a period of about thirty-three and a quarter years. At present there seems to be a strong probability that all comets now attached to our system, have been derived ab

extra.

Since Newton's discovery of the law of universal gravitation, and the possibility of comets moving in any of the conic sections, they have exercised a marked influence on the development of mathematical analysis, in the calculation of orbits and the computation of perturbations. They seem now about to reveal to us the existence of forces in the sun that otherwise might never have been discovered. The motion of one, at least, discovers the existence of some opposing force in our system, unfelt, as yet, by the planets, which may yet very much derange the existing state of things.

ART. VIII-A Hand Book of Politics for 1868. By EDWARD MCPHERSON, LL. D. Washington, 1868.

We have no intention of entering into any elaborate discussion of the respective claims of the candidates for the presidency. It would be entirely superfluons, for there never was a greater disparity between any two aspirants for that high office. Our remarks on this subject shall, therefore, be brief. We are convinced that the most thoughtless cannot compare Grant and Seymour with each other in an intelligent manner without deciding in favor of the former; no unprejudiced person endowed with common sense, and having any regard for his country, would hesitate for a moment to reject the latter. That many respectable men will vote for Seymour-men of talent and ability-we do not doubt; nor do we pretend that they should be regarded as rebels for doing so. It is certainly wrong to vote for an inferior man merely because he belongs to one's own party, but it is a wrong of which all parties are guilty. There should be no abuse, then, on either side, on this ground. It may be freely admitted that it by no means follows that a man is a "rebel," or that he is in any manner disloyal to his country, or its institutions, merely because he votes for Mr. Seymour; but it certainly does follow that he is a political partisan; that he is one who

has not independence enough to think and act for himself, but must think and act as his party requires him.

It is almost needless for us to say that it is not on political grounds we would choose General Grant for the presidential chair and reject Mr. Seymour; we judge each not by his party but by himself. We are in favor of the election of Grant, not because he is a Republican or a Radical, but because he has merited the gratitude of his country; and we are opposed to the election of Seymour, not because he is a Democrat, but because he has merited nothing good from his country. Indeed, we do not regard Grant as a politician at all; he is too honest and straightforward to be one; whereas Seymour is nothing but a politician. This is no mere matter of conjecture or inference. Both the candidates are tried men in a certain sense; one commanded our armies at the hour of the nation's greatest peril; the other was the Governor of the State of New York at the same hour.

Now which performed his duties best? Which proved the most faithful public servant? Which contributed most to vindicate the prestige of the American people as capable of defending, as well as governing themselves as a nation? In a word, did not Grant do all the good which it was possiany one to do in his position? What more could have been done by Washington himself, could he have lived, to save the life of the Republic of which he was the founder? Nor could the Father of his country have treated the conquered, brave enemy, with more generosity.

ble for

What, upon the other hand, did Seymour do as governor? Could he have contributed less towards the salvation of the nation without a flagrant violation of his oath, if indeed he could have done so without rendering himself liable to be put on trial as a traitor? We do not agree with those who accuse Mr. Seymour of having sympathized with the rebels to the extent of wishing that they would succeed in dismembering the Republic. We believe that at heart he was in favor of maintaining the Union; but he had not the manliness to speak and act accordingly. The duplicity and chicanery of the politician clung to him all along. He always took into account the influence he might one day be able to exercise in

the South by a quasi sympathy with the rebels; and it was precisely in the same spirit that he addressed the insurgent mob of New York, as his "friends."

The truth is, that he was a worse enemy to both than those who openly shot them down, because he deceived both and encouraged them to bring ruin on themselves. A large proportion of the rebels thought that Seymour represented the feeling of the majority of the population of the Empire State; and that in time this feeling could not fail to manifest itself in their favor. Far from endeavoring to remove this impression, he did all in his power to strengthen it. The more calm. and thoughtful of the Southerners understand this, and accordingly none detest or despise Seymour more.

Many even of the New York rioters, who belonged only to the lowest class, saw when it was too late, that, after all, Seymour was their enemy rather than their friend-they saw that it was their future votes he cared for, not themselves. Had it been otherwise, he would have threatened them with grape-shot rather than encouraged them to fight; he would have told them that there was no reason why they should have any hatred to the poor Aegro; that if they were poor it was not the Aegro's fault, and that still less, if possi ble, was it the fault of the Federal government. But he did nothing of the kind; we will not say that he meant to prompt them to lawlessness and outrage; we do not believe bim so base as this, let others attribute to him what they will. But that his conduct was calculated to encourage them is beyond question; and whom did they injure most by the course they pursued? was it not themselves and their families? Even the Negroes, the particular objects of their wrath, were not as much injured; one twentieth as many of them were not shot down, or maimed forever; one twentieth as many colored children were not made fatherless by the rioters as there were white children made fatherless by the troops in their perfectly legitimate efforts to protect the lives and property of the peaceable inhabitants.

Yet, we are informed that Seymour and his friends-that is, those who expect to profit by his election-depend largely on the Irish vote. Now, assuming that he did not prompt

many of the Irish to mischief, and their own ruin-assuming that he has done them no harm-an assumption which is certainly not justified by the facts-what good has he ever done them? what real favor has he ever shown them as a people? We know, indeed, that he has made them promises enough, but what promise of any value-what promise that would give him the least trouble or cost him one dollar-has he fulfilled? Nay, what has he done for them in any way in public or private which he would not have done for Hindoos or Hottentots for the same price-that is, for their votes; not the votes they have given, but those that will be needed at a future time, as in the present instance?

It is not known, some say, what Grant may do; he may be prejudiced. But no great soldier like him was ever prejudiced against the Irish. Napoleon and the great Condé were equally friendly and kind to them; even their worst enemies, Cromwell and William III., paid the highest tributes to their bravery and fidelity. Who can say that Grant has ever treated the Irish soldiers in his armies otherwise than in a friendly spirit? What Irishman has he ever slighted or prevented from obtaining promotion, either on account of his nationality or his religion?

We allude thus to the Irish vote, and the influence which should guide it, because, although the class of Irishmen who do most of the voting are not readers of our journal, we have the honor of addressing a large number of the Catholic clergy in all parts of the country, South as well as North; from the humble curé and chaplain, up to the highest and greatest dignitary in America. We know from a personal experience and observation of more than forty years, that, whatever their detractors may say to the contrary, the priests and bishops always advise their people for their good; and this, be it observed, is not Catholic, but Protestant testimony-the testimony of one who spent twenty years of his life where there were very few but Catholics-scarcely a dozen in a whole extensive parish.

Our German friends are somewhat divided at present; but it is certain that the majority will vote for Grant, for they have never lost that admiration of courage and brilliant

and patriotic deeds for which Tacitus gave credit to their ancestors in his Germania-a work which will inspire them with redoubled enthusiasm if they will read it at the present time, when it is sought to degrade manliness, valor and patriotism, and elevate charlatanism, imbecility and pusillanimity.

Some pretend to fear that if General Grant were elected he would convert the republic into a military despotism! Who can give the shadow of a reason for any such apprehension Upon the same ground, Washington should have been rejected; so should Jackson-for both were military chieftains, while their military services were required by their country. If both were devoted to the arts of peace while there was no war, so was General Grant; are not some so thoughtless as to make this very fact a cause of reproach to him? forgetting that the great Cincinnatus of old left the plough in the furrow to go and fight for his country. Had Grant been ambitious to be a despot he would not have acted as he has. Does any one think it likely that he will ever again have so large an army at his command as he so readily disbanded? It is certain that he will not have a larger, at all events; and it is still more certain that he never will have an army more devoted to him. Had he wished to establish a military despotism, the day that General Lee surrendered was his time. No one need have the least doubt that he could have succeeded then. But did he make the least attempt? Was there anything in his conduct to justify the suspicion that such an idea ever entered his mind?

It is true that many have a conscientious fear of entrusting successful generals with much civil power; but the history of the world does not justify it, as can be easily proved. Thus, of all the generals whose conquests have rendered them illustrious, how many have availed themselves of their power to enslave their country? If three can be said to have done so, it is certainly the most. Assuming it to be true that Cæsar, Napoleon, and Cromwell destroyed the liberties of their respective countries, it must be admitted as an evident fact, that a large proportion of those whom they enslaved, if not the overwhelming majority, were attached to