ing so definite and explicit as that would be considered formal and pedantic. Reasoning by means of the regular syllogism is the exception rather than the rule. It is the enthymeme, or incomplete syllogism, that is ordinarily employed; for one or other of the premises is usually a truth so obvious as not to need explicit statement, as, for example, in the following cases:

We shall die, for all men are mortal.

Brought up among savages, he could not be expected to know the usages of polite society.

He is an Oriental, and therefore cannot appreciate the western point of view.

Plagues and convulsions of nature cannot be interpreted as manifestation of God's anger against the wicked, for they involve the innocent as well as the guilty.

In each of these examples one of the premises is suppressed, it being so obvious that the reader is supposed to supply it for himself. Occasionally, even the conclusion may be omitted, as, for example, in the following:

Every man who voted for that measure is a traitor to his country; and we have the honorable gentleman's own word for it that he cast his vote in its favor.

The beginner needs to be cautioned here against the danger of omitting too much, of taking too much for granted. That which appears perfectly obvious to him may not appear obvious at all to his readers. Before making any assumptions he should examine his premises carefully. Whatever can safely be taken

for granted should, of course, be assumed. Whatever is doubtful or apt to be misunderstood, however, should be explained and, if necessary, supported by arguments. It is in this elucidation and establishment of his premises, in fact, that the main work of the argumentative writer lies. Where the premises are universally accepted and the inference is plain, there is little or no need for argument. Argument becomes necessary only where one or other of the premises needs elucidation and support.

A passage from Webster's argument in the Dartmouth College case, for example, will illustrate the point. One of the main propositions which Webster sought to establish in this celebrated case was that certain acts of the New Hampshire legislature in amending the charter of Dartmouth College without the consent of the trustees were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Briefly outlined, his argument takes the form of the following syllogism:

The Constitution of the United States says that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract. But a charter to a private corporation, such as a college, is essentially a contract.

Therefore the acts of the New Hampshire legislature in question amending the charter of Dartmouth College without the consent of the trustees are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

Here the major premise is a clause of the Constitution of the United States, which, of course, is accepted without question. But the minor premise, that is,

that a charter is essentially a contract,-is not so clear. This premise, therefore, Webster has to establish. In fact, the greater part of his speech is taken up with the establishing of this premise. Slightly condensed, his argument runs as follows:

The plaintiffs contend, in the second place, that the acts in question are repugnant to the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States. The material words of that section are: "No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."

It has already been decided in this court, that a grant is a contract, within the meaning of this provision; and that a grant by a State is also a contract, as much as the grant of an individual. In the case of Fletcher v. Peck this court says: "A contract is a compact between two or more parties, and is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing; such was the law under which the conveyance was made by the government. A contract executed is one in which the object of contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that right. If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, grants are comprehended under the term contracts, is a grant from the State excluded from the operation of the provision? Is the clause to be considered as inhibiting the State from impairing the obligation of contracts between two individuals, but

as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself? The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are general and are applicable to contracts of every description.

It has also been decided, that a grant by a State before the Revolution is as much to be protected as a grant since. But the case of Terret v. Taylor, before cited, is of all others most pertinent to the present argument. Indeed, the judgment of the court in that case seems to leave little to be argued or decided in this. "A private corporation," says the court," created by the legislature, may lose its franchises by a misuser or nonuser of them; and they may be resumed by the government under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture. This is the common law of the land, and is the tacit condition annexed to the creation of every such corporation. . . . But that the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations or confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the State, or dispose of the same to such purposes as they please, without the consent or default of the corporators, we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine."

This court, then, does not admit the doctrine, that a legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations. If it cannot repeal them altogether, of course it cannot repeal any part of them, or impair them, or essentially alter them, without the consent of the corporators. If, therefore, it has been shown that this college is to be regarded as a private charity, this case is embraced within the very terms of that

decision. A grant of corporate powers and privileges is as much a contract as a grant of land. What proves all charters of this sort to be contracts is, that they must be accepted to give them force and effect. If they are not accepted, they are void. And in the case of an existing corporation, if a new charter is given, it may even accept part and reject the rest.

There are, in this case, all the essential constituent parts of a contract. There is something to be contracted about, there are parties, and there are plain terms in which the agreement of the parties on the subject of the contract is expressed. There are mutual considerations and inducements. The charter recites, that the founder, on his part, has agreed to establish his seminary in New Hampshire, and to enlarge it beyond its original design, among other things, for the benefit of that Province; and thereupon a charter is given to him and his associates, designated by himself, promising and assuring to them, under the plighted faith of the State, the right of governing the college and administering its concerns in the manner provided in the charter. There is a complete and perfect grant to them of all the power of superintendence, visitation, and government. Is not this a contract? If lands or money had been granted to him and his associates, for the same purpose, such grant could not be rescinded. And is there any difference, in legal contemplation, between a grant of corporate franchises and a grant of tangible property? No such difference is recognized in any decided case, nor does it exist in the common apprehension of mankind.

It is therefore contended, that this case falls within the true meaning of this provision of the Constitution, as expounded in the decisions of this court; that the charter of 1769 is a contract, a stipulation or agreement, mutual in its considerations, express and formal in its terms, and of