at the same time, involves its own universal validity for every rational being.1 For if I am only to act so that my acts can become universal, I cannot will to use any other rational creature as a means without willing that he use me as a means. The rational will therefore imposes universal laws, laws that hold for all, laws acceptable to all, which makes possible a kingdom of ends. Every rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends.3

Translated into popular language, this ethical philosophy of Kant's seems to me to agree with the systems which we have just been considering. Conscience categorically commands certain forms of conduct, regardless of their effects. When we examine the forms of conduct enjoined by conscience, we find that a common principle is applicable to all; they are all fit for something, they all conduce to an end or highest good, — something of absolute worth, something absolutely desired by human nature, or as Kant states it, something that reason or the categorical imperative commands. Now what is this end? It seems to be the good of society. "So act that thou canst will the maxim of thy action to become universal law." That is, do not lie and steal, for thou canst not will that lying and stealing become universal. Why not? "For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since 1 Abbott's translation, p. 56. 2 p. 52.

3 p. 57.

it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over-hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself." The implication here seems to be that society would go to pieces if the principles underlying certain acts should become

universal.

Kant also declares that every man necessarily conceives his own existence as an end in itself. This means that every man has egoistic impulses. And because he is egoistie he must have a due regard for others, he must treat them with respect, for otherwise he cannot expect them to treat him with respect. This is what he means when he says, So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only. This is a philosophical statement of the command, Do unto others

The king

as you would have them do unto you. dom of ends would be impossible unless every man cared for his own welfare and that of his fellows; therefore such principles of morality are implanted in his heart as to make a kingdom of ends possible.1 16. General Survey. In conclusion, let us note the progress which has been made in the history of the theory discussed in this chapter. The Greek

1 Compare with this Sidgwick's system, as given in chap. vi, § 13.

energists regarded as the highest good, the exercise of reason, or the development of knowledge, and tended to ignore the emotional and impulsive factors of the soul-life. Modern energists generally take a broader view of the highest good, defining it not merely as the exercise of the intellectual functions, but as the preservation and development of life as a whole. Happiness as a phase of soul-life receives its appropriate place as a part of the end or highest good, and the theory of energism more closely approximates hedonism. Pleasure is a means to the end of perfection, an accompaniment of virtuous action, a sign that the goal is being realized. The altruistic element is also gradually introduced into the modern conception of energism. The preservation and development of the race is looked upon as the ideal of life and the standard of morality. Man is no longer conceived as striving merely for his own individual perfection and happiness, but for the good of the whole. Sympathy takes its place by the side of self-love as a natural endowment of the soul.1 In the evolutionistic school we also get a closer approximation to intuitionism. Man strives after the preservation and perfection of himself and his fellows; and conscience is largely an inherited instrument in the service of this ideal or goal. It demands what is good for man as a member of society; it is the expression of the general will in the individual heart.

1 Compare chap. vi, § 14.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM1

1. The Conception of the Highest Good. Our historical review has shown us that there are different answers to the question, What is the end of life and the standard of morality? One school holds that pleasure all the way from sensuous pleasure to intellectual pleasure, and all the way from the pleasure of the individual to the pleasure or happiness of humanity is the highest good. Another combats this notion, and sets up as the end, not pleasure, but virtue, knowledge, perfection, self-preservation, or the preservation of society. We pointed out the fact that the Greeks concerned themselves with the question of the highest good, while the modern thinkers formulate the problem in a somewhat different manner, asking, What is the ground of moral distinctions; what makes an

1 For criticism of hedonism, see Plato, Philebus and Republic, Bk. IX; Aristotle, Ethics; Kant, Abbott's translation; Darwin, Descent of Man, chap. iv; Lecky, European Morals, chap. i; Sidgwick, Methods, Bk. I, chap. iv; Bradley, Ethical Studies, III, VII; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Bk. II, chap. ii; Bk. III, chaps. i, iv; Bk. IV, chaps. iii, iv; Martineau, Types, Vol. II; Murray, Handbook of Ethics, Bk. II, Part. I, chap. i; Simmel, Einleitung, Vol. I, chap. iv; Hyslop, Elements, pp. 349-585; Paulsen, Ethics, pp. 250 ff.

act right or wrong; what is the criterion, or stand ard, or ideal of conduct, called moral?

Let us now examine the answers which have been given to the question as the ancient Greeks asked it, and try to reach some conclusion with respect to it. And first, let us inquire, What do we mean by the summum bonum or the highest good?

We may mean by the summum bonum: (1) something which humanity prizes as the most valuable thing in the world, something of absolute worth, for the sake of which everything else that is desired is desired. We may say: (a) that humanity consciously and deliberately sets up this good as its goal or ideal; or (b) that men are urged to action by this good, that this good is the motive of all action without being clearly and distinctly conceived as an ideal.

Or we may mean, not that men consciously or unconsciously strive after a certain end, but (2) that a certain end or result is realized in human conduct. This end or result may be desired by some intelligence outside of man, or it may be a purely mechanical consequence of the laws of nature. Thus we may find that a certain organ in the body realizes a certain end, that it serves a certain purpose, without desiring that purpose, or, in fact, knowing anything about it. We may attempt to explain this by saying that the purpose was desired by an intelligence outside or inside of the organ, which would lead us into metaphysics, — or, that it was simply the effect of certain natural conditions.