the repetition of it here became indispensable, in order to avoid ambiguity. Not to mention, he adds, the invasions from the Goths and l'andals, which are too obvious to insist on. One would imagine him to mean, that the invasions from the Goths and Vandals are historical facts too well known and obvious to be insisted on. But he means quite a different thing, though he has not taken the proper method of expressing it, through his haste, probably, to finish the paragraph; namely, that these invasions from the Goths and Vandals were causes of the corruption of the Roman Language too obvious to be insisted on.

I shall not pursue this criticism any farther. I have been obliged to point out many inaccuracies in the passage which we have considered. But in

order that my observations may not be construed as meant to depreciate the Style or the Writings of Dean Swift below their just value, there are two remarks which I judge it necessary to make before concluding this Lecture. One is, that it were unfair to estimate an Author's Style on the whole, by some passage in his writings, which chances to be composed in a careless manner. This is the case with respect to this treatise, which has much the appearance of a hasty production; though, as I before observed, it was by no means on that account that I pitched upon it, for the subject of this exercise. But after having examined it, I am sensible that, in many other of his writings, the Dean is more

accurate.

My other observation, which is equally applicable to Dean Swift and Mr. Addison, is, that there may be writers much freer from such inaccuracies, as I have had occasion to point out in these two, whose

Style, however, upon the whole, may not have half their merit. Refinement in Language has, of late years, begun to be much attended to. In several modern productions of very small value, I should find it difficult to point out many errors in Language. The words might probably be all proper words, correctly and clearly arranged, and the turn of the sentence sonorous and musical; whilst yet the Style, upon the whole, might deserve no praise. The

fault often lies in what may be called the general cast or complexion of the Style; which a person of a good taste discerns to be vicious; to be feeble, for instance, and diffuse; flimsy or affected; petulant or ostentatious; though the faults cannot be so easily pointed out and particularised, as when they lie in some erroneous or negligent construction of a sentence. Whereas, such writers as Addison and Swift carry always those general characters of good Style, which, in the midst of their occasional negligences, every person of good taste must liscern and approve. We see their faults overbalanced by higher beauties. We see a writer of sense and reflection expressing his sentiments without affectation; attentive to thoughts as well as to words; and, in the main current of his Language, elegant and beautiful; and, therefore, the only proper use to be made of the blemishes which occur in the writings of such Authors, is to point out to those who apply themselves to the study of composition, some of the rules which they ought to observe for avoiding such errors; and to render them sensible of the necessity of strict attention to Language and to Style. Let them imitate the ease and simplicity of those great Authors; let them study to be always natural, and, as far as

they can, always correct in their expressions; let them endeavour to be, at some times, lively and striking; but carefully avoid being at any time ostentatious and affected.

LECTURE XXV.

ELOQUENCE, OR PUBLIC SPEAKING. HISTORY OF ELOQUENCE GRECIAN ELOQUENCE DEMOS. THENES.

HAVING finished that part of the Course which relates to Language and Style, we are now to ascend a step higher, and to examine the subjects upon which Style is employed. I begin with what is properly called Eloquence, or Public Speaking. In treating of this, I am to consider the different kinds and subjects of Public Speaking; the manner suited to each; the proper distribution and management of all the parts of a discourse; and the proper pronun, ciation or delivery of it. But before I enter on any of these heads, it may be proper to take a view of the nature of Eloquence in general, and of the state in which it has subsisted in different ages and countries. This will lead into some detail; but I hope an useful one; as in every art it is of great consequence to have a just idea of the perfection of that art, of the end at which it aims, and of the progress which it has made among mankind.

indeed, below But nothing To be truly

For the best

Of Eloquence, in particular, it is the more necessary to ascertain the proper notion, because there is not any thing concerning which false notions have been more prevalent. Hence, it has been so often, and is still at this day in disrepute with many. When you speak to a plain man of Eloquence, or in praise of it, he is apt to hear you with very little attention. He conceives Eloquence to signify a certain trick of Speech; the art of varnishing weak arguments plausibly; or of speaking so as to please and tickle the ear. "Give me good sense," says he, "and keep "your Eloquence for boys." He is in the right, if Eloquence were what he conceives it to be. It would be then a very contemptible art the study of any wise or good man. can be more remote from truth. eloquent is to speak to the purpose. definition which, I think, can be given of Eloquence is the Art of Speaking in such a manner as to attain the end for which we speak. Whenever a man speaks or writes, he is supposed, as a rational being, to have some end in view; either to inform, or to amuse, or to persuade, or, in some way or other, to act upon his fellow creatures. He who speaks, or writes, in such a manner as to adapt all his words most effectually to that end, is the most eloquent man. Whatever then the subject be, there is room for Eloquence; in history, or even in philosophy, as well as in orations. The definition which I have given of Eloquence, comprehends all the different kinds of it; whether calculated to instruct, to persuade, or to please. But, as the most important subject of discourse is Action, or Conduct, the power of Eloquence chiefly appears when it is employed to influence Con

duct, and persuade to Action. As it is principally with reference to this end, that it becomes the object of Art, Eloquence may, under this view of it, be defined, The Art of Persuasion.

This being once established, certain consequences immediately follow, which point out the fundamental maxims of the Art. It follows clearly, that, in order to persuade, the most essential requisites are, solid argument, clear method, a character of probity appearing in the Speaker, joined with such graces of style and utterance as shall draw our attention to what he says. Good sense is the foundation of all. No man can be truly eloquent without it; for fools can persuade none but fools. In order to persuade a man of sense, you must first convince him; which is only to be done by satisfying his understanding of the reasonableness of what you propose to him.

This leads me to observe, that convincing and persuading, though they are sometimes confounded, import, notwithstanding, different things, which it is necessary for us, at present, to distinguish from each other. Conviction affects the understanding only; persuasion the will and the practice. It is the business of the philosopher to convince me of truth; it is the business of the orator to persuade me to act agreeably to it, by engaging my affections on its side. Conviction and persuasion do not always go together. They ought, indeed to go together; and would do so, if our inclination regularly followed the dictates of our understanding. But as our nature is constituted, I may be convinced that virtue, justice, or public spirit, are laudable, while at the same time, I am not persuaded to act according to them. The inclination may revolt, though the understanding be