contemplation of human acts and impulses, whether of others or ourselves, arouses feelings of approval and disapproval. Since man is originally a social being, he derives his greatest happiness from that which makes for the existence of society and the common weal, The necessary concomitant of virtue is happiness, just as pleasure accompanies the right state of the organism. 11. Darwin.2-The modern evolutionists agree with this conception. I quote a passage from Darwin's Descent of Man: "In the case of the lower animals it seems much more appropriate to speak of their social instincts as having been developed for the general good rather than for the general happiness of the species. The term general good may be defined as the rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected. As the social instincts both of man and the lower animals have no doubt been developed by nearly the same steps, it would be found advis1 Chap. ii, § 4 (1). 2 See chap. ii, § 7 (2). able, if found practicable, to use the same definition in both cases, and to take as the standard of morality the general good or welfare of the community rather than the general happiness. . . When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow-creature, it seems also more correct to say that he acts for the general good, rather than for the general happiness of mankind. No doubt the welfare and the happiness of the individual usually coincide; and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that is discontented and unhappy. We have seen that even at an early period in the history of man, the expressed wishes of the community will have naturally influenced, to a large extent, the conduct of each member; and as all wish for happiness, ‘the greatest happiness principle' will have become a most important secondary guide and object; the social instinct, however, together with sympathy (which leads to our regarding the approbation and disapprobation of others), having served as the primary impulse and guide. Thus the reproach is removed of laying the foundation of the noblest part of our nature in the base principle of selfishness; unless, indeed, the satisfaction which every animal feels, when it follows its proper instincts, and the dissatisfaction felt when prevented, be called selfish.”1 12. Stephen. Leslie Stephen 2 defines the moral law " as a statement of the conditions or of a part of 1 Descent of Man, chap. iv, Part I, Concluding Remarks. |