mentioning this case at the present moment, since it affords a precedent for endeavouring to deal in a similar way with the still more important case of the Suez Canal, which is now in a very bad financial condition, and which, if it remains in the hands of a private company, is likely to suffer hereafter from all the evils of monopoly, aggravated by international jealousy. 2. Canals. These were amongst the first products of the new engineering era, and have been, and now are, almost entirely in the hands of joint-stock companies. They have, however, been generally superseded or swallowed up by railways, and are now of little importance. But for this we should probably have heard many complaints of their profits and charges. 3. Docks were also an early product of the engineering era, and, consequently, they were often made in the first instance by private capital. On a very rough estimate made from the share lists, it seems that the capital of joint-stock companies now invested in docks amounts to nearly 15 millions. From the limited area in each port available for docks, they are often, so far as the port itself is concerned, very special monopolies. But the sea, as we have said, is the greatest of free traders. The rivalry of other ports generally prevents any very bad effect from a dock monopoly, and rouses the trade of the port to put a stop to it when it becomes oppressive. Partly for this reason, and partly because it has been found that rivalry in the same port between competing dock and harbour authorities creates confusion, difficulty, quarrels, and expense, whilst harmonious arrangement is of paramount importance to trade, the tendency for the last 20 years has been to hand over the management and construction of docks to local trusts representing the whole interests of the port and making no profit. Thus docks made by private companies at Sunderland, Liverpool, and Birkenhead, have been in late years handed over to public trusts, whilst at Newcastle and Shields, at Glasgow and Greenock, at Dundee, Leith, Belfast, and Aberdeen, and other ports, docks recently made have been constructed, and are managed by public bodies. representing the dock ratepayers. There are some instances in which (as was formerly the case in Liverpool, and as is now the case with the Dock Company of Hull and with the Town Council of Bristol) actual legal monopolies have been improvidently given to the owners of one set of docks, by means of charges leviable by them throughout the whole extent of the port ; and the evil of such monopoly is felt, not so much in extravagant charges, as in the suppression or taxation of rival docks. In such cases the true remedy seems to be never to allow any managers of such undertakings to make charges except for the services services they render, and never to allow any body to get a monopoly of the docks in any harbour unless it fairly represents all the trade of the harbour. 4. Lighthouses have now, for some years, been made by the Governments of all civilized countries. But in England, which was the first to build them, many of them were originally granted by the Crown to private persons with power to take tolls and it is only since 1830 that the lighthouses so granted have been bought up and placed under public control. Even now the coasts of backward Turkey are lighted by a French Joint-Stock Company, and there are complaints of the profits it is said to be making. On the proper mode of managing lighthouses there is little to be said. It is admitted on all hands that they are necessarily a monopoly-that they must be in the hands of a central authority, and ought not to be a matter of profit to private persons. Whether they should be paid for in the shape of tolls on ships, or by the public exchequer, does not seem to be a question raising any important issue of economical principle. In both cases they are paid for more or less directly by the general consumer; in the one case, through the medium of freights-in the other, more directly by general taxation. The former plan has the practical advantage of affording a good test of the value of any proposed new works, in the willingness or unwillingness of the shipping interest, who are the immediate payers, to saddle themselves with the necessary tolls. 5. Roads. These were originally made by the local authority, i. e. by the parish. But under the demand for channels of through communication to be used by wheeled vehicles, and with the engineering improvements of the last century, the system of turnpike trusts grew up, a system under which private capital was obtained in the shape of loans secured upon tolls, and the management placed in the hands of a body of trustees, partly public, partly private. The tendency of late years has been to do away with this system-to improve Highway Boards-to place the whole of the roads under their management-to abolish turnpiketolls, and to pay expenses out of rates. The importance of turnpike trusts is diminishing yearly-partly for the above reason, partly on account of the transfer of through traffic to railways. The number of turnpike trusts, according to the last published Return, was 952; their income 898,2897., and their capital debt 2,883,2807.,-a mere flea-bite compared with Joint-Stock Company capital, and annually decreasing. * Report by Secretary of State on Turnpike Trusts (378.). 1871. Under Under these circumstances the management of roads calls for no special regulation. Turnpike-tolls are a nuisance; but they are in a fair way to be abolished, and all the roads in the kingdom are likely soon to be in the hands of local authorities and supported by local rates. 6. Bridges and Ferries.-These form part of roads, and have been similarly dealt with, except in certain special cases, such as the bridges over the Thames, which, as we know, have been originally built by private enterprise on the security of tolls, and which are now gradually being bought up by public bodies. It is not likely that many more bridges will be constructed on this principle. But if they are, it is obviously desirable that the concession should be for a limited term, and that in no case should it be accompanied, as has too often been the case, with a prohibition to set up another bridge or ferry within a certain distance, which, of course, has the effect of conferring a strict legal monopoly. 7. Railways.-These have all been made since the setting in of the engineering and joint-stock era, and are in the hands of Joint-Stock Companies. They are the great example, for good and for evil, of the joint-stock system, and will probably prove its greatest difficulty. The subject of railways alone, if exhaustively treated, would far exceed the limits of an article; but there are one or two points which it is impossible to omit in dealing with the general question of industrial monopolies. The development of railway communication in Great Britain has been such as no Government management, however good, could possibly have produced. The number of lines, the number of trains, and the general comfort and convenience, are beyond those of any other country. If trunk lines had been laid out by Government, there would probably have been one main line to the North. There are now four. The capital invested amounts to 520,000,0007., and the number of miles of railway constructed to upwards of 15,000. Competition has wholly failed. It is true that it has been tried in the most foolish and expensive way, through the medium of haphazard decisions of Parliamentary Committees; but it is evident that under no conditions could it have been successful or permanent. The waste of money has been great; and the result is and must be monopoly. Each great Company fights off, buys up, or amalgamates with, its original rivals, till it gets a district to itself; and it then makes alliances as to rates and fares with its great neighbours so as effectually to prevent competition. There may be an occasional struggle for some special local traffic, such as the recent fight for the carriage of coals; coals; but the public are little interested in it, for it is sure to end either in the victory of one or other Company, or in an arrangement between them, and, either way, monopoly. There may be also, when two railways run trains to the same place, a competition in the speed of trains; but this is extravagant in cost and of doubtful benefit to the public. The extent to which amalgamation, and consequently monopoly, has been carried, may be seen by a Return moved for by Mr. Cave in 1868. From this Return it appeared that in the seven preceding years upwards of 500 Bills had been passed, containing amalgamations or working arrangements. In 1866, out of 13,954 miles open, belonging to 353 original Companies, 12,221 miles were worked by 28 Companies. According to the Annual Railway Return of 1870, the number of original Companies is 450, owning 15,145 miles of railway; but the number of working Companies is only 103. Nor must it be supposed that it is the interest of the public to resist monopoly. Unity of management, through booking, correspondence of trains, are so important, that the public lose more by the division of authority and responsibility than they gain by competition. In general the large Companies possessing large districts serve the public better than Companies with small and divided or straggling districts, and when large Companies interfere with one another, the result is inconvenience, and not cheapness. The writer of this article has had much experience of a great railway, which in the course of thirty or forty miles cuts three other great railways at six several points. Where they would naturally compete with one another, they have arranged the fares. But at no one of the six points at which this railway cuts the others is there anything like through-booking, or jointarrangement, so that it is almost impracticable for travellers on one of the lines to make free use of the others. Ireland, however, is the best instance of evil arising from numerous companies, competing, or rather fighting, with one another. In that country the number of original companies is 42, and of working companies 21, the mileage 2000, and the capital 26,875,0437.; so that the number of working companies as compared with capital or mileage is far greater than in England and Scotland. The average capital of lines worked by one company in the United Kingdom is upwards of a million, and of mileage 150, whilst in Ireland the same average gives 127,8007. capital and 95 miles to each working company; and it is notorious that the service is much worse than it is in England. There is no * Parliamentary Paper, No. 242, 1868. arrangement arrangement between companies whose lines form part of the same system. The larger companies fight with one another, and often oppress the smaller companies in the hopes of buying them up more cheaply. In the meantime the shareholders and the public suffer, and trade is paralysed. There are other complaints of the Irish system, but the greatest evil of all is the want of harmony, which cannot exist without monopoly. But whilst monopoly is thus inevitable and desirable, it must not be forgotten that the interest of the Companies is to a certain extent only that of the Public. It is the interest of the Companies to develop traffic, so long as the development produces profit proportioned to the increased outlay. But it is quite possible that developments may be required which would pay their own expenses and be very useful to the public without bringing an additional penny of profit to the Shareholders. For instance, local branches may be much wanted, the traffic from which would only pay their expenses by benefiting the district, but would leave no profit to the Company. And, again, as regards fares; it is much better for the Public that a hundred passengers should be carried for sixpence than fifty for a shilling. But it is easier, cheaper, and in every way better for the shareholders to carry fifty for a shilling. Again, Companies have no interest, or too often think they have none, in uniting together and developing each others' traffic. Each Company is seeking to oust, to buy up, or to amalgamate with its neighbour on the best terms for itself, and does its best to keep its traffic from going on to its neighbour's lines. On all these points the action of Railway Companies may be directly adverse to that of the Public. But no effectual attempt has been made to foresee and provide for these cases. Still less has any attempt been made to enable the Public Exchequer to reap any ultimate benefit from the large profits which these great monopolies were expected to make, and will probably yet make. The Legislature has provided an elaborate code of laws for the protection of landowners, of road trustees, and of gas and water companies; and there are many doubtful and illogical enactments having the safety of passengers for their object. There have also been provisions of the most elaborate kind fixing the capital of the railway companies, their borrowing powers, and the financial arrangements of the shareholders inter se,-matters which really concern themselves, and not the public. These matters, according to the wiser principles of recent legislation concerning all other joint-stock companies, are left to the partners themselves, and to the operation of the ordinary law of debtor |