where it can be desired without impertinence or immodest intrusion, universally desirable. But while we thus love truth, and apply it to the benefit of ourselves and others, care must be taken that in carrying out our obedience, we endeavour to do it fully and entirely: and that in aiming at the accomplishment of our objects, we use only such means as are justifiable. Otherwise, in our attempt to fulfil one law we * The language which some persons at times use, would seem to indicate that, though they consider themselves to owe a duty to their neighbour, they may do pretty much as they please in regard to themselves. Thus, though they would on no account injure the property, the health, or the reputation of others, they are frequently ready to sacrifice their own; and so improper concessions are erroneously deemed the mark of exalted virtue. Here then is the fruit of liberality not chastised by right principle. But the commandment is, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," not "better than thyself." All our powers both of body and mind, all our opportunities and privileges are the property of God, to be applied by us as stewards. We are not our own, but bought with a price. Well-meaning persons may sometimes use an exaggerated manner of talking, in respect to these matters, with a view of combating the selfish propensities of mankind: say that we are all too prone to promote our own interests at the expense of our neighbour; these persons possibly think that a counteracting tendency may be supplied by the use of language stronger than is warrantable. But surely things should be stated as they are. shall assuredly violate another. To do evil that good may come is contrary to our natural sense of propriety. It is opposed to our primary notions of what a being such as God, most just and holy, who Himself on all occasions acts with the most perfect rectitude, would approve. Again, there is an implied condemnation in the words of St. Paul: "We be slanderously reported, (Bλaopnμoûμeda), and some affirm that we say, Let us do evil that good may come."* Why slanderously, if the thing is innocent? Moreover if we do the evil, that deed is certainly accomplished, while the attainment of the good being future, is therefore uncertain. We may illustrate what has been said, by taking as an example for warning, the conduct of a man, who being placed in some position of trust, appoints an unfit person to the discharge of duties, for which his only recommendation is consanguinity (suppose) to the patron. Here the object, that of benefiting a kinsman, is certainly good. But the means are unjust.† In considering then all the circumstances of *Rom. iii. 8. † Euripides puts a sentiment in the mouth of Eteocles altogether to be repudiated: εἴπερ γάρ, ἀδικεῖν χρὴ, τυραννίδος πέρι κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν· τἄλλα δ ̓ εὐσεβεῖν χρεών. his position, and laying down his principles of action, a man will not only recollect that he must seek for truth as a mean to the end that he may obtain good and avoid evil; but also his line of conduct, from the beginning to the termination of any enterprise, must be consistent with the principles of justice and propriety. It will not be forgotten, that a primary principle implanted in man's nature is that he should aim at the accomplishment of objects. (See p. 4.) This, no doubt, is a law of the Lawgiver. It was not intended that the human mind should lie fallow in unprofitable idleness. God, when He gave reason, designed that the gift should be applied. Also if we aim at avoiding evil, we may be considered as aiming at good. When we endeavour to discharge our duty to God, to our neighbour, or to ourselves, it may be said that we are aiming at a good object. Herein especially, if we take pains to appreciate the perfections of God, as far as our limited faculties will permit, and to estimate His dealings with ourselves individually, so that we may duly pray to Him and praise Him, it may be considered that we are aiming at good. On the whole then, to aim at objects being a law, and to take care that such objects be good, being the mark of a good man; and after all our reasonings the love of truth, justice, benevolence, becoming only still more firmly settled in our hearts, we may briefly assert as a very comprehensive principle of human action, the following: that is to say, In cases involving our moral conduct, let us at all times honestly endeavour to appreciate the evidence which discloses truth, in order that we may, in a proper and justifiable manner, apply it to the accomplishment of good objects, in obedience to the commands of God, and to the promotion of His honour and glory. L CHAPTER XI. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING THE Ir will of course be borne in mind, that in considering the question of the proper and justifiable manner in which it behoves a man to carry out his purposes, we must observe his position with reference to the affairs in which he takes part, and possibly the authority by which he acts. Thus the situation and circumstances of one person may be such, that he may, with the most perfect propriety, promote certain good objects, for the accomplishment of which it would be impertinent in another man, not occupying a similar ground, to interfere. Suppose, for instance, that the government of one country should pretend to introduce laws for the regulation of the internal affairs of another independent state. The laws might be perfectly good; altogether suitable to the wants of the people for whom they were intended; vigorously executed: and yet, not originating in a just authority, would involve an |