to be entered in accordance with the statute. (Colo.) Richards v.
Sanderson, 167.
1. DEED Omission of Grantor's Name.-A deed signed by the
grantor is operative, though his name is omitted from the body of
the instrument. (Ga.) Sterling v. Park, 224.
2. DEED, Delivery of to a Third Person for the Grantee.—A
grantor may deliver a deed to a third person to be held until the
grantor's death, and then delivered to the grantee, and such original
delivery is good and vests title in the grantee, if there is no reserva-
tion of the right of the grantor to avoid or resume possession of the
instrument. (Ala.) Griswold v. Griswold, 64.
DEEDS-Warranty of Existence of Street.-The fact that a
deed describes the land as bounded by a certain street or alley raises
no implied warranty that such street or alley exists, if the grantor is
not the owner of the soil therein. (Tenn.) Fulmer v. Bates, 1059.
4. DEEDS Acknowledgment-Residence.-A statute providing
that the place of residence" of the grantor in a deed be stated
in the certificate of acknowledgment is directory merely. Hence the
acknowledgment is sufficient although the grantor's residence is not
stated. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
5. DEEDS Acknowledgment-"Free Act and Deed."-If a cer-
tificate of acknowledgment of a deed recites that the grantor "duly
acknowledged the execution of the same," the acknowledgment is
sufficient, although it does not recite that the deed was executed as the
grantor's "free act and deed." The statute relating to the latter
clause is directory and not mandatory. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
6. DEEDS-Forged-Effect of Notice and Knowledge. If a
grantee takes a deed for land from a grantor whose title is known
to the former to rest in an erased, mutilated and forged deed, the
grantee takes no interest in the land, whether the forged deed was
recorded or not, or whether it was outside the chain of title or not.
(Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
7. DEEDS, FORGED.-One can acquire no interest in land
through a forged deed, whether or not he has notice of the forgery.
(Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
See Covenants; Executors and Administrators, 7-9; Wills, 4, 5.
Note.
Definition of betting, 694.
of forcible detainer, 372.
of forcible entry, 371, 372.
of gaming or gambling, 694.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-Estoppel Against Heirs.-
Brothers and sisters, by renouncing the succession of a deceased
brother in favor of their mother, do not thereby estop themselves from
contesting the right of the children of such brother to share in the
mother's estate. (La.) Succession of Gabisso, 529.
Adultery-Identification of Accomplice.-If a peti-
tion for divorce charges adultery between the defendant and a named
accomplice as the sole ground therefor, and the judgment of final
divorce recites that it was rendered after due proof, although the evi-
dence is not preserved, the identification of the accomplice is suffi-
cient for the purposes of a statute prohibiting and declaring null
marriage between a person divorced for adultery and his or her ac-
complice therein. (La.) Succession of Gabisso, 529.
DIVORCE-Appeal-Desertion.-A decree of divorce granted
upon the ground of desertion is properly reversed where the record
fails to show that the desertion was willful, or without reasonable
cause, as required by the statute. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton,
339.
3. DIVORCE-Appeal by Writ of Error-Laches.-Upon a writ
of error to review a decree of divorce, the defense or doctrine of
laches does not apply, as the statute fixes the period within which
the writ may be sued out. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
DIVORCE-Jurisdiction-Division of Real Estate.-Courts
have no power or jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding to divide or
apportion the real estate of the parties, unless given such power
by statute, and if they attempt to act in excess of the powers therein
granted, their action is void and subject to collateral attack. (Neb.)
Fall v. Fall, 767.
5. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-Right of Husband to Wife's
Choses. The fact that a husband reduces to his possession a note
belonging to his wife gives him no property rights in it, and the
fact that he disposes of it before she obtains a divorce does not pre-
vent her from thereafter recovering it or its equivalent from him.
(Ky.) Johnson v. Johnson's Committee, 449.
CONTRACT-Transaction to Facilitate Divorce.-An agree-
ment by a wife to confirm a gift of a note to her husband if he will
not oppose her action for a divorce is void, and does not affect
her right to recover the note or the amount of it. (Ky.) Johnson v.
Johnson's Committee, 449.
7. DIVORCE-Custody of Children.-In awarding the custody of
a child to one of the parents in a divorce proceeding, the good of
the child is the primary object, and due regard must be had as to
the character and conduct of the parties in awarding the custody of
the child. (Ill.) Cohn v. Scott, 342.
8. DIVORCE-Custody of Children-Discretion. In awarding the
custody of a child in divorce proceedings a very large discretion must
be permitted to the chancellor; but it must be a judicial discretion,
and is subject to review on the evidence heard in open court. (Ill.)
Cohn v. Scott, 342.
9. DIVORCE-Custody of Children-Evidence Out of Court.-On
the question of awarding the custody of a child to one of the parents
in a divorce proceeding, the interests of the child cannot be bound
by an agreement between counsel, that in addition to the evidence
taken in open court, the chancellor may make a personal investiga-
tion of the character and home surroundings of one of the parties.
(Ill.) Cohn v. Scott, 342.
Death of Party After Appeal.
10. DIVORCE-Appeal After Death of Party Divorced. The death
of the plaintiff in a divorce suit before writ of review is sued out
by the defendant does not destroy the marriage status so that there
is no subject matter of which a court of review can assume jurisdic-
tion. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
11. DIVORCE Death of Party Divorced Prior to Appeal. If the
successful party to a divorce suit dies before appeal, it is not essen-
tial to the right to review the decree by writ of error that it appear
from the record of the suit that the deceased left property in which
the surviving husband or wife will take an interest upon the de-
cree being reversed. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
12. DIVORCE-Appeal After Death of Party Divorced-Practice.
Upon a writ of error to review a decree of divorce after the death
of the successful party, it is proper to file in the appellate court an
affidavit showing to whom the property of the deceased will pass un-
der her or his will, and to make such persons defendants in error.
(Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
See Husband and Wife, 3-6.
1. LEASE-Easement of Light and Air.-In the lease of a dwell-
ing there is an implied grant of the right to light and air from ad-
joining land of the lessor, if the situation and habitual use of the
tenement are such that the air and light are essential to its enjoy-
ment. (Ga.) Darnell v. Columbus Showcase Co., 206.
LEASE-Easement of Light and Air.-If a lessor cannot use
his adjoining land in such a manner as to shut out necessary light
and air from a dwelling which he has leased, then one to whom he
thereafter rents the adjoining land cannot do so. (Ga.) Darnell v.
Columbus Showcase Co., 206.
3. LEASE-Damages for Injury to Tenement.-Where one of the
tenants of a common landlord piles lumber on his part of the leased
premises so as to obstruct the light and air of the other tenant, and
so as to cast water into his tenement in order to cause him to aban-
don the lease, the injured tenant may recover punitive damages in ad-
dition to compensatory damages for the depreciated rental value of
the tenement. (Ga.) Darnell v. Columbus Showcase Co., 206.
EJECTMENT.-A Tenant in Common is Entitled to Recover
Possession of the Whole Premises against a defendant who is in pos-
session of the land, but has no title thereto other than liens for taxes
paid. (Kan.) Horner v. Ellis, 446.
1. ELECTION to Change County Seat-Majority of Voters Voting
on the Question is Sufficient.-Under a constitution providing that no
courthouse or county seat shall be removed except by a majority
vote of the qualified electors of the county voting at an election held
for such purpose, it is not necessary that there be a majority of the
electors of the county voting in favor of the removal. All that is
required is a majority of the persons voting at the election. (Ala.)
Ex parte Owens, 67.
2. ELECTION-Secrecy is not Essential to a Ballot.-An elec-
tion by ballot is not necessarily secret. (Ala.) Ex parte Owens,
3. ELECTIONS.-A Ballot is a little ball or a printed or writ-
ten ticket used in voting. (Ala.) Ex parte Owens, 67.
4. ELECTION-Secrecy of Ballots-Numbering of Ballots.-A
statute providing for the numbering of ballots to correspond with the
numbers on the poll lists is not unconstitutional as invading the secrecy
of elections under a constitution providing for elections by ballot.
(Ala.) Ex parte Owens, 67.
ELECTIONS-Class Legislation.-A statute taking the city of
Memphis out of the operation of the general election statute and
placing it in a class by itself, whereby in the use of the elective fran-
chise it is relieved from burdens imposed upon other communities,
and its people deprived of safeguards vouchsafed to other commun-
ities, is unconstitutional. (Tenn.) Malone v. Williams, 1002.
Statute Allowing Recanvass.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE Requiring the Recan-
vassing of Votes.-A statute authorizing a proceeding to recanvass
the votes cast at a prior election for the office of mayor of a city or a
judicial hearing and determination of the title of the respective
candidates at that election contravenes the section of the state con-
stitution declaring that all laws creating, regulating or affecting
boards or officers charged with the duty of receiving, recording or
counting votes at elections shall secure an equal representation of the
two political parties, or of that section providing that trial by jury
in all cases in which it has heretofore been used shall remain inviolate
forever. (N. Y.) Matter of Metz v. Maddox, 909.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Power to Create a Tribunal and
Authorize the Recounting of Votes.--Where the results of an election
have been canvassed and determined under the provisions of law then
existing, and a certificate of election given conferring a prima facie
title to the office, possession of which has been held thereunder, the
legislature has no power to create a new tribunal to authorize it to
recanvass the election and award the possession of the office to an-
other claimant should be found entitled thereto. (N. Y.) Matter of
Metz v. Maddox, 909.
ENTIRETIES.
See Husband and Wife, 7, 8.
1. EQUITY JURISDICTION.-If a court of equity has, by its
decree, ordered and directed persons properly within its jurisdiction
to do, or refrain from doing, a certain act, it may compel obedience
to this decree by appropriate proceedings, and any action taken by
reason of such compulsion is valid and effectual wherever it may be
assailed. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall, 767.
2. BILL IN EQUITY-Combining Legal and Equitable Matters.—
A Demurrer to a bill on the ground that it combines matters triable
by a court of equity with matters triable at law should specify what
is alleged to be triable only at law. (Md.) Murphy v. Penniman,
3. PLEADING.-A Cross-bill must be Confined to the subject mat-
ter of the original bill, and cannot introduce new and distinct mat-
ters not embraced in the original bill. (Ill.) Patterson v. Northern
Trust Co., 299.
4. PLEADING.-Matters in Cross-bills must be Germane to the
matter involved in the original bill, and the new facts which it is
proper for the defendant to introduce thereby are such only as are
necessary for the court to have before it in deciding the questions
raised in the original bill to enable it to do full and complete justice
to all the parties before it in respect to the cause of action on which
the complainant rests his right to aid or relief. (Ill.) Patterson v.
Northern Trust Co., 299.
5. PLEADING Cross-bills. If an original bill is filed by a trus-
tee solely for the purpose of obtaining an instruction of the court as
to his power and duty, as trustee, in bidding at a sale that may be
made under a decree of foreclosure theretofore entered, a cross-bill
filed for the purpose of vacating the decree of foreclosure upon the
ground of fraud is not germane to the original bill, and therefore
is subject to demurrer. (Ill.) Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 299.
6. PLEADING Cross-bills-Want of Equity.-A demurrer to a
cross-bill is properly sustained when it shows no equity on its face.
(Ill.) Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 299.
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.
See Executors and Administrators; Wills.
1. JUDICIAL NOTICE.-The Prevalence of Boophilus Bovis, or
Southern Ticks, in the cattle country south of Kansas is a fact of
common knowledge, of which the courts take judicial notice. (Kan.)
State v. Asbell, 345.
2. EVIDENCE of Fact Admitted. It is not reversible error to
permit a witness to testify to a fact admitted or already proven.
(Mich.) Haapa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 627.
3. EVIDENCE Admissible for One Purpose Only is not to be
Considered for Another.-Evidence which is purely hearsay and in-
competent as to one issue, but admissible as to another, is not to be
considered as bearing on the former. (N. Y.) Stronge v. Knights
of Pythias, 902.
4. PRACTICE-Evidence After Close of Case.-If evidence in a
cause is heard at one term of court and the cause is taken under
advisement until the next term, it is no abuse of discretion to permit
the introduction in evidence at that term of the certified copy of
plaintiff's appointment as administrator, especially when this in no
way injures the defendant. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
ALL FRAUDULENT JUDICIAL or Execution Sales are void
as against any party having a vested interest in the property and
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