nature of things, the relation of causation is wanting. Wherefore we conclude that sequence, or order of sequence, is an imperfect and inexact definition of causation; and that, while an effect is always, philosophically, sequent of its cause, there is besides sequence a relation, in the nature of things, between them, such as we recognize between an actor and his act, and not merely such as exists between an act and its possible consequences. If it be said, "God said let light be,' and light was," an unreasoning intelligence will perceive that one event succeeded the other, and nothing more; the reasoning faculty alone can perceive the relation of the fiat to the fact, and that the one was the cause of the other. The idea of this relation is, then, essential to the idea of causes and effects as such, and we must therefore conclude that a consciousness of both the nature and relation of cause and effect constitutes the simple and perceptive function of this faculty, as distinct from its ruminant or reflective function. This perceptive function, independently of ratio. cination, by syllogistic or mathematical methods, constitutes, so far as this faculty, considered by itself, is concerned, the element of pure reason. Unreasoning brutes perceive sequences and bear them in remembrance, as, for example, that when they hear a certain call and go to their cribs they find food there, or if they do certain acts the whip of the master scourges them; but of the relation of causation existing in the nature of things, they have no conception; this last being the prerogative of

man.

To more clearly define the nature and function of the faculty of reason, it becomes desirable to regard it in its relation to the other faculties of the mind. Reason is not an affection, such as love or hate, nor does it take direct or perceptive cognizance of the moral quality of actions, yet its relation to the other faculties is intimate and consequential. Conscience, as we universally agree, alone takes cognizance of moral quality. In the instance of any human act, tried in the court of conscience, the perceptions testify to the facts, reason determines the relation of cause and effect between the intention of the agent and the consequences of his act, and then the moral sense is competent to rightly determine the moral quality of the action. All decisions of conscience concerning the moral quality of actions, that are unsupported by reason, are unadvised and liable to be erroneous. The functions of moral sense and reason are, however, as distinct as those

of the eye and the ear. Again, there is in the mind a religious faculty, the faculty of adoration. This faculty, equally with the moral sense, is distinct from reason; yet, like the moral sense, it is dependent upon reason for the right direction of its exercise. Left to itself, it gropes blindly towards the divine, discerning, indeed, its quality, but uncertain of its fact, and, often seizing upon objects unworthy of its highest exercise, pays to them the homage due to God alone. We shall see how reason aids the religious faculty.

Reason, instinctively casting its regards abroad throughout creation, finds it filled with effects; discovers, indeed, that all things are effects. Searching to find the causes of these effects, it finds innumerable causes for parts of them, and finds, also, that these causes are themselves effects. Following these chains of effects, proper and causative effects, to their ultimate, it arrives at the conclusion that all things are effects, and that the cause of these effects must be infinite, and therefore one. Reason of itself cannot regard the Deity in any other sense than that of an infinite cause, the ultimate of all actual and possible causes. This result pure reason arrives at, not by process of ratiocination, but instinctively and perceptively. The reasoning man, who attempts to bring the reason of other men to the same conclusion, is, however, compelled to perform this fact by a process of ratiocination.

This we must conceive to be the true theory of pure reason, stripped of the drapery of mysticism in which pedants have enshrouded it. It lifts alike the soul of the peasant and the philosopher, the shepherd and the prelate, up to the knowledge of the very God, and points the adoring faculty to the true and only worthy object of its worship. From this summit of wisdom, the just ideas of the economy of divine providence, and of the moral laws of the universe, flow downwards in streams of synthesis, to inform, refresh, and invigorate the souls of men. The moral, rational, and religious faculties, which not only distinguish man from the brute creation, but constitute for him an entity as a moral being, distinct from his animal nature, are the eyes and ears of his understanding, by means of which he receives inspirations and spiritual suggestions, and through which he offers worship and supplication and derives consolations, and becomes likewise participant of the divine love and wisdom.

Here we have a solution of the mystery of the Divine

in the human. The human is receptive of the divine, when the superior faculties of the former are open to its access, as naturally as a flower is supplied with the dew and rain of heaven when it opens its thirsty calyx to re

ceive them.

The mind of man, elevated by pure reason to a knowledge of the Divine, afterwards deduces divine laws and truths from this fountain-head by syllogistic ratiocination. Tracing down, link by link, the chain of reason, he finds that it extends to the minutest, and even through the minutest objects of creation, to the most stupendous and sublime, and at every step of his explorations, if the faculties of his soul are developed harmoniously, he will find his conceptions of the infinite wisdom constantly enlarging, and his soul more and more filled with awe and the spirit of worship; and this sense of the infinite majesty would overwhelm his weak faculties, if he did not, at the same time, bear in mind the truth that the Divine love and condescension are likewise infinite.

Thus

In proportion as man comes into the divine, in the same degree he becomes possessed of the divine ideas; and, to this extent, when he contemplates the creation, he sees it, as it were, with the eyes of God. seeing, he perceives that the Supreme Being regards all his creatures with an equal and infinite love, and man thus learns how it may be possible for himself to become so imbued with the divine spirit, that he shall actually obey the sublime law of love, by, at the same time, loving God with all his soul and his neighbor as himself; which is the perfect fulfilment of that law which Christ declared to be the sum of the divine law.

The foregoing discussion brings into view an important element of the theory of pure reason, namely, the mutual dependence between reason and the other faculties for the exercise of even their perceptive function. We have seen that the moral sense cannot take cognizance of the moral quality of an action, until reason has determined the relation of causation between the intent and the consequence of the act; and, likewise, that the religious. faculty seeks blindly and ineffectually towards the divine, until reason finds for it, and discovers to it, the ultimate cause, which, when it perceives, the religious faculty itself discovers to be divine, reason having no proper perception of the divine, as such, but only as a cause. But the function of reason does not stop at the point where it has discovered to the religious faculty the first cause; it has

yet to discover to the moral faculty the characteristics of this self-existent causative entity. To do this, it is necessary for reason to learn from religion the nature of divine quality, and from conscience the nature of moral quality; and of these qualities it must first be informed before it can discuss the laws of religious and moral relation between God and the moral universe, in the same manner in which it must be informed by the faculties appropriate to the physical senses, respecting the nature and qualities of matter, before it can discuss the laws of matter, and the theory of the material universe. Pure reason has received a broader definition than the one we have above given, and has been asserted to be a faculty of the mind, by which it perceives the very truth of things, independent of any process of ratiocination; in other words, it has not been by this latter definition confined to the perceptive function of the rational faculty, but extended equally to the perceptive function of all the faculties of the human mind.

Whether the specific name, pure reason, shall have attached to it the broad and general signification of embracing the perceptive function of all the faculties of the mind, or whether it shall be held to apply only to the perceptive function of the rational faculty, is a question of minor importance, compared to the ascertainment of the direct and relative functions of the faculties of the mind; for this understanding furnishes us with the materials needful for the construction of the true theory of the mind, which must be the corner-stone of mental philosophy; and for want of which many learned and ingenious thinkers have failed in their noble endeavours towards placing the science of mental philosophy on a firm and enduring foundation. It would seem to be most accordant to the idea of philosophical accuracy to confine the term within the narrower limits to which the name itself is alone appropriate. The propriety of this restriction is the more apparent when we reflect that to the exercise of the perceptive function of the faculty of reason we are indebted for the discriminations which the mind instinctively makes between the true and the false, the seeming and the real, in an immense multiplicity of instances. The mind which is deficient in this faculty is constantly exposed to the danger of mistaking sequents for effects, and finds it difficult, even when warned of its error, to discriminate between the two; and hence arise, rather than from wilful perversion, an immense

proportion of the errors and mistakes which constantly disturb the order of society and imperil its welfare. A broad illustration will make this point clear to the most casual observation. A ship goes to sea on Friday, and is lost. The unreasoning mind of the ignorant sailor never goes farther in accounting for this calamity than to the fact that the vessel sailed on an unlucky day; while reason, discerning that between the two facts no possible relation of causation exists, goes farther in its search for the true occasion of the disaster, and finds, either in the insecurity of the vessel, in its improper management, or in some unforeseen casualty, its certain cause.

The question may arise, Does not the reasoning faculty necessarily carry on a syllogistic process for the purpose of determining that all things in creation are effects, and, likewise, in ascertaining the true cause of these effects? The answer is, not necessarily; for it is to be borne in mind that this faculty alone is capable of discerning effects as such and their relation to causes. While among a multiplicity of causes and effects, a rational process, similar to the mathematical one called reductio ad absurdum, may be necessary, in order to determine to which particular cause a certain effect is related, no such difficulty arises in considering creation as a unit, for the faculty of reason instinctively, and proprio vigore, discerns whether this entity is an effect or a cause, and having found the effect to be infinite, in extensity, decides that its cause is infinite, and therefore one; which is the sum of our proposition. In this statement of the argument, we have not gone beyond the axioms of mathematics or of logic, and the argument is therefore complete, without ratiocination.

Referring to the foregoing remark, that "the effect" (creation) is infinite in extensity," it may be proper to more clearly define in what manner the term infinite can be applied to the creation. If it could with truth be affirmed that matter is absolutely infinite, it would follow of necessity that matter could not be an effect, for nothing is beyond infinity, and every effect must have a cause equal to itself; and to say that an effect is infinite, and its cause is also infinite, thereby affirming the existence of two infinities, would be to utter a solecism, which reason abhors. It is necessary, therefore, if the term infinite is applied to an effect, such as creation, that it should be understood only in the qualified sense that the creative cause is infinite in esse, while the creation itself