would be exactly the same if the authority were attempted to be given to another individual or to a partnership, whether carrying on as Kingston & Co. or the Kingston Catering Company. A may trade in his own name, may make and sell a business, and may then pass the name with it, but he cannot sell his right to begin to make a business in his name. At first this sounds too subtle, but reflection tends to show that it is sensible enough. In principle it resembles the other English rule, that while a claim of damages may be assigned. as a pertinent of a principal asset, it is not allowed to be assigned per se, for that would be to foment litigation and the sale and purchase of lawsuits.

SIGNS.

It must suffice to cite two modern cases, the one Scots and the other English. In Scotland there is Crawford's Trustees v. Lennox, 1896, 23 R. 747. It related to the sign of a gilded figure of a lion at the entrance to an hotel. The hotel was called the Golden Lion, and that name and the figure had been attached to it for a very long time. The actual figure had been provided by a previous tenant at his own expense, and sold by him to his successor in the tenancy. In time the latter also left, but he removed his business and the lion figure to another hotel in the same town. He did not call his new hotel the Golden Lion or anything like it, and he placed the figure, not at the door, but on the roof; he also had a picture of the same or another lion on his new business cards. This use of the figure and picture of a lion the proprietors of the former hotel attempted to stop. They obtained interdict in the Sheriff Court, but lost it in the Second Division. Nothing, or next to nothing, turned on the ownership of the actual lion figure. The ground of judgment was that, on the facts, it was not conceivable that any grown person fit to go about alone could be misled. Obviously it was open to the owners of the Golden Lion Hotel to have another identical figure erected exactly where the old one had stood before its removal. But what they really wanted to assert was a claim to an exclusive pertinent right to have the figure of any lion attached to any hotel in the same town, and for that, of course, they could show no shadow of title. At the same time, many people may be inclined to think that the result was not altogether satisfactory. As to that, the practical idea is that it is extremely probable that at the beginning of the lease the tenant would, if asked, have at once agreed to a condition that he would never at any time in connection with any other hotel in the town use the figure or picture of a lion.

The English case is Townsend v. Jarman, already mentioned. Two partners had sold the premises to a company, and then, later, the voluntary liquidator had sold to one of the old partners. The name of the other partner was the name under which the business had been carried on, and that name was carved on one of the stones in the front of the premises. The ex-partner whose name it was, sought to have the purchasing partner ordained to remove the name, but it was held that he had no such right, as the carving passed as a pertinent. It was stated by the judge (Farwell (J.)) that the case was unique.

ACCIDENT AND DISEASE.

Of

THE recent decision of the House of Lords in Grant v. Kynoch, 1919, 1 S.L.T. 280, is one of the most important yet delivered on the Workmen's Compensation Act. The questions with which it deals relate to all kinds of employments. course, the more hazardous employments, such as mining and seafaring, are more closely affected, but, as even the most sheltered occupation can be reached by disease, the issues involved may without exaggeration be said to have a universal application.

The Workmen's Compensation Act provided for compensation for personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the workman's employment, and sec. 8 brings certain diseases within the right to compensation, subject to the conditions there set out. The words of the statute have been open to much criticism. Simple as they appear to be, their application to particular incidents has been found SO difficult that the law reports are full of various decisions, each attempting and attempting in vain-to provide some fixed canon of interpretation from which a rule can be established for future guidance.

The particular case before the Courts showed with what little success these efforts have been crowned. James Grant, the husband of the appellant, was a workman engaged at 25s. per week wages in handling and bagging artificial manures. These manures are highly impregnated with the germs known as streptococci and staphylococci. If the defensive barrier of the skin be broken down by abrasion or scratch, these germs find ready access, and blood-poisoning is set up-only too often with fatal consequences. James Grant while engaged at his work had such an abrasion on his left leg. It was not known how it was caused, and it could not be related to his employment. Infection took place at this spot, and he became ill on the 1st of January, 1916, while engaged at his work, and died

on the 16th of February. It was not possible to state within any exact limit of time when the infection actually occurred, but the arbitrator found the following facts:-That the infection which caused the illness and death was derived from poisonous germs contained in bone dust handled in the course of his employment. He awarded compensation, but on appeal to the Second Division of the Court of Session his finding was recalled. The case thus came before the House of Lords. The question to be answered was whether the finding was justified and did it show that the injury was due to an accident in the course of and arising out of his employment.

Death due to disease differs widely from death due to other injury in many obvious respects. The actual occurrence and onset of the illness cannot be stated with the same certainty, the possibility of infection from other sources than the cause of infection present at the work cannot be overlooked; and the difficulty of bringing these conditions within the common meaning of the phrase "accident" is in itself considerable.

The earliest case in which infection by hostile microorganisms was held to be within the statute was Britons, Limited v. Turvey, 1905, A.C. 230. In that case a wool sorter died of anthrax, and it was held that his representatives were entitled to recover. It was found as a fact by the County Court judge who awarded compensation that the disease was caused by the accidental alighting of a bacillus from the infected wool on a part of the deceased's person, which afforded a harbour in which it could multiply and grow, and so cause a malignant disease and consequent death. It was held that this was an accident, because in the words of Lord Macnaghten it was an accident that the noxious germ happened to be present in the material that the deceased was sorting, that it had escaped the preventatives provided by down draught or suck of the fan, that it struck the man in the corner of his eye, and so found entrance into his system, and as this accident caused death the case was clearly within the statute. The importance of this decision lies in the fact that it included disease within the definition of accident, and disregarded the cases that had formerly decided that the onset of the disease must be the sequel of an accident causing physical injury received in the employ

ment.

In Elke v. Hart-Dyke, 1910, 2 K.B. 677, the Court of Appeal decided that enteritis due to inhalation of sewer gas suffered by a man engaged in work on sewers was not an injury by accident. And in Martin v. Manchester Corporation, 1912, 5 B.W.C.C. 259, it was also held that the contraction of

scarlet fever in a fever hospital by a porter whose duty it was to clean out the mortuary and attend to the wards of a fever hospital, was not an injury by accident.

In Jenkins v. Standard Colliery Company, Limited, 1911, 5 B.W.C.C. 71, and Chandler v. Great Western Railway Company, 1912, 5 B.W.C.C. 254, death due to blood-poisoning was also held to be outside the statute. In the former case the decision depended entirely on the consideration of whether the physical injury had been caused in the course of the work, but in the latter the question of.the actual cause of the disease was discussed. A man had injured his thumb away from his work, and the injury was the source of the infection. Both Lord Moulton and Lord Cozens-Hardy were apparently influenced in their conclusion against the claim by the fact that the dirt with which the broken surface would have been brought in contact in the course of the deceased's occupation was not from its nature a probable vehicle for germs.

Against these latter cases, however, there is another series of cases which also demand attention. In Glasgow Coal Company v. Welsh, 1916, S.C. (H.L.) 141, a man contracted rheumatism from standing in water which he had been directed to bale out, and this was held to be an accident within the meaning of the statute. In Drylie v. Alloa Coal Company, 1913, S.C. 549, where a miner on the breakdown of the pumping machinery was kept standing in water and contracted pneumonia, it was held that it was injury due to accident within the meaning of the statute. And in Brown v. John Watson, Limited, 1915, A.C. 1, under similar circumstances the same conclusion was reached. Lord Dundas in Drylie v. Alloa Coal Company expressed the view that disease was not an accident unless it could be definitely collocated, in the relation of effect to cause, with some unusual, unexpected, or undesigned event arising at an ascertained time out of the employment. In Lyons v. Woodilee, 1917, S.C. (H.L.) 48, Lord Loreburn quoted these dicta of Lord Dundas, and added "that as there are many causes of most events, it (i.e., the connection be"tween the work and the disease) must be a connection which is "not as a matter of common sense too remote."

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In the last-mentioned case the arbitrator had found against. the claim, and his decision was upheld on appeal. In the present case of Grant v. Kynoch, however, the Court by a majority held that the connection between the work and the disease was not as a matter of fact too remote, for the arbitrator had found as a fact that the infection setting up blood-poisoning was due to the impregnation of germs acquired by a man

in the course of and arising out of his employment. It was an accident that the germs fell upon the deceased, it was an accident that they came in contact with the abraded surface of his skin, and from these accidental circumstances resulted the illness which ended in death. Accordingly, the House of Lords restored the decision of the arbitrator, and granted the claimant compensation.

ALLOCATION OF FEU-DUTY.

It is rather startling to be told, as we are told by Lord Kyllachy in The British Linen Company v. Ogg and Others, 5th March, 1904, 11 S.L.T. 756, that at common law an allocation of feuduty can only be made by a charter of novodamus duly feudalised, and that if you have recourse to the 8th section of the Conveyancing Act of 1874, an allocation made in virtue of that section can only be granted in favour of a proprietor, and must be written on the disposition in his favour. That Lord Kyllachy is right in this is borne out negatively by the fact that, although it is not uncommon to find allocations of feu-duty in old charters by progress, no forms of such allocations are given in the old style books. There is, indeed, in "The Prac"tical Conveyancer"-a useful book on forms published by George Watson, writer, Edinburgh, in 1867-a form of clause to be inserted in a charter or writ of resignation, providing for what is called a "division" of the feu-duty. The reddendo clause runs that the vassal is to pay a certain annual sum as the proportional part effeiring to the ground dealt with of the total feu-duty payable for the whole original feu; but this is qualified by a declaration that it shall nevertheless be competent to and in the option of the superior to recover the whole feu-duty out of the part of the feu dealt with, reserving merely to the vassal his right of relief against the other proprietors in the feu, the superior being bound to assign the feu-duty, other than the proportion applicable to the subjects dealt with, then resting-owing by the other proprietors, so that the vassal paying may operate his relief against them. This, however, is not an allocation in the modern sense, and has no effect in freeing the grantee's portion of the property from the remainder of the feu-duty. Lord Kyllachy's dictum has the support affirmatively of Mr. Montgomerie Bell. In his Lectures, in dealing with the charter of resignation, Mr. Bell says, "If "the terms of the original feu-right are to be altered by the "parties in any respect, this ought to be done by a clause of "novodamus, which will be introduced in the charter of resignation after the quaequidem ... A charter of resig

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