ness as to obstruct the view, a licensing board must refuse to issue
him a license. (Neb.) In re MacRae, 829.
Regulation of Sales-Sunday Laws.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Police Power. Statutes under-
taking to limit the sale of liquors on Sunday must be referred to the
police power, and, if sustainable, must be sustained as an exercise of
that power. (Ala.) Beauvoir Club v. State, 82.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Regulation or Prohibition of the
Sale of Intoxicating Liquors. The traffic in intoxicating liquors is a
proper subject of police regulation, and may be controlled, restricted
or even prohibited, without violating any constitutional right, and
this rule applies to social clubs. (Ala.) Beauvoir Club v. State, 82.
6. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Social Clubs.-A transaction
whereby an incorporated social club sells intoxicating liquors to one
of its members is within the meaning of the statute prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquors without a license or prohibiting the sale
of intoxicating liquor on Sunday. (Ala.) Beauvoir Club v. State, 82.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Sunday Laws. It is within the
exercise of the police power for the legislature to enact laws against
keeping open on Sunday places for the sale of intoxicating liquors,
whether such sales are for profit or not. Nor is it material whether
the sales are public or private, provided the places are kept open
therefor. (Ala.) Beauvoir Club v. State, 82.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Special Legislation Statutes Un-
dertaking to Make Sales of Intoxicating Liquors by One Club Lawful.
A statute undertaking to make lawful the sales of intoxicating liquors
by a social club under circumstances where like sales by other social
clubs are unlawful, is unavailing as against a constitution providing
that the operation of no general law shall be suspended by the gen-
eral assembly for the benefit of any individual, corporation or as-
sociation., (Ala.) Beauvoir Club v. State, 82.
9. LIQUORS.-Ignorance that Liquors are Intoxicating consti-
tutes no defense or excuse for their unlawful sale. The seller must
know at his peril whether or not they are intoxicating, and his belief
that they are not, however honest, and resulting from a guaranty
under which he bought them, is no excuse. (Tenn.) Haynes v.
State, 1055.
10. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Sale to Minor.-If a minor pur-
chases liquor for another who sends him to buy it, and whose money
pays for it, and the dealer knows that the real purchaser is an adult
and that the minor is only his messenger, the dealer cannot be con-
victed of selling liquor to a minor. (Neb.) In re MacRae, 829.
11. INTOXICATING LIQUORS Sale to Minor.-Merely to de-
liver liquor to a minor, with notice that it is to be carried to an
adult is not a sale within the meaning of the statute. (Neb.) In
re MacRae, 829.
Se. Waters and Watercourses, 1, 2.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See Evidence, 1.
1. JUDGMENTS of Other States-Effect on Title to Realty.-A
decree of chancery, with respect to realty beyond its jurisdiction, can
have no direct operation upon the property, and per se can in no
way affect the legal or equitable title thereto. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall,
767.
2. JUDGMENTS of Other States-Effect on Title to Realty.-A
decree of a court of chancery in another state acting upon a person
within its jurisdiction and directing him to make a conveyance of
lands in nowise affects the title to the land. The decree and order
act only upon the person, and, if obedience to its mandate is refused,
it can only be enforced by the usual weapons of a court of chan-
cery. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall, 767.
3. JUDGMENTS of Other States-Faith and Credit.-The clause
of the national constitution providing that the courts of one state
shall give full faith and credit to the judgments and decrees of the
courts of a sister state does not require the courts of one state to
give such judgments more force or greater effect than they would
have had if rendered by the courts of that state, upon the same
cause of action. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall, 767.
4. JUDGMENTS Affecting Streets-Res Judicata.-A judgment
by a court having jurisdiction that plaintiffs are the owners in fee of
land claimed by a defendant city as a street, and enjoining it from
interfering with the plaintiff's possession and use of such land, is
binding as res judicata upon the public in the absence of fraud.
(Ill.) Healy v. Deering, 331.
5. JUDGMENTS Affecting Streets-Parties. In a suit instituted
by an individual to establish his title to, and recover the possession
of land claimed by a city as a public street, it is not necessary that
both the city and the people of the state should be made parties to
the suit to make the judgment binding upon the public. If the city
is a party, the public is bound by the judgment. (Ill.) Healy v.
Deering, 331.
6. JUDGMENTS Affecting Streets-Parties-City as Representa-
tive of People.-In an action involving the existence of a street, a
city, as a party to the suit, is the representative of the public, who
are privies, and a judgment, therein, not the result of fraud nor col-
lusion, is binding upon the people. (Ill.) Healy v. Deering, 331.
Estoppel and Res Judicata.
7. JUDGMENTS Consent Degree, Who Bound by.-A judgment
by consent of the parties is binding upon them and upon their privies,
and cannot be reversed, impeached, or set aside by a bill of review,
or bill in the nature of a bill of review, except for fraud. (Ill.)
Healy v. Deering, 331.
8. RES JUDICATA—Estoppel by Verdict.-The rule that a ver-
dict not followed by judgment is not an estoppel does not apply
where the parties agree or acquiesce in a verdict without the entry
of a judgment. (Ga.) Crosby v. Pittman, 234.
Am. St. Rep., Vol. 121-71
9. JUDGMENT, Admissibility of as a Muniment of Title.-A
judgment is admissible against one not a party thereto as a muni-
ment of title. (Cal.) Chapman v. Moore, 130.
10. JUDGMENT Quieting Title, Admissibility and Effect of as
Against Third Persons.—If it is admitted at the trial that the legal
title to property at a date specified was in A, a judgment against him
at a subsequent date in favor of B vesting title in him to the same
property is admissible in a subsequent action against C for the pur-
pose of proving that A's title had at and before the entry of sucb
judgment passed to B. (Cal.) Chapman v. Moore, 130.
11. JUDGMENTS-Res Judicata.-An action cannot be main-
tained to set aside or vacate a decree of foreclosure based on a
prayer for relief at the trial which resulted in such decree. (Neb.)
City of Lincoln v. Lincoln St. Ry. Co., 816.
12. JUDGMENTS, Collateral Attack upon.—In a collateral attack
upon a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, it can be impeached
only for want of jurisdiction appearing on the face of the judgment-
roll. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
JURISDICTION.
See Courts; Process.
1. JURORS Qualifications-Residence.-Mere temporary absence
of a person from the parish of his residence, without intention of
changing citizenship or abandoning his residence, will not destroy
his qualifications to serve as a juror in such parish. (La.) State
v. Wimby, 507.
2. JURORS Disqualification-Discretion of Court.-The trial
court has a very large discretion to excuse a juror on the ground
of legal disqualification, if the circumstances are such as, in his
judgment, afford any reasonable ground for apprehension of unfair-
ness, and his ruling in this regard will not be reversed except for
an abuse of discretion. (S. C.) Tucker v. Buffalo Cotton Mills, 957.
3. JURORS Qualifications.-The trial court need not examine
the jurors on their voir dire when no motion is made therefor, and
the objection raised rests on admitted facts. (S. C.) Tucker v.
Buffalo Cotton Mills, 957.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
See Easements; Railroads, 3.
LICENSES, Two or More on the Business of the Same Person.-
A charter provision that no more than one license shall be assessed or
collected from persons doing business under a firm name does not pro-
hibit the exaction from an individual or firm of a license for carry-
ing on the business of a retail dealer in beer and another license for
carrying on business as a wholesale dealer in the same article. (Ala.)
City of Mobile v. Phillips, 17.
See Animals, 2, 3; Innkeepers.
1. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Conflict of Laws.-If the law
of one state provides that a civil action upon any agreement, con-
tract or provision in writing must be brought within five years, it
only bars the remedy, and does not go further and extinguish the
cause of action. Hence a suit to foreclose a mortgage on lands in
another state brought in that state, where the period of the statute
of limitations is longer, the mortgage being given to secure the pay-
ment of a note executed and made payable in the former state, is
not barred by its statute of limitations. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Conflict of Laws.-Except in
those cases where the cause of action is extinguished by the statute
of limitations, the law of the forum governs. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts,
662.
3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Death of Debtor-Extension of
Time. A statute providing that if any person entitled to bring
any of the actions before mentioned therein, or liable to any such
action, shall die before the expiration of the time limited therein
or within thirty days after the expiration of such time, and the
action survives, it may be commenced by or against the executor or
administrator of the deceased, or the claim may be proved as a
debt against the estate of the deceased, at any time within two years
after granting letters testamentary or of administration, and not
afterward, if barred by the provisions of the statute, does not apply
to causes of action barred more than thirty days before death, nor
to causes of action not barred until more than two years after the
granting of letters testamentary or of administration. (Mich.)
Morse v. Hayes, 643.
4. LIMITATIONS—Action of Widow to Recover Her Interest in
Her Husband's Lands.—If a husband and others institute a proceed-
ing to devest the interest of his wife by a fraudulent execution
or judicial sale, and his lands are sold and conveyed pursuant to such
sale, her right to maintain ejectment for her interest does not accrue
until his death, and hence possession held adversely to her under
such sale during his lifetime is not to be considered. (Kan.) Mc-
Kelvey v. McKelvey, 436.
See Adverse Possession; Mortgages, 2.
Lobbying, contingent compensation, whether affects validity of con-
tracts for, 729, 734, 739.
contracts for based upon agreements for contingent compensa-
tion, 729, 734, 739.
contracts for may include the doing of all acts lawful for the
employer to do, 735.
contracts for, presumptions in favor of, 733.
contracts for public service in are valid, 736.
contracts for the solicitation or use of personal influence, 727,
728, 731.
contracts for, when against public policy and void, 726.
contracts for, when valid, 727.
contracts for, whether will be construed as not intending im-
proper means to be used, 729, 730.
contracts for which are void, illustrations of, 730-733.
contracts for, which are not valid, illustrations of, 733-740.
Lobbying, contracts for which may involve improper acts, 735.
money, use of to influence legislation, whether ever proper, 729.
persons engaged in must disclose the capacity in which they act,
1. MANDAMUS, Title to Office, When may be Tried upon.-The
title to an office may be drawn in question and incidentally deter-
mined on an application for a writ of mandate, though such deter-
mination may not be conclusive as an adjudication or estoppel be
tween the parties claiming the office. (Cal.) McKannay v. Horton,
146.
2. MANDAMUS, Trial of Title on Application for.-Where an ap
plication for mandamus is made to compel the issuing of a warrant
to pay the salary of an officer, and two persons claim to be entitled
to such salary and to be incumbents of the office, and their re-
spective title and rights depend on who is the de facto mayor of a
city, and the government of the city must come to a standstill if
claims of public creditors cannot be paid, and many matters essen-
tial to the public welfare must be left uncared for unless some person
is recognized as properly entitled to exercise the functions of mayor,
the court is justified in proceeding with the hearing, though in so
doing it must determine who is the de facto mayor. (Cal.) MeKan-
nay v. Horton, 146.
Controlling Medical Board.
3. MANDAMUS to Control State Board of Health-License to
Practice Medicine.-If a state board of health, against all the rules
and the great weight of evidence, arbitrarily refuses to grant a license
to an applicant to practice medicine, mandamus will lie to compel it
to do so. (Mo.) State v. Adcock, 681.
4. MANDAMUS to Control State Board of Health.-A state boarl
of health is clothed only with administrative and discretionary powers,
and an unwarranted exercise of that discretion is a subject for review
by mandamus. (Mo.) State v. Adcock, 681.
5. MANDAMUS to Control State Board of Health-License to
Practice Medicine.-If a state board of health, against the great
weight of the evidence, arbitrarily refuses to grant a license to an ap-
plicant to practice medicine, there is no remedy by appeal, and the
only remedy is by mandamus. (Mo.) State v. Adcock, 681.
MANDAMUS to Control State Board of Health.-A state board
of health has merely administrative and ministerial duties to perform,
and cannot act arbitrarily, nor against the great weight of the
positive testimony, upon a given question, and if it does so act, the
person aggrieved has redress by means of the writ of mandamus.
(Mo.) State v. Adcock, 681.
1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-Prohibited Marriages.-Under a
statute prohibiting and declaring null marriages between persons who
are divorced for adultery and their accomplices therein, a marriage
between one who has been divorced for adultery and the accomplice
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