either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should to inform himself about them."1 "The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as understanding rational beings; being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration: wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences. The relation of other modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of number and extension and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstration if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. Where there is no property there is no injustice, is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property being the right to anything, and the idea to which the name injustice is given being the invasion or violation of that right, it is evident that these ideas being thus established, and these names annexed

§ 4.

1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, chap. xiv,

to them, I can as certainly know this proposition to be true; as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again: No government allows absolute liberty; the idea of government being the establishment of certain rules or laws which require conformity to them, and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases, I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in mathematics." 1 (3) The Frenchman, Helvétius,2 does not materially differ from Hobbes and Locke. The moral sense is by no means innate; indeed, everything except selflove, that is, the aversion to pain and the desire for pleasure, is acquired. "In all times and at all places, in matters of morals as well as in matters of mind, it is personal interest which governs the judgment of individuals; and general or public interest, which determines that of nations. . . . Every man has regard in his judgments, for nothing but his own interest."4 Consequently, the only way to make him moral is to make him see his own welfare in the public welfare, and this can be done by legislation only, i.e., by means of the proper rewards and punishments. Hence "the science of morals is nothing but the science of legislation."5

1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, chap. iii, $ 18.

21715-1771. De l'esprit; De l'homme. Bibliography in Weber. 8 De l'homme, Section V, chaps. iii, iv; Section II, chaps. vii, viii. De l'esprit, Discourse ii.

5 Ib., II, 17. Similar to the views of Helvétius are those

(4) Even the author of the Evidences of Christianity, William Paley,1 denies the existence of a moral sense.2 "Upon the whole," he says, "it seems to me, either that there exist no such instincts as compose what is called the moral sense [here Paley opposes Hume] or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reasoning," etc.3 "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." 4 "We can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by: for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws of the magistrate, unless rewards and punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God."5 The difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty is

of Mandeville (1670-1733, author of The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices made Public Benefits), Lamettrie (1709–1751, author of L'homme machine, Discours sur le bonheur), and Holbach (1723-1789, author of Système de la nature). All these thinkers are materialists. See especially Lange, History of Materialism; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik; Martineau, Types, Vol. II, pp. 312 ff.; Lecky, Morals, chap. i.

1 1743-1803.

2 See his Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.

8 Ib., Bk. I, chap. v.

5 Ib., Bk. II, chap. ii.

4 lb., Bk. I, chap. vii.

that, "in the one case, we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come."1

(5) Jeremy Bentham's 2 statements on this point are not more radical. He says: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."3 "Conscience is a thing of fictitious existence supposed to occupy a seat in the mind." Conscience is the favorable or unfavorable opinion a man has of his own conduct, and has value only in so far as it conforms. to the principle of utility. It is utterly useless to speak of duties, he declares; the word itself has something disagreeable and repulsive in it. While the moralist is speaking of duties, each man is thinking of his own interests.5

According to the philosophers whom we have just been considering, man is by birth a moral ignoramus who desires his own happiness. He comes in contact with fellows similarly endowed, and in order to live with them must obey certain rules. The

1 Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. II, chap. iii. 2 1748-1842. See especially Principles of Morals and Legisla tion.

3 Principles of Morals, etc., chap. i.

* Deontology, Vol. I, p. 137.

5 For Bentham, see especially Lecky and Martineau, op. cit.

pains and pleasures annexed to these laws point out to him the course to pursue. Pleasure and pain are the great teachers of morality.

(6) But, it might be asked, how on this scheme can we explain the fact that men pronounce judgment upon acts without thinking about the pleasures and pains they produce? How does it happen that men love virtue for virtue's sake?

An ingenious theory, the so-called theory of association of ideas, is brought in to settle this difficulty.1 David Hartley 2 attempts to show how the moral sense is formed in a purely mechanical way. Man is at first governed solely by his pleasures and pains. He soon learns to associate his pleasures with that which pleases him, and then loves this for its own sake. The infant connects the idea of its mother with the pleasure she procures it, and so comes to love her for her own sake. Money in itself possesses nothing that is admirable or pleasurable; it is a means of procuring objects of desire, and so becomes associated in our minds with the idea of pleasure. Hence the miser comes to love it for its own sake, and is willing to forego the things which the money procures rather than part with a fraction of his gold. In the same way the moral sentiments are formed. They procure for us many advantages which we love, and we gradually trans-.

1 We find the beginnings of this theory in Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson, Gay, and Tucker. See Lecky, Vol. I, pp. 22 ff. 2 1705-1757. Observations on Man.