.

denied benefits to the secretary and treasurer of a mercantile company, who was also a buyer, and sometimes sold goods behind the counter, saying that the law was for the benefit of workmen and laborers serving at modest salaries or for wages, under the direction and control of others, and not for the executive officers of corporations. (Bastheim case, 1917.) A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals of New York in a case (Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co., 116 N. E. 364) in which the president and principal stockholder of the company lost a leg as the result of an accident occurring while he was handling lumber. His salary was not affected by the accident, nor were his dividends reduced thereby. The industrial commission of the State, however, granted his claim for compensation, awarding the maximum schedule benefits. The company and the insurer carried the case to the court of appeals, where it was held that the intention of the law was to make a distinction between such an officer as the claimant in this case and other employees of the corporation, and the order granting the award was reversed.

Public employees.-A separate statute extends the benefits of the New Jersey compensation law to public employees, but provides that elective officers and persons receiving salaries greater than $1,200 per year shall not be entitled to compensation. This was held (Mayor, etc., of Jersey City v. Borst, 101 Atl. 1033) to debar disability benefits only, and where the injury was fatal the claim of dependents was allowed without regard to the excess of salary above $1,200. The law of Illinois brings within its scope all employers engaged in the enumerated hazardous occupations, including under the term "employer" the State and each county, city, town, township, etc., election being presumed in the absence of active rejection of the act. In McLaughlin v. Industrial Board of Illinois (117 N. E. 819) the contention was made that the act was invalid, since there was at common law no liability of the township in cases such as that in hand, in which a road workman was killed by an explosion of dynamite used in removing stumps from a highway; and that the legislature could not, and did not intend to, require a township to make an election in order to escape the provisions of the act. As to this the court held that the legislature had the right and power to make a township liable in damages to its employees, and that it was not essential that it should specify the means by which an election not to provide and pay compensation under the act should be made. It was also urged that it would be illegal to compel taxpayers to pay compensation under an elective act when they had no choice in the matter and no opportunity of making an election. To this the court replied that the officials in interest had the power of making the election, and that municipalities speak through their elected officials

and not through the taxpayers. The law was therefore held constitutional and applicable to employment of the nature under consideration. Compensation was denied, however, as already noted, on the ground that the employment was casual.

A different view was taken by the Supreme Court of Kansas of the law of that State, compensation being denied a teamster injured while hauling sand for a county road, on the ground that the county was not, in the work in hand, engaged in trade or business within the scope of the compensation act. (Gray v. Board of County Commissioners, 165 Pac. 867.)

Somewhat resembling the contention raised in the McLaughlin case was the objection made to the law of Nevada that in making. it compulsorily applicable to counties there was a violation of the due-process-of-law clauses of the Federal and State constitutions. The supreme court of the State took the position, however, that in requiring counties to pay premiums under the act it was directing money to be spent for a public purpose, which was a legitimate chargo upon the people, the State, and its subdivisions, so that the law was constitutional. (Nevada Industrial Commission v. Washoe Co., 171 Pac. 511.)

The status of a city policeman was passed upon by the same court in Griswold v. City of Wichita (99 Kans. 502; 162 Pac. 276). In this, as in the foregoing case, it was said that the city in employing the policeman was not engaged in trade or business, and further that he was not in any case a workman within the meaning of the law, so that no compensation would be allowed. A sheriff elected to office was held by the California courts not to be an employee under appointment, and an award in his favor made by the compensation commission of the State was annulled; and this even though words of specific exclusion in the act of 1911 were omitted from the act of 1913. (Mono County v. Industrial Accident Commission, 167 Pac. 377.)

Extraterritoriality.-The terms of the laws vary as to their applicability to accidents occurring outside the State, being explicit in some instances, while in other cases construction by the courts is necessary. Thus the law of Indiana specifically states that every employer and employee under the act shall be bound by its provisions regardless of the place of the occurrence of the injury; so that a circus employee, himself a resident of Indiana, his employer being a corporation organized under the laws of the State, was entitled to the benefits of an award made by the State board for an injury received in the State of Illinois. (Hagenback v. Leppert, 117 N. E. 531.) On the other hand, the Kentucky board ruled that the law of the locality should decide, and dismissed the claim of a workman. usually employed in Kentucky, but receiving the injury complained

of in the State of West Virginia. So also the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled (Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. 158; 150 N. W. 620) that a workman injured outside the State can not recover under the State law, but must look to the law of the locality for redress.

The Industrial Commission of New York made a distinction in the case of an employee of a corporation doing business in New York, the employee himself being a resident of Rhode Island, but at the time of his injury working in the State of Texas. The case of Post v. Burger (see Bul. 203, p. 221) was distinguished, Post being said to be a resident of New York and potentially a public charge on the State if injured, while in this case the injured man would in no event assume such a status. It was said that he might recover under the laws of Texas, since in actions of tort the law of place must govern, so that compensation was denied (Carlson case, 1917). It is not clear, however, how this distinction could be made to nullify the argument of the court of appeals to the effect that the premiums paid for insurance under the act are computed on the pay roll, and not on the time worked within or without the State boundaries. The State fund was the insurer, and the workman had been directed by his employer in New York to go to Texas, where the injury occurred. In passing upon the case, the commission stated that the New York statute could not compel employers either in New York, in Rhode Island, or in Texas to cover their employees everywhere with compensation insurance.

Admiralty.-Developments have been particularly interesting in this field by reason of the action of the United States Supreme Court and of the Federal Congress therein. The administrative bodies in New York and California had been, by reason of their geographical location, especially active and interested in the matter of compen-ation for longshoremen and others engaged in maritime operations. As noted in Bulletin 203, page 222, the Court of Appeals of New York (In re Walker, 109 N. E. 604) had ruled that as an employee was entitled under Federal law to proceed either at common law or in admiralty to recover for injuries, so now he might choose to make a claim under the compensation law as superseding the common law in the State. This case came before the Supreme Court, which held (four judges dissenting) that a State can not impose obligations such as are contained in the New York compensation law, upon maritime commerce, since to do so would be to destroy the uniformity in maritime matters that the Constitution intended to establish in its provisions as to admiralty jurisdiction. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524; Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255, 37 Sup. Ct. 545.) An interesting sequel to this decision was an amendment to the Federal Judicial Code, saving to claimants of the class affected the right to proceed under any com

pensation law applicable to the locality in which the injury was received.

Interstate commerce. The difficulties attendant upon the determination of claims of employees engaged in the operation of trains are so obvious as to be quite generally understood. The rights of recovery are widely different, dependent upon whether the employee is engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, and the boundaries between these two classes of employment are not only obscure in themselves, but the efforts of the courts in attempting to determine them have been hardly less confusing than clarifying. Thus a preliminary question to be disposed of in the case New York Central R. Co. v. White, noted under the discussion of constitutionality of the laws, was as to the status of the employee suffering the injury. It appeared from the facts that he was a night watchman, guarding tools and materials intended to be used in the construction of a new railway station and new tracks not yet brought into use. The company made the contention that, on account of the interstate nature. of the business, the rights of recovery against it were defined and limited exclusively by the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908. The Supreme Court held, however, that since the employee was not at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation, nor in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it, but had to do solely with construction work, he was within the jurisdiction of the State law. On the other hand, where a workman employed in cutting weeds, etc., along the right of way of a railroad died from congestion of the lungs following poisoning from ivy vine, an award and decision in his favor (see Bul. 203, p. 206) were reversed by the Court of Appeals of New York because consideration had not been given to the contention that the work of removing the weeds, grass, etc., was interstate commerce. The court held that if the work contributed to the safety and integrity of the railroad, which was an interstate carrier, it was a part of interstate commerce, and the industrial commission must pass upon the nature of the employment before making its award. (Plass v. Central New England Ry. Co., 117 N. E. 952.)

A serious result of error in choosing the remedy appeared in a Michigan case, where an employee was adjudged to be in intrastate employment after having sued under the Federal law. Since the compensation law requires claims to be filed within six months after the injury, and a greater time had been consumed in the court proceedings, no right of recovery remained. (Schild v. R. Co., 166 N. W. 1018.)

The most important decisions in this field, however, are those of the Supreme Court in passing upon the question of the right of the

States to enact supplemental legislation in the field of interstate commerce. As pointed out in Bulletin 203 (pp. 223–225), the courts of New York and New Jersey adopted the position that inasmuch as the Federal law took cognizance only of cases in which the employer was negligent, it was possible for the States to establish as to accidents not involving negligence the doctrine of liability without fault embodied in the compensation system, so as to make it applicable to railroad operation, whether interstate or intrastate. The exclusive force of the Federal act where applicable was recognized, but where no negligence was charged it was assumed that there was no applicability of the Federal law, and that compensation might be awarded on the contractual obligation imposed by the compensation statute. This the Supreme Court of the United States denied, holding that interstate commerce is not in any way subject to State compensation laws, and saying that the Federal statute is "comprehensive and also exclusive, fixing the entire responsibility of interstate carriers to their employees, so that no power to supplement the laws lies within the purview of State legislatures." (New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147; 37 Sup. Ct. 546.) This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of New York, which affirmed the judgment of the court below, sustaining an award where a section laborer had lost the use of an eye by being struck by a pebble while tamping ties on the main track of the road. A quite similar case was before the Supreme Court from the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. In this case an employee of an interstate railway, in charge of a switch engine, was killed while leaving the yards after his day's work, which had included employment in both interstate and intrastate commerce. An award of the court of common pleas was made in favor of the claimant on the ground that the employee was not at the time of his injury employed in interstate commerce, so that compensation should be made under the State law. The supreme court of the State reversed this judgment, on the ground that the injury was sustained in interstate commerce, so that the case should be controlled entirely by the Federal statute. The court of errors and appeals in turn reversed this judgment, admitting that the employment was interstate in its character, but regarding the Federal act as without bearing because the case was one in which no negligence was charged, in which event the Federal statute afforded no remedy. The Supreme Court reversed this judgment for the reason noted in the New York case above, i. e., that in interstate commerce the full measure of the carrier's liability is determind by the Federal law. (Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170; 37 Sup. Ct. 556.) It may be noted that two justices dissented to the opinions in both the above cases, on the ground