franchise, to prevent illegal votes, and to ascertain with certainty the result. Such rules are directory merely, and not jurisdictional or imperative": Hodge v. Linn, 100 Ill. 397; Platt v. People, 29 Ill. 54.

The supreme court of Missouri, a state with a constitution permitting the numbering of the ballots and with a statute requiring that they be numbered, and which further provided that ballots not numbered could not be counted, in case of State v. Mullix, 53 Mo. 355, held, in an election contest, that the ballots not numbered should not have been counted and that the statute was not merely directory, because it expressly required that the ballots should be numbered, and not counted unless they were. We have nothing in our organic law or statutes striking down ballots because numbered or not numbered. Therefore the doing of the one or leaving undone the other is merely directory, and neither of which invalidates the election.

The "Majority of the Electors" referred to in a constitution as requisite to the ratification of an amendment thereto means the majority of the electors voting upon the question of amendment, and not a majority of all the electors of the state or of those voting at the election: Green v.-State Board of Canvassers, 5 Idaho, 130, 95 Am. St. Rep. 169. See, too, Fox v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 74, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1037.

The Legislature may make Reasonable Regulations for Conducting Elections, so long as the voters are permitted to vote by ballot and in absolute secrecy for the candidates of their choice: Taylor v. Bleakley, 55 Kan. 1, 49 Am. St. Rep. 233, and note; note to Chamberlain v. Wood, 91 Am. St. Rep. 685. As to the meaning of a "secret ballot," see the recent cases of Detroit v. Board of Inspectors of Election, 139 Mich. 548, 111 Am. St. Rep. 430; Helme v. Board of Election Commissioners, 149 Mich. 390, 119 Am. St. Rep. 681.

COLLINS v. GILLESPY.

[148 Ala. 558, 41 South. 930.]

INFANTS.-The Next Friend of an Infant has No Authority to receive payment or to enter satisfaction of a judgment in favor of an infant. (p. 81.)

Petition in the case of Mamie Collins, a minor, by her next friend and father against the Birmingham Railway Light and Power Company that John G. Gillespy, a clerk of the court, be ordered to pay twenty-five dollars received by him in satisfaction of a judgment in such action to such next friend. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and the petitioner appealed.

Ward & Drennan, for the appellant.

J. S. Gillespy, pro se.

559 DENSON, J. "It is the general rule that no one but a regularly qualified guardian of an infant has authority to reeive payment and enter satisfaction of a judgment recoverd in favor of such infant, and that a next friend has no such authority." And although there are authorities which seem to take the contrary view, this court has decided that a next friend has no such authority: 560 Isaac v. Boyd, 5 Port. 388; Smith v. Redus, 9 Ala. 99, 44 Am. Dec. 429; 17 Am. & Eng. Eney. of Law, 2d ed., 859, and cases in note 10. See, also, with respect of the office of a prochein ami, the following cases: Thomason v. Gray, 84 Ala. 559, 4 South. 394; Cook v. Adams, 27 Ala. 294; Cooper v. Maclin's Heirs, 25 Ala. 299; Riddle v. Hanna, 25 Ala. 484; Klaus v. State, 54 Miss. 644; Mitchell v. Connolly, 1 Bail. (S. C.) 203. If the next friend has not the authority to receive payment or enter satisfaction, it follows logically that an attorney who derives the only authority he has from the next friend is not clothed with such authority.

There is no error in the record, and the judgment of the court must be affirmed.

Weakley, C. J., and Haralson and Dowdell, JJ., concur.

The Extent of the Authority of a Guardian ad litem or next friend of an infant is the subject of a note to Fletcher v. Parker, 97 Am. St. Rep. 995.

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 121-6

BEAUVOIR CLUB v. STATE.

[148 Ala. 643, 42 South. 1040.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Title of Statutes.-When the title of a statute contains one general subject, which is clearly expressed, such as "To prohibit the sale of liquor on Sunday," it may in the body include a provision for all matters germane and referable to that subject. (p. 83.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Title of Statute. The subject of penalizing the keeping open of a barroom or other place for the sale of liquors on Sunday is included in the general title of a statute, "To prevent the sale of liquor on Sunday." (p. 83.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Police Power.-Statutes undertaking to limit the sale of liquors on Sunday must be referred to the police power, and, if sustainable, must be sustained as an exercise of that power. (pp. 84, 85.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--Regulation or Prohibition of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors.-The traffic in intoxicating liquors is a proper subject of police regulation, and may be controlled, restricted or even prohibited, without violating any constitutional right, and this rule applies to social clubs. (p. 84.)

Clubs.-A transaction

INTOXICATING LIQUORS—Social whereby an incorporated social club sells intoxicating liquors to one of its members is within the meaning of the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license or prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor on Sunday. (p. 84.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Sunday Laws.-It is within the exercise of the police power for the legislature to enact laws against keeping open on Sunday places for the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether such sales are for profit or not. Nor is it material whether the sales are public or private, provided the places are kept open therefor. (pp. 84, 85.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Constitutionality of Statute, How Raised. A general suggestion that the provisions of a statute are unconstitutional and void is permissible as a way of presenting the constitutionality of the statute. (p. 86.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Special Legislation Statutes Undertaking to Make Sales of Intoxicating Liquors by One Club Lawful. A statute undertaking to make lawful the sales of intoxicating liquors by a social club under circumstances where like sales by other social clubs are unlawful, is unavailing as against a constitution providing that the operation of no general law shall be suspended by the general assembly for the benefit of any individual, corporation or association. (pp. 87, 88.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Privilege of not Answering Incriminating Questions is Personal.-That a witness was improperly compelled to answer, and did answer, incriminating questions, against the objection of the defendant in a criminal prosecution, cannot be urged by such defendant in the appellate court. (pp. 88, 89.)

Indictment and conviction of the Beauvoir Club for keeping open its clubrooms on Sunday for the selling of intoxicating liquors. The defendant appealed.

Marks & Sayre and Rushton & Coleman, for the appellant. Massey Wilson, attorney general, for the state.

646 DENSON, J. The indictment is in the following language: "The grand jury of said county charge that, before the finding of this indictment, Beauvoir Club, a corporation, did on Sunday unlawfully keep open a clubroom for the sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, 647 against the peace and dignity of the state of Alabama." It is founded. on the act of the legislature entitled "An act to prohibit the sale of liquors on Sunday," approved February 23, 1903 (Pamph. Acts 1903, p. 64). The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground, among others, that "so much of said act as undertakes to penalize the keeping open of a barroom or other place for the sale of liquors on Sunday is violative of the constitution, in that the same is not clearly expressed in the title of the act." In respect to this act we said in a former case: "The title of the act is in a sense general and contains but one subject, "To prohibit the sale of liquor on Sunday.' This is clearly expressed. Everything contained in the several sections is directed to the subject of the law as expressed in the title, and we think plainly and unquestionably germane and referable to the subject. Whenever this is the case, the act cannot be said to be offensive to section 45, article 4 of the constitution": Borck's Case (Ala.), 39 South. 580; State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663, 33 Am. Rep. 224. So it seems that this contention of the defendant is concluded by Borck's case. Being satisfied with that decision and in adherence to it, we hold that the trial court properly overruled the third and fourth grounds of the de

murrer.

But it is insisted that, even though the first clause of the act, the one on which the indictment is based, is a valid enactment, yet it has no reference to private social clubs, and therefore the indictment charges no offense. The argument by the defendant in support of the insistence is that the act is a police regulation; that such regulations are made with reference to the conduct of individuals in its bearing on the public; that to promote the public welfare is the sole justification for the curtailment of personal liberties and the regulation of individual acts; that the place is kept open, not for the benefit of the public, but of the members of the club; that, if sales of liquor are made on Sunday by the club to

its members in its rooms, this is not an act or acts which affect the public welfare-there is no point of contact with the public-and, therefore, not within the legitimate exercise of the police power. There can be no doubt 648 that the legislation in question must be referred to the police power of the legislature. Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of this power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health and property of citizens, and the preservation of good order and the public morals. These objects belong emphatically to that class which demand the application of the maxim, "Salus populi suprema lex," and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the legislature may devise; and while the determination of the legislature as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers in relation to such objects is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts, yet the traffic in intoxicating liquors is universally recognized as a proper subject for police regulation, and may be controlled, restricted or even totally prohibited, without violating any constitutional right: Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 929; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273, 31 L. ed. 205; 23 Cyc. 65, and cases in notes 64, 65, and 66.

So far as the demurrer to the indictment is concerned, this court is committed to a doctrine that a transaction whereby an incorporated social club sells intoxicating liquors to one of its members is a sale technically and within the meaning of a statute prohibiting the sale of vinous, spirituous, or malt liquors, without a license: Markin v. State, 59 Ala. 34; Manassas Club v. City of Mobile, 121 Ala. 561, 25 South. 628. The evil intended to be corrected by the act in question is the keeping open on the Sabbath day of barrooms or other places where liquors are furnished and drunk, and it can make no difference whether few or many persons can obtain admission and buy or obtain the liquors in the club, or whether other people may or not see them buy the liquor, or for what other purpose the place is being operated, if the fact remains, as it does (on the demurrer), that intoxicating liquors are sold on the Sabbath day: State v. Gelpi, 48 La. Ann. 520, 19 South. 468; Mohrman v. State, 105 Ga. 709, 70 Am. St. Rep. 74, 32 S. E. 143, 43 L. R. A. 398. It is also settled law that it is within