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is only infinite in posse. the asymptote is an illustration of infinitive approximation, as distinct from absolute infinity.

The mathematical line called

The experiments of Professor Plateau, for determining the "figures of equilibrium in a liquid mass withdrawn from the action of gravity," have demonstrated that, in all such figures, excepting the sphere, while their minor axes, or "axes of revolution,' are finite, their major axes, or axes of extensity, are "infinite;" that is to say, the figures are capable of infinite extension in one direction, without ever arriving at ultimate and determinate forms, while in the other direction their forms and dimensions are definite. While this ingenious savant disavows all idea that these phenomena, being regulated by the law of molecular attraction, can be regarded as indicative of the laws of equilibrium governing the forms and motions of cosmical bodies, which are subject to the influence of inter-planetary attraction, his statement of the result of his experiments affords a most apt analogy to the idea which reason entertains respecting the created universe; namely, that while it is finite as to the actual dimensions of its particulars, it is infinite in its possible extensity; and, as all things are possible only to what is absolutely infinite, therefore the cause of what is infinite in posse must be infinite in esse.

If it should be objected that this statement is obnoxious to the liability of involving the solecism of two infinities, the sufficient answer is, that creation, the effect, is but an emanation or product of the cause, which includes within its own infinity all its possible infinite effects, of which the infinite cause is the sum and essence. As, then, all effects, which are all things, are within the infinite, and as pure reason, only, is competent to sweep around the sublime circuit of the universe, and to perceive the infinite, it is the faculty by which the knowledge of all truths is possible to the human mind.

The argument is now complete, as to its main purpose. It remains to consider whether the faculty of reason does not perceptively take cognizance of relation, in general, and of all relations in particular. Each faculty, for itself, takes cognizance of its own relation to that of which it is perceptive: the hearing faculty of its relation to sound, the affections to their objects, adoration to the divine, and the moral sense of its relation to moral actions; but reason has in this regard a wider scope. It is the special function of reason to deal with all questions

of relation, and it must, therefore, be assumed that it perceptively takes cognizance of relation in general, as it does of the relation of causation in particular; but of other relations in particular, it does not necessarily take perceptive cognizance, but deals with them by means of the reasoning process, which is distinct from the perceptive function of the reasoning faculty, and constitutes its ruminative or reflective function.

The mind is enabled by process of reasoning to determine what is true, and to distinguish it from what is false, by demonstrating the fallacy and absurdity of all other conclusions than the true ones.

The proposition that the whole is equal to all its parts is no more self-evident than is the one that two sides of a triangle A, B, C, being given, the third side is A, C ; and the proposition-two sides of a triangle and the contained angle being given, to find the third side involves no process of reasoning any more than the two axiomatic ones. just given; for the mind instantly perceives that the third side can only be A, C, and that its dimension is simply a matter of mensuration or calculation, involving no process of reasoning whatever. The same is true of a syllogism. That the major and minor involve the con⚫clusion is instantly perceived to be a truism: as, for example, if it be stated that all biped animals, having wings and feathers, are birds; that a turkey is a winged and feathered biped animal, therefore a turkey is a bird; is only equivalent to saying that a bird is a bird. Calling it a turkey, or an owl, makes no difference with the fact of the proposition. The faculty of reason, in all such cases, does not elaborate, it simply perceives. But if the question should be propounded, aliunde,—is the bat a bird, or does it belong to some other genus? Numerous questions of fact arise concerning the structure, functions, and habits of this animal, as compared with those of the several animal species to which it may be supposed to be related; questions of adaptation, conformity, &c., in the discussion and resolution of which the reasoning faculty takes part, in common with the observing and knowing faculties. The office of reason, in this and in similar discussions is, to determine the laws of adaptation and relation concerned therein; and the entire proceeding is commonly understood and defined as being a process of reasoning, although other faculties besides that of reason partake therein: and this designation is correct, because the process would be wholly in

consequent, without the participation of the reasoning faculty.

Every faculty of the mind has a ruminative function. Impressions made upon the mental perceptions after a time lose their vividness, and are said to be forgotten or displaced by more recent impressions; but often, and especially when the faculties are not employed perceptively, they revive ideas before impressed upon them, and reperuse the tablets of memory. The mind resembles a palimpsest from which whatever has been written upon it is never so entirely erased that it may not again become legible, notwithstanding what has subsequently been inscribe on the same surface; and it is believed that no impression once made upon the mind is ever wholly lost, but that the dimmest of former thoughts may be repro'duced in their original clearness and vividness. Certain it is, that each faculty, by itself, and especially when stimulated thereto by the sympathetic action of its associate faculties, is capable of recalling an almost endless succession of former thoughts and sensations long forgotten, as well as those that are more recent. This is peculiarly noticeable in dreams, in the day-dreams of the senile, and especially in somnambulism. The reasoning faculty, recalling numerous perceptions of causes and relations, and ruminating upon them, using them as the weaver does the warp and woof of his loom, combines them into new associations, whereby relations before unnoticed are perceived to exist, and new ideas are formed, which we denominate original ideas, as being distinct from those produced by the act of perception. mental process is properly designated as conception, a term improperly applied to ideas resulting from mere perception. Conception, therefore, is the act of forming original ideas within the mind.

This

It is further to be remarked concerning rumination, that if one faculty is thus employed, the neighbouring or related faculties do not remain dormant, but are awakened to a similar exercise, the result of which is called the association of ideas. The associate action of the other faculties, in concert with the faculty of reason, induces ratiocination, while those faculties are reviving former impressions, equally as while they are receiving eternal impressions; and this condition of the mind is more favourable to reflection and conception, as the mutual harmony of action is less liable to disturbance than when the faculties are awake to the intrinsic entrance to exter

nal impressions foreign to the subjects which the mind has under consideration. The mind, in this condition, is like a council deliberating with closed doors, instead of holding its sessions in a public thoroughfare.

The conceptive or reflective mood of the mind is the one most favourable to the discovery of the laws of the material world, as well as of the moral universe. The explorer and the experimentist are usually so absorbed in their special pursuits that they are, as a general rule, little inclined to generalization. A division of labour seems to be attended with results as salutary in intellectual affairs as in those of a mechanical character. Every man labours most efficiently in that pursuit for which he has a natural predilection. While many take delight in the collection of facts, others prefer to erect these facts into systems, and still others to determine their theories. It is the same as in the building of a temple; many procure materials, others fit them to their appropriate places in the building, and one architect plans and superintends the building of the edifice. The discovery and collection of facts which are essential to the formation of systems and theories, is a labour the zealous and industrious prosecution of which is worthy of all commendation, but the right employment of these facts is the chief glory of an age of intellectual progress.

The men who have conferred the most valuable and lasting benefits upon the world have been its thinkers-its thinkers, not its dreamers. Sir Isaac Newton attributed his successes in the discovery of the laws of matter and of motion to his habit of continuous and protracted thought upon whatever subject interested him, rather than to superior mental acumen. It was by reflection that Dr. Franklin conceived the idea of the identity of electricity and lightning, as well as the method by which he tested the truth of his conception; and by the same process Professor Morse conceived the idea of his electro-magnetic telegraph. The cotton-gin was conceived in the mind of Whitney before his hands essayed the first rude model of his machine. The frescoes of Michael Angelo were painted in his fancy before his hand seized the pencil or the brush; and the Cathedral of St. Peter's stood sublime in the mind of the architect before the first stone of his work was laid in its place. By the reflective exercise of the reasoning faculty, the statesman is able to forecast the future bearings of laws and institutions upon the welfare of millions of the human family; and the

moral philosopher, by the same process, deduces the laws of human conduct, points out to erring man the paths of rectitude and the remedies for the moral evils that afflict society; and, piercing even into the deep things of the divine, learns whatever it is possible for man to know concerning the theories of Divine Providence and moral government, and reverently complies with the divine injunction to acquaint himself with the mind of God himself.

If one were to propound the question, What is truth? to a dozen different individuals, he would from each of them receive a different answer. One might be: "Truth is the thought of God;"-a safe answer, yet by no means a definitive one, for the thought of God is truth, and more. Another would probably be: "Truth is the reality of things,"-a tautological answer; for if truth is reality, why not call it reality? But language is not nearly so rich in synonyms as many people, and even many lexicographers, suppose. Reality is not abstract, while truth is; and truth, therefore, is not reality.

Reason, the legislator of the mind, defines truth to be-the idea of the reality of things. If you correctly and perfectly describe to another person any particular thing, you tell him the truth concerning it, for you convey into his mind the idea of the thing as it really is, or the idea of its reality; certainly not its actual reality. To realize any thing, is to have the thing itself in possession; and to realize the truth concerning any thing, is to have the idea of the reality of the thing in the mind.

According to the rational theory, the sin of lying and the evil of lying are two distinct things; and, excepting that the sin of lying originates in evil, one of the two may exist without the other. The sin of lying consists in the bad intent in which the lie is conceived, while the evil of lying is in its consequences. Of the moral quality of the intent, the moral sense takes direct cognizance; but of the moral quality of the act, the moral sense only takes cognizance when reason has determined the relation of causation between the act and its consequences; and if these are evil, the act, as well as the intent, is evil. If a person utters truth, believing it to be falsehood, and with malevolent intent, the sinfulness is confined to the intent. A falsehood may be uttered without malevolent intent, the utterer even supposing it to be truth, yet its consequences may be as evil as if its utterance had originated in express malice. In this instance the evil is

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