conscience, for having writ a speech to a purpose absolutely disagreeing with his own opinion." This remonstrance had not the desired effect. In an evil hour, the King dissolved the Parliament, to which he owed the ratification of his title; and the Tories, as was foreseen and predicted by Shrewsbury, gained a preponderance in the new elections. This led to disagreeable consequences. In the New Parliament, which met in March 1690, the Whigs, to give additional security to the New Government, brought forward an act for abjuring King James. A discussion of the most stormy nature followed; and the King favoured the scruples of the Tories so far as to send a message to the House, expressing his wish that, by dropping the obnoxious topic, all farther heats might be avoided. This greatly of fended the Whigs; and Shrewsbury, who had warmly promoted this act, immediately proffered his Majesty the seals, which, after much reluctance expressed on the part of the King, were accepted.

The failure of the ill-fated expedition against Brest is, as might have been expected, a topic of correspondence between the King and his Minister; but we only allude to this subject at present, for the purpose of calling the attention of our readers to a paragraph, in a letter of the Duke of Shrewsbury, relative to the celebrated Marlborough. After bewailing the death of General Tollemache, who, in the attack on Brest, fell a sacrifice to his gallant and enterprising spirit, Shrewsbury proceeds:-"Writing upon this subject, it is impossible to forget what is here become a general discourse, the probability and conveniency of your Majesty receiving Lord Marlborough into your favour. He has been with me since this news, to offer his service, with all the expressions of duty and fidelity imaginable. What I can say, by way of persuasion, upon this subject, will signify but little, since I very well remember when your Majesty discoursed with me upon it, in the spring, you were sufficiently convinced of his usefulness; but some points remained

Correspondence, p. 15.

of a nature too tender for me to pretend to advise upon, and of which your Majesty is the only and best judge; but if those could be accommodated to your Majesty's satisfaction, I cannot but think he is capable of being very serviceable. It is so unquestionably his interest to be faithful, that single argument makes me not doubt it". To enable the reader to comprehend fully the nature of the objections and suspicions respecting Marlbourgh, which are here very plainly hinted at, it may not be improper to state, that, at the Revolution, he was one of the peers who voted for a regency, and that when there appeared no alternative but to bring back King James, or place the crown on the head of the Prince of Orange, "he absented himself from the discussion, and submitted, as was his duty, to the decision." It was natural, therefore, that King William should be slow to promote a man who had shown an evident and illdisguised partiality for the House of Stuart. Time has now demonstrated how well-founded were the jealousies and suspicions entertained respecting him by our Great Deliverer. It is matter of undoubted historical truth, that, at the time when the letter was written, (July 2, 1694,) from which we have extracted the above passage, Marlborough was in correspondence with the exiled Monarch; had expressed his sorrow for the part he had acted in bringing in the Prince of Orange; had promised to make atonement for his error, by his future conduct; and had obtained a promise of pardon for himself, his wife Godolphin, and others. This political tergiversation Mr Coxe, in his memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, has endeavoured as far as possible to palliate-for justify it he could not. He was personally attached to King James-he was displeased with the measures of King William in favour of the Dissenters

he was disgusted with the repulsive and phlegmatic manners of the new Sovereign, and his impolitic and marked partiality for his Dutch favourites-and, above all, he distrusted the stability of the New Government, and wished to secure himself

+ Correspondence, p. 47.

and his friends, in the event of a restoration! Such is the substance of the Archdeacon's apology; and it may be allowed to go for so much. "In all revolutions," says Mr Southey in a loftier strain of moral sentiment," the foundations, not of Government alone, but of morality, are also shaken. There is so much villany and falsehood at the commence ment, (for they who aim at revolutionizing a country scruple at no arts, however base, and at no crimes, however atrocious,) and so much wickedness of every kind in the progress, that, from seeing right and wrong habitually confounded, men insensibly adapt their principles to the season, and self-preservation and self-advancement become the only rule of conduct. This was exemplified in the state of England during the interval between the Restoration and the Revolution: the standard of general morality was never at any other time so low."

A considerable portion of the carlier part of this "Correspondence" relates to the sending a great fleet of sixty sail of the line to the Mediterranean, under Admiral Russel, for the purpose of checking the operations of the French in Cataloniawhere they had hitherto carried every thing before them-by preventing them from deriving succours from the Toulon fleet; and to the resolution of ordering Russel to winter with the fleet at Cadiz. This wise, but, as it was then viewed, daring measure, originated with the King himself; and though it was of the utmost consequence to his interests, it was strenuously opposed by Russel himself, and so feebly and equivocally countenanced by the Ministry at home, that William, then in Flanders, had no alternative but take the whole responsibility on himself, by sending Russel peremptory orders to winter in the Mediterranean. This decisive measure was attended with the happiest results. The French, afraid to venture their fleet at sea, shut themselves up in Toulon; and having no other harbour in those seas, the British flag rode triumphant; our commerce was protected and flourished; our allies re

.

ceived effectual and seasonable aid; and the terrors and ill-omened predictions of the splenetic Admiral were so far from being realised, that the fleet was richly supplied with ammunition and stores, by its presence made the King's Government respected, and compelled the Venetians and others, who had formerly stood aloof, to acknowledge him. That the Ministry and the Admiral should at first have opposed this measure, or lent it a feeble, or, it may be, an insidious concurrence, is hardly to be wondered at, when we reflect how little progress naval affairs had made at that period. It was reserved for the immortal Nelson, more than a century afterwards, not merely to prove the indomitable courage which British seamen can display in battle, but also their unconquerable perseverance in blockade.

Connected with this happy stroke of policy, is a circumstance which deserves to be mentioned here. Before Russel had received definitive orders to winter in the Mediterranean, and while his return home was calculated upon, he had been left in want of the necessary ammunition and stores. While matters were in this situation, he wrote home a strong, and, as usual, querulous representation of the state of the fleet, in which he represents himself as in no condition whatever to meet and fight the enemy; and this communication he sent through France! By one of the caprices of fortune, this letter came into the King's hands, while he was at the camp of Boquette, near Namur, and, from the harsh and highly disrespectful reflections it contained on himself, must have excited his utmost indignation. "It passed through France," says he, in a letter to Shrewsbury t," and I do not know whether he sent it that way, that it might be opened and read; but even if that was not his intention, it was inconceivably imprudent!" The publication of the Stuart Papers, (which we sincerely trust will not be much longer delayed,) can alone determine whether the conduct of this surly Whig Admiral was the result of treachery, or only of "inconceivable" folly. Though somewhat out

+ Correspondence, p. 104.

of place, we shall here present this precious sample of a Revolution Admiral, to the curiosity of our read

ers.

"Barcelona Road, 31 July, 1695. "I herewith acknowledge the receipt of their Excellencies, the Lords Justices' order of the 11th of June, which, by the grace of God, I will obey in the best manner I can. I am afraid my temper has been represented too froward and uneasy, which inclines me to make no reply or representations to the orders I receive. But this last order, which comes by his Majesty's direction to the Lords Justices, will prove (as I apprehend) so very prejudicial, that I could not avoid laying my thoughts before them; and I hope your Grace will not believe it proceeds from any uneasiness I lie under, but purely for the public service.

"I will depend so much on your Grace's good nature to forgive me, that I will trouble you, in this private letter, with what offers to me on the whole matter.

"Except it be those ships represented to you, in my letter from Cadiz, of the 17th April, O. S., there is not any other but what ought to be on their passage to England; and should I, pursuant to the order, send such ships home as are not fit to continue longer abroad, I would be glad to be informed of what use the remaining part would be here, till joined by a farther strength; so that since these ships must remain till the latter end of September, or beginning of October, to perform some Flemish expedition, I do affirm to you, it is impossible for them to return home with any reasonable hopes of safety.

"The King might have been pleased to impose what hardships he had thought fit upon me, (as making a winter voyage for England is a great one,) I should have been very well satisfied; but to expose the fleet to so apparent danger, upon no other account (as I can foresee) than saving the Dutch their money, of which I have had many instances this voyage, I cannot but repine at it to a degree that gives me all imaginable disquiet. It is not hard to guess that this advice comes from Secretary De Wieldy, of the Admiralty

of Amsterdam, and I cannot bear the thoughts that a Dutch Secretary. should govern the English fleet. Had there been any one reason given against the representation the Lords Justices made to the King, for the defective ships returning, I could in some measure have been satisfied; but as matters are now ordered, the consequence, I fear, will be, that the three-decked ships must winter at Cadiz; and, from their own weakness, and the worms' eating, it will be almost impossible ever to get them home again; or, if otherwise, and they proceed in October, it being the most tempestuous season in the year, they will perish in the sea. If I am not extremely out in my calculation of this matter, I am sure your Grace's thoughts will be no more at quiet than mine are. Had the Dutch complied with their quota of twenty-four ships, (of which ten considerable ships have been all this summer wanting,) as I said in my letter to the Lords Justices, I should have sent, with the Turkey convoy, those of my fleet that are in the very worst condition, which would have been some ease to my mind. But when these ships will arrive, God knows; and these here, had I not lent them money, must have remained at anchor at Barcelona all this summer, nor have I had any service from them in the winter. Their constant want of provisions, and their thriftliness in not allowing their ships to be cleaned, has made them of no other service than lying for a show in the Bay of Cadiz.

I must desire the favour of your Grace, that I may know whether any ships are coming out of England, that I may leave, in the several ports, the necessary orders for their proceeding, and what flags shall be here to govern the fleet after September; for, at present, I know nothing, but that after that month, I may be drowned coming home. I am not free from the apprehension of an order coming to stop me here all winter, which, if such a thing should happen, I will rather run the hazard of his Majesty's displeasure than remain here; for I am already ruined in my health; and whatever people may surmise to the contrary, I am very considerably a worse man in my

own fortune than when I left England; nor am I under the least expectation or hopes of that being made good to me, by his Majesty's bounty or generosity. But pardon this expression, being things that give me no uneasiness *.

That the acrimonious and reproachful style of this letter made a strong impression on the King, we learn from various hints that occasionally escape from his habitual reserve, in the course of his correspondence with Shrewsbury; and we have already seen how deeply he felt the imprudence or treachery of sending such a document through France, where it was unquestionably "opened and read." Though the intimate and confidential friend of Russel, Shrewsbury indicates his displeasure at the Admiral's rashness in very pointed and dignified terms:-"You must give me leave to think you in the wrong, to send any letter through France, that gave so exact an account of the condition of your fleet, and how it was to be disposed of the rest of the summer; but if that was not very cautious, with respect to the public, the inclosing a letter to me in one to Mr Blaithwayt, (the King's private Secretary,) of the nature of your's, was not more careful of yourself, since curiosity or suspicion might very well invite the King to what has unluckily happened +."

It is well known that the re-capture of Namur (the French had taken it some time before, and strengthened the fortifications and works with the greatest industry and skill,) was one of William's most glorious and successful achievements. No sooner had the place been invested, than Boufflers, one of the bravest of the French Marshals, threw himself into it, resolved to defend it to the last extremity. The garrison consisted of 14,000+ picked men, and the French engineers had exhausted all their skill to render the place im

pregnable. A French army, 100,000 strong, commanded by Marshal Villeroi, was in the immediate neighbourhood, while the covering army, commanded by William, amounted only to 60,000. Yet, with such consummate and overmastering skill and generalship did William manœuvre this inferior force, that Villeroi, after looking at him for several days, found it adviseable not to attack him, and left the town and citadel to their fate. The town and citadel surrendered after a month's siege each. "The King," says Burnet §, "had the entire credit of this matter; his general officers having a very small share in it, being most of them men of low genius, and little practised in things of that nature." To this lamentable account of the military talents of William's general officers, we must particularize one illustrious exception, the celebrated engineer Coehorn, who so eminently distinguished himself during the siege, that his fame rose to the highest pitch, and even eclipsed that of his French rival, Vauban. William's annunciation of his success to Shrewsbury, strikingly marks the habitual piety, modesty, and reserve of his character, and must be read with great interest. It is as brief as it is characteristic:- "You doubtless rejoiced at the information of our success, by the capture of the Castle of Namur. With all its circumstances, it is assuredly a great event, and we cannot sufficiently offer up our thanks to God for this success, from which we shall doubtless derive considerable advantages."

Yet, in spite of this splendid achievement, which, had he been enabled to follow it up, might have led to the most important consequences, by forcing the enemy to a peace, and thereby saving much blood and treasure, the Ministry had not influence enough in Parliament to induce that Assembly to vote money sufficient to