æternis), he writes, that the intellectual light which is within us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the increated light in which the eternal reasons are contained: "Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis nihil est aliud, quam quædam participata similitudo luminis increate, in quo continentur rationes æternæ."*

Some persons think that it was the German philosopher, Kant, who discovered the fact of the indeterminateness of the substance of the human soul, but this supposed recent discovery turns out, like many others, to be an old one, as may be seen in the writings of Thomas. Proposing to himself the question whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence: after various observations on intelligence, and the intelligibility of objects, he answers:

“It is not, therefore, by its essence, but by its acts that the understanding knows itself, and that in two ways. One way, in particular, according to which Plato or Socrates perceives that he has an intellectual soul from the fact that he perceives he understands; the second way, in general, inasmuch as we consider the nature of the human mind in the intellective act. But it is true that we derive the judgment and efficacy of the knowledge by which we know the nature of the soul, by the light of the divine truth of which our intellect participates, and in which are - contained the reasons of all things, as was said above. Hence, Augustine says, in the ninth book on the Trinity: We have intuition of the inviolable truth by which we perfectly determine, as far as possible, not what the mind of each man is, but what it should be according to eternal reasons. But there is a difference between these two cognitions, for to have the first, we need only the presence of the mind, which is the principle of the act by which the mind perceives itself; and, therefore, we say that it knows itself by its presence; but for the second, the presence of the mind is not sufficient, but a careful and subtile investigation is necessary. Hence, many are ignorant of the nature of the soul; wherefore, Augustine, in the tenth book on the Trinity, in reference to this investigation, says: The soul should not try to see itself as something absent, but endeavour to discern itself as something present; that is, to know its difference from other things, which is to know its essence (quidditatem) and nature."

Another of Kant's discoveries, to wit, the divisions of judgments into analytic and synthetic, one so much lauded for the new light it has brought into the intellectual world, turns out likewise to be an old discovery, the newness of the thing being merely in the change of terms. In the scholastic writers, we find the distinction made between the two kinds of judgment. The following extracts from Thomas Aquinas will place the matter beyond cavil:

Pars. 2. L. xxxiv. A. 5. Summ. Pars. I. 2, lxxxvii. A. 1.

"A proposition is known by itself, per se nota, when the predicate is contained in the subject, as, man is an animal; for animal is of the essence of man. If, then, it is known to all what the subject and predicate are, that proposition will be known to all by itself, as is seen in the first principles of demonstration, which are certain common things, not unknown to any one, as being and not being the whole, the part and thus similar."*

66

Any proposition the predicate of which is of the essence of the subject is known by itself, although such a proposition is not known by itself to any one who is ignorant of the definition of the subject. Thus, the proposition man is rational, is by its nature known by itself, for whoever says man says rational.†

His teaching on the subject of evil cannot be considered hackneyed or common-place, and therefore we will the more readily make room for an analysis of it.

According to the universal acceptation of the word, evil is the privation of a thing, which from his having been born, one ought to have. If man has not wings it is not an evil to him, he is not born to have them. But if he has not hands, it is an evil for him because naturally he ought to have them if he is perfect, whilst it would not be evil for a bird. It is thus that this word is understood. by all mankind. Now, privation is not an essence, but a negation in the substance. Evil is not then a real essence. This is what totally overthrows the error of the Manichees, who suppose that there are things which are in their nature evil. Hence, it follows that evil is caused only by something that is good. That which has no existence, can be the cause of nothing. It is necessary, therefore, that every cause must be some being. Now, evil is not any thing whatsoever, but a privation; evil, therefore, cannot be the cause of any thing. If, therefore evil has a cause, this cannot be but something that is good. Hence, it follows also, that evil is founded on something that is good, for evil cannot exist by itself, having no essential existence. It must be the case, then, that evil is in some subject. Now, every subject, being a certain substance, is something that is good. Therefore every evil is in something that is good.

St. Thomas sounds and illumines these matters with so rare a sagacity, that he sometimes arrives at conclusions as surprising for their justness as for their novelty. "It has been asked," he says, "If there is a God, whence comes evil? We should rather conclude thus: If there is evil, there is a God, for evil would have no existence

Summa Theologica, P. La. 2. 2d A. 1 in corp. La., 2d, 2 94a, A. 2d, in corp. § Ibid. cap. 10.

Contra Gent. 7 and 6.

Cap. 11.

without order in the good, the privation of which is evil. But there would not be this order, if God did not exist."*

Surely, every Christian soul that can fully comprehend his meaning will be pleased with what, in another place, he says of the Eternal Word. He proposes to himself the question: Whether any relation to creature is signified in the name of the Word: Utrum in nomine Verbi importetur respectus ad creaturam; and he answers thus: "I reply, that in the Word, relation to creature is signified. For God, in knowing himself, knows every creature. The Word, therefore, conceived in the mind, is representative of all that is understood by it. Wherefore, there are in us different words according to the different things we understand. But because God, by one act, understands both himself and all things, His only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures. And as the science of God is, with respect to himself, cognition, but with respect to creatures cognition and cause, so the Word of God is expressive only of what is in God the Father, but both expressive and productive of creatures; and this is why it is said in the thirty-second Psalm, 'He said, and they were made;' because the productive reason of those things, which the Father makes, is contained in the Word."+

In truth, we know not which most to admire in the writings of the illustrious Doctor, whether their profundity, their sublimity, or their calm, majestic beauty. We will conclude our extracts from them with his admirable portraiture of a true sage, and would simply remark that, in our estimation, he was himself one of its most noble realizations. We quote textually the first chapter of the Introduction to his work, Contra Gentiles :

"What is the duty of a sage?' 'My heart shall meditate truth and my lips shall hate wickedness.'I

"Universal usage, which the philosopher, that is to say, Aristotle & decides we must follow in naming things, generally requires that we should call sages those who directly ordain or dispose affairs, and who govern them well. Hence, among other things that men conceive of the sage, the philosopher concludes that it is the part of the sage to ordain. Now, of every thing that is to be governed or ordained for a special end, it is necessarily from that end the rule of government and of ordinance should be taken, because then every thing is disposed for the best when it is suitably ordained for its end. In reality the end, the object of every thing, is the good. Hence we see that in the arts one governs another, and that he is as it were the ruler of him to whom the end in view appertains.]

* Lib. iii., c. 71, n. 7. † Summ., P. 1, 2, 34, A. 3.

§ Aristotle, 2 Top.

Prov. viii.

In præm. metaphys., c. 2.

VOL. XVII.—NO. XXXIII.

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"Thus medicine governs pharmacy and ordains it, because health, with which medicine is concerned, is the object of all the medicaments which pharmacy prepares. It is the same thing with the act of the pilot in regard to him who builds ships; with the captain in regard to the armorer. Experts in those arts that govern others receive the name of sages. But as those artists who pursue certain particular things for particular ends do not attain the universal end of things, they are called sages in this or that department, as it is said, 'as a wise architect I have laid the foundation.' But the absolute name of sage is reserved for him alone whose consideration is occupied with the end of the universe, because this end of the universe is also its origin. Hence, according to the philosopher, it is the concern of the sage to consider the highest cause.

"Now, the final cause of every thing is that which its author and creator proposed to himself. The prime author and mover of the universe is intelligence, as will be shown further on. The final end of the world must therefore be the good of intelligence. But this good is the truth. It must be the case, then, that truth is the final end of the whole universe, and that wisdom insists principally upon this end, and upon its consideration. It is for this reason that the divine wisdom having assumed flesh testifies that he came into this world for the manifestation of the truth, saying: For this I was born, and for this I came into the world that I might give testimony to the truth.'t

"The philosopher himself decides that the highest philosophy is the truth, not of any truth, whatever it may be, but that truth which is the source of all truth; that is, of that which concerns the principle of the being of all things, in such a manner, that its especial truth is the principle of every truth; for the disposition of things is the same in truth as it is in being. Now, in contraries, it is the same thing to sustain one, or to refute the others, as medicine restores health and expels disease. Thus as it is the part of the sage to meditate truth, especially in regard to the first principle, so it is his part to impugn the contrary falsehood.

"It is meetly, then, that from the very mouth of wisdom two duties of the sage are signalized in the words of our text; one, to meditate and announce the divine truth, the truth by excellence, in saying: 'my heart shall meditate the truth, the other, to impugn the falsehood contrary to the truth, when it says: my lips shall hate wickedness,' by which it designates the falsehood contrary to the divine truth, to religion, which is called piety, whilst the contrary falsehood receives the name of impiety."

The reader must have noticed how frequently St. Thomas quotes Aristotle, or simply, the philosopher as he frequently calls him. The reason of this will be found in the following circumstance. It is well known that Plato and Aristotle were the chiefs of pagan philosophy. The elegance of Plato gave his philosophy the greater Vogue among the gentiles; and the most learned of the Christian fathers were, according to Alban Butler, educated in the maxims of his school. His noble sentiments on the attributes of the Deity, and particularly on Divine

Providence, and his doctrine of the rewards and punishments of a future state seemed favourable to religion. And it cannot be doubted that he had learned in the course of his travels in Egypt and Phoenicia, many traditional truths delivered down from the patriarchal ages, which the corruption of idolatry had not wholly concealed or banished.

On the other hand, the philosophy of Aristotle was much in esteem among the Heathen; was silent as to all traditional truths, and contained some glaring errors, which several opponents of Christianity adopted against the religion of the gospel. It must, however, be acknowledged by all impartial judges, that Aristotle was the greatest and most comprehensive genius of antiquity, and that he was the only one that had laid down complete rules for, and explained the laws of, reasoning; and that he had given a thorough system of philosophy. It appears that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Peter Abelard and others made a bad use of Aristotle's philosophy. But above all, the Mahometans of Spain and Arabia wrote with incredible subtilty on his principles.

It was with their own weapons that St. Thomas opposed those enemies of the truth, and employed the philosophy of Aristotle in defence of the faith, in which he succeeded in a wonderful manner. He discerned and confuted Aristotle's errors, and set in a new and clear light the great truths of reason which that philosopher had enveloped in obscurity. Thus Aristotle, who was called the terror of Christians, "became" as Alban Butler says, "in the hands of Thomas, orthodox, and furnished faith with new arms against idolatry and atheism," for this admirable Doctor has corrected his errors, and shown that his whole subtle system of philosophy, as far as it is grounded on truth, is subservient to the cause of revelation.

This, Thomas has done through the nicest metaphysical speculations. He everywhere strikes out a new track for himself, and enters into the most secret recesses of their shadowy region, so as to appear new even on known and common place subjects. For his writings are original efforts of genius and reflection, and every point he treats in a manner to make it appear new. If his speculations are sometimes fine-spun, and his divisions. run into niceties, it was in a great measure owing to the speculative and refining genius of the Arabians,