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conduct in a Tragedy, or an Epic Poem. Just reasonings on the subject will correct the caprice of unenlightened Taste, and establish principles for judging of what deserves praise. But, at the same time,

these reasonings appeal always, in the last resort, to feeling. The foundation upon which they rest, is, what has been found from, experience to please mankind universally. Upon this ground we prefer a simple and natural, to an artificial and affected style;, a regular and well-connected story, to loose and scattered narratives; a catastrophe which is tender and pathetic, to one which leaves us, unmoved. It is from consulting our own imagination and heart, and from attending to the feelings of others, that any principles are formed which acquire authority in matters of Taste.*

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* The difference between the authors who found the standard of Taste upon the common feelings of human nature ascertained by general approbation, and those who found it upon established principles which can be ascertained by reason, is more apparent than a real difference. Like many other literary controversies, it turns chiefly on modes of expression. For they! who lay the greatest stress on sentiment and feeling, make no scruple of applying argument and reason to matters of Taste. They appeal, like other writers, to established principles, in judging of the excellencies of Eloquence or Poetry; and plainly shew, that the general approbation, to which they ultimately recur, is an approbation resulting from discussion as well as from sentiment. They, on the other hand, who, in order to vindicate Taste from any suspicion of being arbitrary, maintainthat it is ascertainable by the standard of Reason, admit nevertheless, that what pleases universally, must on that account be held to be truly beautiful; and that no rules or conclusions concerning objects of taste, can have any just authority, if they be found to contradict the general sentiments of men. These two

When we refer to the concurring sentiments of men, as the ultimate test of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts, this is to be always understood of men placed in such situations as are favourable to the proper exertions of Taste. Every one must perceive, that among rude and uncivilized nations, and during the ages of ignorance and darkness, any loose notions that are entertained concerning such subjects carry no authority. In those states of society, Taste has no materials on which to operate. It is either totally suppressed, or appears in its lowest and most imperfect form. We refer to the sentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations; when arts are cultivated and manners refined; when works of genius are subjected to free discussion, and Taste is improved by Science and Philosophy.

Even among nations, at such a period of society, I admit, that accidental causes may occasionally warp the proper operations of Taste; sometimes the state of religion, sometimes the form of government, may for a while pervert it; a licentious court may introduce a taste for false ornaments, and dissolute writings. The usage of one admired genius may procure approbation for his faults, and even render them fashionable. Sometimes envy may have power to bear down, for a little, productions of great merit; while popular humour, or party spirit, may, at other times, exalt to a high, though short-lived, reputation,

systems, therefore, differ in reality very little from one another. Sentiment and Reason enter into both; and by allowing to each of these powers its due place, both systems may be rendered consistent. Accordingly, it is in this light that I have endeavoured to place the subject.

what little deserved it. But though such casual circumstances give the appearance of caprice to the judgments of Taste, that appearance is easily corrected. In the course of time, the genuine taste of human nature never fails to disclose itself, and to gain the ascendant over any fantastic and corrupted modes of Taste which may chance to have been introduced. These may have currency for awhile, and mislead superficial judges; but being subjected to examination, by degrees they pass away; while that alone remains which is founded on sound reason, and the native feelings of men.

I by no means pretend that there is any standard of Taste, to which in every particular instance, we can resort for clear and immediate determination. Where, indeed, is such a standard to be found for deciding any of those great controversies in reason and philosophy, which perpetually divide mankind? In the present case, there was plainly no occasion for any such strict and absolute provision to be made. In order to judge of what is morally good or evil, of what man ought, or ought not in duty to do, it was fit that the means of clear and precise determination should be afforded us. But to ascertain in every case with the utmost exactness what is beautiful or elegant, was not at all necessary to the happiness of man. And therefore some diversity in feeling was here allowed to take place; and room was left for discussion and debate, concerning the degree of approbation to which any work of genius is entitled.

The conclusion, which it is sufficient for us to rest upon, is, that Taste is far from being an arbitrary principle, which is subject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits of no criterion for deter

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mining whether it be false or true.

Its foundation is the same in all human minds. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which in general operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general Taste of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they please, concerning the caprice and the uncertainty of Taste, it is found by experience, that there are beauties, which, if they be displayed in a proper light, have power to command lasting and general admiration. In every composition, what interests the imagination and touches the heart, pleases all ages and all nations. There is a certain string to which, when properly struck, the human heart is so made as to

answer.

Hence the universal testimony which the most improved nations of the earth have conspired, throughout a long tract of ages, to give to some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Eneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which such works have acquired as standards, in some degree of poetical composition; since from them, we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which therefore poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a temporary reputation to an indifferent poet, or a bad artist: but when foreigners, or when posterity, examine his works, his faults are discerned, and the genuine Taste of human nature

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appears. Opinionum commenta delet dies; na"turæ judicia confirmat." Time overthrows the illusions of opinion, but establishes the decisions of

nature.

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TASTE, Criticism, and Genius, are words currently employed, without distinct ideas annexed to them. In beginning a course of Lectures where such words must often occur, it is necessary to ascertain their meaning with some precision. Having in the last Lecture treated of Taste, I proceed to explain the nature and foundation of Criticism. True Criticism is the application of Taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. The object which it proposes is, to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of Genius.

The rules of Criticism are not formed by any induction, à priori, as it is called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observations. Criticism is an

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