tongue? Who is perpetually circumspect over his actions? Who loveth his neighbour as himself, seeking his good, and delighting therein as in his own, being sorry for his adversities, as if they had befallen himself? Who feeleth that contrition of spirit, that shame, that remorse for his sins, or that detestation of them, which they deserve? Who is duly sensible of his own unworthiness?"

Thus then we have a truth, difficult to receive, and yet of great importance for us to know, i.e. all men are naturally diseased by a moral taint, prone to commit sin,* and actually sinners. When a man is convinced of this truth, and has freely admitted it with reference to himself, he has obtained what may be termed an elementary principle of human action: and in regard to the evidence by which it is established, we see that Scripture and the observation of mankind are coherent and harmonious.

* See Article IX. of our Church.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE NEW RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MAN CONSEQUENT UPON ADAM'S TRANSGRESSION. FLECTIONS ON THE MEDIATION OF CHRIST.

RE

It is a sad certainty then, that men are thus born into the world prone to sin, and that they actually do sin. It is of course therefore manifest, that our condition is materially different from what it would be, if there was no such tendency, and if it was in our power to live on free from transgression, and ever ready to render a true answer, that we had at all times discharged our entire duty. Such, we have reason to conclude, would be the case of Adam before the fall, i. e. that he had a law given to him, and power to obey.

Now, whatever might be the fate of Adam consequent upon his fall, suppose that from him children were born into the world, subject to a law which it was impossible for them to fulfil : suppose that without any fault of their own (for being unborn at the time of his transgression, they could not be answerable for it) they had

inherited a natural taint and corruption: conceive it however determined, that in the whole issues and events of things their destiny should be miserable, on the ground of their having broken a law which was given them to fulfil, while no consideration was entertained of their natural infirmity. Suppose now it was attempted to defend such a dispensation: suppose it was alleged that if persons lived under a law, and transgressed, it was naturally and essentially just that they should be punished: conceive it urged too that the transmission of the taint arising from Adam's transgression was but agreeable to the whole course of events in the world: that what was propagated was thus naturally deteriorated in consequence of the deterioration of its parent stock: that poor fruit for instance grew on a poor tree, and a bad crop was produced by bad seed. Still it would be open to an objector to reply: Abstractedly indeed it may be right that one who breaks a law to which he is subjected by competent authority, should be punished: yet it must be understood as a limitation to this principle, that he has the power to obey; for assuredly it is what may be likewise termed an abstract principle, that no one is justly answerable where he has no power, "nemo tenetur impossibili": moral agents may reasonably expect to be

treated according to the rules of morality; and between them and the merely vegetable productions of nature, as fruit or corn, there is an essential and marked difference.

When Adam sinned, it was determined, not that the human race should be utterly extinguished, but that a posterity of Adam should still be born into the world. Nevertheless it appears to have been an indispensable principle, that from a vitiated root there must proceed children of a corrupt nature. It seems likewise another principle, that "the wages of sin is death,"* and the sense of ill-desert implies and is naturally connected with punishment. Still it would appear inconsistent with the justice of a just God, to hold His creatures answerable for things placed beyond their power. Here then are difficulties of which the full comprehension, much more the reconciliation, is manifestly placed above the reach of man's limited faculties. as the illiterate and ignorant peasant cannot fully understand the difficulties, much less the solution of the difficulties, which are presented in the path of the statesman: as children are unable to comprehend the circumstances, and therefore of course the conduct suitable to the circumstances of their

* Rom. vi. 23.

Just

elders thus man, a priori, has no means of determining what it might be necessary to do in the case which has been contemplated; what might be consistent, or not inconsistent, with the high attributes and dignity of the Creator; what physically possible or impossible.

Moreover, all this mystery and difficulty is in no way contrary to what, from the very nature of the case, might, a priori, have been well conceivable. Originally, man was placed in a particular relation to his Maker, and faculties being given to him agreeable to such a position, by the act of man the relation was altered. Now whatever course of conduct it might please God to adopt suitable to the new position, it is not at all surprising that the powers of man, being adapted to the former relation, might not suffice for the full comprehension of measures which would have been unnecessary if the ancient position had been preserved.*

*In the way of illustration we may remark, that even such a doctrine as that of the forgiveness of injuries would have been unknown, had not man fallen; for in a state of innocence there would have been no injuries.

Again, those who reject positive institutions because our unassisted powers have been unable to discover their propriety, would do well to consider, that what might suffice for man in his state of innocence under the first dispensation, might not suffice in his state of degradation under the second.