admired as the very quintessence of genius; Walder's gay sprightliness was mistaken for the tender spirit of Love poetry; and such writers as Suckling and Etheridge were held in esteem for dramatic -composition.

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The question is, what conclusion we are to form from such instances as these? Is there any thing that can be called a standard of Taste, by appealing to which we may distinguish between a good and a bad Taste? Or, is there in truth no such distinction, and are we to hold that, according to the proverb, there is no disputing of Tastes; but that whatever pleases is right, for that reason, that it does please? This is the question, and a very nice and subtle one it is, which we are now to discuss.

I begin by observing, that if there be no such thing as any standard of Taste, this consequence must immediately follow, that all tastes are equally good; a position which, though it may pass unnoticed in slight matters, and when we speak of the lesser differences among the Tastes of men, yet when we apply it to the extremes, presently shews its absurdity. For is there any one who will seriously maintain that the Taste of a Hottentot or a Laplander is as delicate and as correct as that of a Longinus or an Addison? or that he can be charged with no defect or incapacity, who thinks a common news-writer as excellent an Historian as Tacitus? As it would be held downright extravagance to talk in this manner, we are led unavoidably to this conclusion, that there is some foundation for the preference of one man's Taste to that of another; or that there is a good and a bad, a right and a wrong, in Taste, as in other things.

But to prevent mistakes on this subject, it is necessary to observe next, that the diversity of Tastes which prevails among mankind, does not in every case infer corruption of Taste, or oblige us to seek for some standard in order to determine who are in the right. The tastes of men may differ very considerably as to their object, and yet none of them be wrong. One man relishes Poetry most; another takes pleasure in nothing but History. One prefers Comedy; another, Tragedy. One admires the simple, another the ornamented style. The young are amused with gay and sprightly compositions. The elderly are more entertained with those of a graver cast. Some nations delight in bold pictures of manners, and strong representations of passion. Others incline to more correct and regular elegance both in description and sentiment. Though all differ, yet all pitch upon some one beauty which peculiarly suits their turn of mind; and therefore no one has a title to condemn the rest. It is not in matters of Taste, as in questions of mere reason, where there is but one conclusion that can be true, and all the rest are erroneous. Truth, which is the object of reason, is one; Beauty, which is the object of Taste, is manifold. Taste, therefore, admits of latitude and diversity of objects, in sufficient consistency with goodness or justness of Taste.

But then, to explain this matter thoroughly, I must observe farther, that this admissible diversity of Tastes can only have place where the objects of Taste are different. Where it is with respect to the same object that men disagree, when one condemns that as ugly, which another admires as highly beautiful; then it is no longer diversity, but direct oppo

sition of Taste that takes place; and therefore one must be in the right, and another in the wrong, unless that absurd paradox were allowed to hold, that all Tastes are equally good and true. One man prefers Virgil to Homer. Suppose that I, on the other hand, admire Homer more than Virgil. I have as yet no reason to say that our Tastes are contradictory. The other person is more struck with the elegance and tenderness which are the characteristics of Virgil: I, with the simplicity and fire of Homer. As long as neither of us deny that both Homer and Virgil have great beauties, our difference falls within the compass of that diversity of Tastes, which I have shewed to be natural and allowable. But if the other man shall assert that Homer has no beauties whatever; that he holds him to be a dull and spiritless writer, and that he would as soon peruse any old legend of Knight-errantry, as the Iliad; then I exclaim, that my antagonist either is void of all Taste, or that his taste is corrupted in a miserable degree; and I appeal to whatever I think the standard of Taşte, to shew him that he is in the wrong.

What that standard is, to which in such opposition of Tastes, we are obliged to have recourse, remains to be traced. A standard properly signifies, that which is of such undoubted authority as to be the test of other things of the same kind. Thus a standard weight or measure is that which is appointed by law to regulate all other measures and weights. Thus the court is said to be the standard of good breeding; and the scripture of theological truth.

When we say that nature is the standard of Taste, we lay down a principle very true and just, as far as

it can be applied. There is no doubt, that in all cases where an imitation is intended of some object that exists in nature, as in representing human characters or actions, conformity to nature affords a full and distinct criterion of what is truly beautiful. Reason hath in such cases full scope for exerting its authority, for approving or condemning; by comparing the copy with the original. But there are innumerable cases in which this rule cannot be at all applied; and conformity to nature, is an expression frequently used, without any distinct or determinate meaning. We must therefore search for somewhat that can be rendered more clear and precise, to be the standard of Taste.

Taste, as I before explained it, is ultimately founded on an internal sense of beauty, which is natural to men, and which, in its application to particular objects, is capable of being guided and enlightened by reason. Now, were there any one person who possessed in full perfection all the powers of human nature, whose internal senses were in every instance exquisite and just, and whose reason was unerring and sure, the determinations of such a person concerning beauty, would, beyond doubt, be a perfect standard for the Taste of all others. Whereever their Taste differed from his, it could be imputed only to some imperfection in their natural powers. But as there is no such living standard, no one person to whom all mankind will allow such submission to be due, what is there of sufficient authority to be the standard of the various and opposite Tastes of men; most certainly there is nothing but the Taste, as far as it can be gathered, of human nature. That which men concur the most in admiring must be held

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to be beautiful. His Taste must be esteemed just and true, which coincides with the general senti-> ments of men. In this standard we must rest. To the sense of mankind the ultimate appeal must ever lie, in all works of Taste. If any one should maintain that sugar was bitter and tobacco was sweet, no reasonings could avail to prove it. The Taste of such a person would infallibly be held to be diseased, merely because it differed so widely from the Taste: of the species to which he belongs. In like manner, with regard to the objects of sentiment or internal Taste, the common feelings of men carry the same authority, and have a title to regulate the Taste of every individual.

But have we, then, it will be said, no other criterion of what is beautiful than the approbation of the majority? Must we collect the voices of others, before we form any judgment for ourselves, of what deserves applause in Eloquence or Poetry? By no means; there are principles of reason and sound judgment which can be applied to matters of Taste, as well as to the subjects of science and philosophy. He who admires or censures any work of genius, is always ready, if his Taste be in any degree improved, to assign some reasons for his decision. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which he proceeds. Taste is a sort of compound power, inc which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or less, with the feelings of sentiment.

But, though reason can carry us a certain length in judging concerning works of Taste, it is not to bet forgotten that the ultimate conclusions to which our reasonings lead, refer at last to sense and perception. We may speculate and argue concerning propriety of

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