sion, have disseminated, from an ignorance or perversion of facts, suspicions, jealousies, and accusations of the whole government." Notwithstanding the disagreement between the executive and one branch of the legislature concerning self-created societies, and the policy observed towards foreign nations, the speech of the President was treated with marked respect; and the several subjects which it recommended engaged the immediate attention of Congress. A bill was passed authorizing the President to station a detachment of militia in the four western counties of Pennsylvania; provision was made to compensate those whose property had been destroyed by the insurgents, should those who had committed the injury be unable to repair it: and an appropriation exceeding one million one hundred thousand dollars was made to defray the expenses occasioned by the insurrection. only will those causes of dissatisfaction be urged which really operate on the minds of intelligent men, but every instrument will be seized which can effect the purpose, and the passions will be inflamed by whatever may serve to irritate them. Among the multiplied evils generated by faction, it is perhaps not the least that it has a tendency to abolish all distinction between virtue and vice; and to prostrate those barriers which the good and wise have erected for the protection of morals, and which are defended solely by opinion. The victory of the party becomes the great object; and, too often, all measures are deemed right or wrong as they tend to promote or impede it. The attainment of the end is considered as the supreme good, and the detestable doctrine is adopted that the end will justify the means. The mind habituated to the extenuation of acts of moral turpitude, becomes gradually contaminated, and loses that delicate sensibility which instinctively inspires hor- Many of the difficulties which had occurred in drawror for vice and respect for virtue. In the intemper- ing out the militia were removed, and a bill was introate abuse which was cast on the principal measures of duced to give greater energy to the militia system genethe government, and on those who supported them, in rally; but this subject possessed so many intrinsic diffithe violence with which the discontents of the oppo-culties, that the session passed away without effecting nents to those measures were expressed, and especially any thing respecting it. in the denunciations which were uttered against them by the democratic societies, the friends of the administration searched for the causes of that criminal attempt which had been made in the western parts of Pennsylvania to oppose the will of the nation by force of arms. Had those misguided men believed that this opposition was to be confined within their own limits, they could not have been so mad, or so weak, as to have engaged in it. The ideas of the President on this subject were freely given to some of his confidential friends. "The real people," he said, "occasionally assembled to express their sentiments on political subjects, ought never to be confounded with permanent self-appointed societies, usurping the right to control the constituted authories, and to dictate to public opinion. While the former was entitled to respect, the latter was incompatible with all government, and must either sink into general disesteem, or finally overturn the established order of things." From the Philadelphia Gazette. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED The United States," VS. Fourteen packages On motion for a new trial. OPINION OF JUDGE HOPKINSON. the verdict; and to support the motion on the part of the Numerous reasons have been filed in this case against claimants for a new trial. Some of them have not been and therefore will not require particular attention from touched or insisted upon in the argument on the motion, the Court. Such as have been maintained in the argument, will be considered and disposed of. The rea sons are, In his speech at the opening of Congress, the President detailed at considerable length the progress of oppo-issue between the United States and Kirby, Beard and 1 and 2. "Because the Jury were sworn to try the sition to the laws, the means employed both by the legis- Kirby, whereas no such issue exists upon the record. lature and executive to appease the discontents which Because the Jury were incorrectly qualified.” had been fomented, and the measures he had finally taken to reduce the refractory to submission. As commander in chief of the militia, when called into actual service, he had, he said, visited the places of general rendezvous, to obtain more correct information, and to direct a plan for ulterior movements. Had there been room for a persuasion that the laws were secure from obstruction, "he should have caught with avidity the opportunity of restoring the militia to their families and homes. But succeeding intelligence had tended to manifest the necessity of what had been done; it being now confessed by those who were not inclined to exaggerate the ill conduct of the insurgents, that their malevolence was not pointed merely to a particular law; but that a spirit inimical to all order had actuated many of the offenders. I have no doubt that the Jury were properly sworn both as regards the real parties in interest, and as they appear upon the record; but I shall put the dismission of this exception on another ground. It is now After bestowing a high encomium on the alacrity and promptitude with which persons in every station had come forward to assert the dignity of the laws, thereby furnishing an additional proof that they understood the true principles of government and liberty, and felt their inseparable union; he added-"To every description of citizens let praise be given. But let them persevere in their affectionate vigilance over that precious depository of American happiness,-the constitution of the United States. And when in the calm moments of reflection, they shall have retraced the origin and progress of the insurrection, let them determine whether it has not been fomented by combinations of men who, careless of con-lates to alleged errors of the court. sequences, and disregarding the unerring truth that The first four Jurors called to the book, were sworn to try the issue between the United States and fourCo., were the claimants. The counsel for the claimteen packages of goods, whereof Cardwell, Potter and him that Cardwell, Potter and Co., were not the claimants immediately interrupted the clerk, and observed to ants, but the agents of the claimants, who were Kirby, Peard and Kirby, and that the Jury should be so sworn. Under this direction, to which the District Attorney agreed, the four Jurors were re-sworn according to it, and all the other Jurors were also so sworn. been so sworn or qualified; that Kirby, Beard and Kirby objected to the verdict, that the Jury should not have are not the claimants on the record, but the issue was between the United States and Cardwell, Potter and Co, claimants. Can it be imagined that a court holding the power to set aside a verdict, and grant a new trial, for the purposes of justice, would exercise that power under such circumstances, when the error, if any, was the error of the party who would now take advantage of it; and which is confessedly a mere matter of form, and pure technicality, having no influence or bearing on the merits of the case? It is impossible. This is the first class or head of reasons; the next re 1 and 2. "In admitting the three appraisements to be those who rouse cannot always appease a civil convul. 'received in evidence." This exception was passed over on the argument. Indeed I know not what could have been said for it, as the appraisements in question were not only a part of the proceedings directed in such cases by the act of Congress, but were read to the Jury on the express call of the counsel of the claimants. 3d. "In admitting in evidence the invoices of John Siter, William Chaloner, Joseph Brown and John Bury." As to the invoices of Siter, Chaloner and Brown, they were neither offered nor given in evidence. Those gentlemen had severally made importations of articles similar to those in question, and they were examined as to the prices they had paid for them. They did refer, without objection, to their invoices to assist their memories in ascertaining the prices; but the invoices were not read to the Jury, or, in any other manner, made a part of the evidence of the cause. No exception was taken or noted by the claimants to the decision of the court on the admissibility of the question "what were the prices paid by the witnesses for these articles?" although the question was objected to; and as to the invoices, they were used in no other way than that mentioned. The invoice of John Bury was offered and read in evidence and also the letter which accompanied itbecause both the invoice and the letter came from the claimants, and were clearly evidence against them. If this were not so, their admission can afford no ground of exception to the verdict, as they were given to the Jury without objection. These are all the reasons founded on supposed errors of the court in the course of the trial; another class lates to alleged errors in the charge to the Jury. 5 The 2d error under this fourth head relates to the appraisements and was not noticed in the argument. The 3d error of this head, which relates to "the small invoice" was also passed by in the argument. As to that paper I told the Jury, that there was a mystery about it which had not been explained; not merely because it gave a different valuation to the goods, from that in the regular invoice by which the goods were offered for entry-but that it purported to be a bill of sale from Kirby, Beard and Kirby, to Potter, Cardwell and Co., when in truth no such was made; but the goods were sent to this country for and on account of Kirby, Beard and Kirby, and Potter, Cardwell and Co., were but the consignees, having no ownership in them, nor interest but as consignees. I stated other circumstances which threw a cloud of suspicion over this part of the case, together with the explanations that were offered on the part of the claimants; and left the whole to the Jury for their consideration, with this observation-"The Jury must say what this paper means, and whether it gives rise to any suspicion of an unfair intention." 4th error-"In instructing the Jury that the appraise. ments were made with great care and were therefore entitled to great weight in the consideration of the case." cannot perceive in what was the error or the mischief As these appraisements were received in evidence, I to say that they had been made with great care. The appraisements under their oaths taken here, as they had appraisers appeared before the Jury and made the same under their official oaths taken at the Custom House. re-ral days, occupied in the business, and the means they They explained particularly the time, which was sevetook to obtain information, to assist them in ascertaining the true value of the articles at the time and place required by the law. Was there any error in telling the Jury that appraisements thus made, for whatever purpose they were given in evidence, were entitled to their respect in proportion to the care with which they had been made? I think not. 1st. "In instructing the Jury, that there was nothing in the objection that the act of 28th May, 1830, was unknown to the house of Kirby, Beard and Kirby before they shipped the goods in question." I cannot withhold the expression of my surprise that this reason should be seriously urged to the court, how ever expedient it might have been to address it to a Jury, to enlist their feelings for the claimants on a supposed ignorance of the law they were offending. What is the purport and effect of the law of 28th May, 1830? Is it to create a new offence to make that unlawful which was before lawful? Certainly not so. The of fence they have committed was always a violation of the laws of the United States, visited by certain and severe penalties. But these penalties were found not to be adequate to prevent the offence. The temptations to cupidity were too strong to be restrained by an increase of duties on the goods which were falsely invoiced. The penalty was therefore enlarged to an entire and absolute forfeiture of the goods. The plea of the claimants is "we knew that by making up this false invoice, with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States, we were violating one of their laws but we supposed that in case of a detection we should suffer only by an increased charge upon our goods and not by their forfeiture, and therefore we are innocent; therefore we should be acquitted of all penalty and the Jury should have so rendered their verdict." This is a most extra. ordinary course of reasoning in law or morals. Besides, did Messrs. Kirby, Beard and Kirby, require to have a knowledge of the enactments of the act of 28th May, 1830, to teach them that fraud and perjury are crimes every where, under all circumstances and upon all subjects? And it was only by and through fraud and perjury that the offence charged and proved upon them by the verdict of a most respectable and intelligent Jury, could have been perpetrated. But, in their code of morals, fraud and perjury are nothing unless they are to be followed by a forfeiture of goods. These remarks are reluctantly made; but they are rendered necessary by the perseverance and zeal with which the reason has been pressed first upon the jury and now again upon the court. The 5th error under this head, has not been insisted upon; indeed it is a mistake in point of fact. The Jury were told to consider John Bury's testimony, of special importance, because it came from the claimants themselves; but this was not said as to Mr. Siter's evidence. We come now to the 5th general class.-"Because the court did not instruct the Jury upon the rule of law, pressed in argument by the counsel of the claimants, in reference to the testimony of Donald Mcllvain, viz:That he was entitled to belief unless impeached, and that no such attempt having been made, he stood before the Jury entirely worthy of credit; but on the contrary remarked that it was strange he did not purchase at the prices named." If the Judge had instructed upon the point as the exception requires him to do, he might indeed have been charged with invading the rights of the Jury. If there be any thing which peculiarly belongs to them in the trial of a cause, it is to judge of the credibility of witnesses, and it is not for the court to "direct or instruct" them who is "entitled to belief”—or who stands before them "entirely worthy of credit." As to the evidence of Donald McIlvain, if I had told the Jury my opinion of it, it would have been that it was impeached by all the evidence of the cause, and by circumstances testified by himself. I repeat now, what I said to the Jury, it is difficult to reconcile the evidence of Donald Mellvain with his conduct; it is difficult to discover why, if he were desirous of purchasing goods for himself, and had orders to do so from others, he did not take them at the prices he says they were offered to him for, as these prices were certainly lower than any other sales or offers we had any account of, and much lower than the actual sales made about the same time. It is difficult also to reconcile his testimony with the letter and invoice received by John Bury, from Kirby, Beard and Kirby, in which the pins are charged at a much higher price than Donald McIlvain says the same house offered them to him for, at or near the same time, and which prices Kirby, Beard and Kirby assured Mr. Bury were their lowest. After these remarks I told the Jury that nevertheless, Mr. McIlvain had sworn posi⚫tively to the fact, and they would give the weight they thought proper to his evidence, under all the evidence and circumstances of the case. There is another answer to this exception to the charge of the court which I mention not because it is necessary in the case, but on account of its general importance. If the counsel in a cause desire to have the opinion of the court given to the Jury upon any point or matter of law, it is their duty to state it explicitly, and to ask the opinion of the court, or they cannot make the silence of the court, or an omission to instruct the Jury on that point, a ground for a new trial. Misdirection is always a good ground, but not an omission to direct, where no direction is required. It is not enough to say, that the counsel "pressed a point in his argument;" he must do more-no court is bound to give specific answers to, or notices of, all the matters the counsel may think it expedient to press upon them in the argument. When a charge or opinion of the court is wanted on a particular point, it must be particularly stated and asked for; such is the practice, and such it ought to be; or verdicts would be perpetually in danger from concealed objections. The 6th error, "Because the court told the Jury that the claimants had known the testimony of the United States for eighteen months—and yet produced none to contradict it; there being no proof of that knowledge made at the trial, and the court being entirely mistaken as to the fact." The entire mistake as to the fact is found in the exception and not in the court. I speak not of my personal knowledge that this case was formerly heard before me and proceeded on to the close of the testimony on the part of the United States, when it was dismissed on discovering that it was a case for a Jury and not for the Judge alone. But on this trial of the cause, the former hearing was repeatedly referred to by the counsel on both sides Indeed in the cross-examination of some of the witnesses of the United States, they were questioned by the claimants' counsel as to what they had said as to the evidence they had given-on the former hearing. I reminded the Jury of this fact, that there had been a former hearing at which these witnesses had been fully examined in the presence of the claimants' counsel and cross-examined by him; and remarked to them that by this means the claimants had been made acquainted with the evidence by which they were assailed, and had had full time to repel it; but that they had not produced a single importer of pins in the United States, to prove that he had purchased pins at the prices of their invoices, nor any manufacturer in England, to say that he had sold them at such prices. I see no error or extension of the court over the Jury in these observations; or departure from the evidence in this The generality of this exception admits only of a general answer-and it might be dismissed for the reason that it specifies nothing; but I will take the occasion to state what I believe to be the right, and duty of a court in charging a Jury, beyond which not a step was taken in this case. That the question of fact should not be taken from the Jury by the court is too clear to be the subject of discussion; but I hold it to be equaily certain, that it is the right and duty of the court to give its aid to the Jury in explaining the evidence; in collating its various parts; in drawing their attention to the most material facts in proof and their application to, and bearing upon the important points of the case; in ascertain ing between contradictory testimony which is best entitled to belief; with such comments as will clearly explain to them the view taken by the court of the case. All that is necessary is, that the Jury should distinctly and explicitly understand that such observations are to be received by them merely for the purpose of assisting them in their deliberations, of recalling their recollection to the facts testified, and turning their attention to the true points of inquiry; but that the decision to be made upon the evidence belongs altogether to them, and that no direction or authoritative instruction is to be given concerning them. These doctrines are fully recognized and strongly enforced by Starkie, (1 Evid. 440. 1.) This respectable author says:-"The prac tice of advising the Jury, as to the nature, bearing, tendency and weight of evidence, although it be a duty which, from its very nature, must be, in a great measure discretionary on the part of the Judge, is one, which does not yield in importance to the more definite and ordinary one of directing them in matters of law. The trial by Jury is a system admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, but, in order to obtain the full benefit to be derived from the united discernment of a Jury, it must be admitted to be essential, that their attention should be skilfully directed to the points material for their consideration." After some further remarks, this author adds that-"Jurors unaccustomed, as they usually are, to judicial investigations, require in complica. ted cases, all the aid which can be derived from the experience and penetration of the Judges, to direct their attention to the essential points, and enable them to arrive at a just conclusion." Again, after saying that the Jury should have "excluded from their consideration all such evidence as is likely to embarrass, mislead or prejudice them in the course of the inquiry," he proceeds "much yet remains to be done of a nature which cannot be defined; to divest a case of all its legal incumbrances; to resolve a complicated mass of evidence into its most simple elements; to exhibit clearly the connexion, bearing, and importance of its distinct and separated parts, and their combined tendency and effects, stripped of every intrinsic and superfluous consideration, which might otherwise embarrass and mislead a Jury; and to do this in a manner suited to the comprehension and understanding of an ordinary Jury, some of the most arduous as well as the most important duties incident to the judicial office." In this powerful delinea. tion of what a charge to a Jury ought to be, who is not reminded of the clear and luminous order; of the strong and satisfactory discriminations; and the admirable combination of facts and circumstances, with which Judge Washington discharged this most arduous as well as most important duty of the judicial office? I have quoted the opinions of this author which he sustains by authority, thus at large, because I think them replete with good sense and practical ability; and that it is only by following them that the trial by Jury will be attended by invaluable advantages which belong to it. It is a solecism to say that a court may set aside the verdict of a Jury, if, in the opinion of the court, it be contrary to evidence; and yet that is an invasion of the right of the Jury over the facts, if the court should present to them their views of the evidence to prevent the error instead of correcting it. In the case in question no instance has been pointed out in which the court exceeded or even filled the space allowed. The evidence given on the trial was arranged in the order of the points to be considered and decided, but its effect was left fully and without prejudice to the Jury. The witnesses were named, and the circumstances alluded to which might detract from or give weight to their testimony, but their credibility, positive and comparative, was distinctly submitted to the judgment of the Jury. Finally, the allegation of the exception, that the "charge of the court was such as to take away the question of fact from the Jury" has not been supported by any reference to the charge, or any part of it, found 1832.] in the notes of the Judge, or in those of any of the The 9th error. "Because the court erred in saying, that the various expressions in the acts of Congress upon the subject of value, and the computation of advalorem duties, were unimportant in the case; also in saying that to prove the value in London, value at Manchester, Liverpool and Warrington could be a guide." We find in this exception, the same error which attends so many of those we have to consider in this case; that is, an entire mistake of what was said by the court. I will transcribe from my notes, what I did say to the "All the evidence which has Jury on this subject, been given of prices, of market value, or fair market value, or current value, or actual value, is to bring you to the same conclusion, to a satisfactory answer to the question you are trying: Is the valuation of these goods in this invoice a false valuation as charged in the information, which is the offence described in the act of Congress of 1830, on which this information is founded? Were these goods really worth more in the London market? Were the buying and selling prices higher in that market, than those charged in this invoice at the time when this invoice was made up? However the phrases may vary in the different acts of Congress-current value-actual value-or market value, the inquiry with you always is-does the invoice contain a true valuation of these pins, or a false one? and the phraseology of the law is important on this issue, only as it may assist you in answering and deciding this question. Were these pins, or similar pins, bought and sold in the London Are the valumarket, in June, 1830, at these prices? I see no error in ations of this invoice true or false?" any part of these remarks. As to the other branch of this exception, that the court erred in saying "that to prove value at London, value at Manchester, Liverpool and Warrington, could be a guide,”-the Jury were constantly kept in mind that they were to inquire into and decide upon the value at London, and that the prices and value at the other places mentioned, of which evidence was given on both sides, were to be considered by them only as auxiliary to that purpose, and they might make it so, as the witness had stated what was the ordinary difference of prices in these markets, when any existed. Some illustrations were given to show that the evidence was not to be confined literally to the time and place of exportation, or it would tie us down to the hour and to the exact spot where the manufactory or warehouse stands. reasons. proper, on his own responsibility. But is was a strong "Because when the Jury came in, The 10th error. and one of them asked, whether in making up his opinion, he was at liberty to avail himself of his own preIn the case before as, the question asked by the Juvious knowledge, the court replied-"your oath is to decide according to the evidence; that is the only pro-ror, and the answer given by the court, are thus stated per guide to your decision." The language used by the court to the Jury was not precisely that stated in the exception; although the difference may not be important. I am willing to give my answer its full and fair meaning, such as was probably understood by him. It certainly was not, nor was it intended to be, a prohibition to the Juror, to avail himself of his knowledge of the subject; to his giving his verdict on any ground, or for any reason he might think on my notes. They were read at the time to the Juror in the presence of the counsel, and agreed to be correct. One of the Jurors asks-"Whether he may avail him self of any previous knowledge he has of the subject, in giving his verdict, the court replied-that the ques tion is answered by the oath of the Juror to try the cause, and a true verdict give, according to the evidence." I think, indeed, (although it is not on my notes,) that now notice. the evidence of a cause, is, that which is delivered on oath, in the presence of the court and the parties. The question was suddenly put to the court, and immediately answered, as I now think, with too much reserve; and that I might, and, perhaps, ought to have been more decided and peremptory in my instruction to the Juror, to disregard his private knowledge, and to render his verdict solely on the legal and open testimony of the cause. I am confirmed in this opinion, not only by the cases already referred to, but by others I shall not When a remedy for a false verdict, or one contrary to evidence, could be obtained only by attaining the Jury, (a very severe proceeding against them) every presumption or possibility was resorted to in order to support the verdict, and save the Jury from a judgment of attaint. But a salutary and reasonable change has taken place in the law, of setting aside verdicts, since the practice of attainting Jurors has been disused; and these mistakes are corrected by the most liberal and efficacious remedy, of granting new trials. In 3 Bac. Ab. 778, speaking of attainting Jurors, it is said, "But to attaint them for finding contrary to evidence is not so easy, because they may have evidence of their own cognizance of the matter before them, or they may find, on distrust of witnesses, on their own proper knowledge." This is the law of the text, and the old authorities are given for it; but in a note, it is thus modified and corrected-"If a Jury give a verdict on their own knowledge, they ought to tell the court so, that they may be sworn as witnesses, and the fair way is to tell the court, before they are sworn, that they have evidence to give." The case in Salkeld, already referred to, is here cited. The modern doc. trine is more explicitly stated by Starkie, (1 Evid: 405, "Neither Judge nor Juror can notice facts within his private knowledge, he ought to be sworn and state them as a witness." A note informs us that the law was formerly otherwise, and cites Plowd. 83.-Partridge vs. Strange. The ancient doctrine was founded, as I have said, on the law of attaints. "The note proceeds, "But this doctrine was again gradually exploded when attaints began to be disused, and new trials introduced in their stead. It is quite incompatible with the grounds on which new trials are every day awarded, viz. that the verdict was given without, or contrary to evidence." In the same volume, 448-"It is now perfectly settled that a Juror cannot give a verdict founded on his own private knowledge; for it could not be known whether the verdict was according to or against evidence: it is very possible that the private grounds of belief might not amount to legal evidence. If such evidence were to be privately given by one Juror to the rest, it would want the sanction of an oath, and the Juror would not be subject to cross-examination. If therefore a Juror know any fact in a trial material to the issue, he ought to be sworn as a witness, and is liable to be cross-examined, and if he privately state such fact, it will be ground of a motion for a new trial." In 3 Bl. Com. 372.5. the doctrines and reasons of Starkie are recongnized as the law of this day. If such be the law, there was no error in the answer given by the court to the inquiry of the Juror, at least, none of which the claimant can complain. The court might have been more explicit and direct in cautioning the Juror against making up his verdict on his previous or personal knowledge. The 11th and last Error is a most striking misconception of the court, viz: “The court intimated to "the Juror, who made the foregoing inquiry, that unanimity was not to be expected, and that he should endeavour to come to the opinion of his fellows." put to the court; for the Jury came in more than once before they gave their verdict. On one of these visits to the court (subsequent as I think, to that on which the question was asked, but this is not material,) one of the Jurors expressed himself with much impatience, and in very strong terms, of the obstinacy of one of his fellows, alluding as I supposed, to the only Juror who had made the inquiry of the court. It was then that I remarked that it could hardly be expected that twelve men would at once agree upon any subject of any difficulty, and that it was a duty they owed to each other to exercise patience and perseverance in their discussions; to listen calmly to one another, and truly endeavour to come at last to the same opinion. In making this laborious examination of these reasons for a new trial, I have been governed, as may be seen, not by the difficulties I found in them, but by my res pect for the counsel who has considered and treated them as matters of importance. The rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted is discharged. "Ordered that William W. Fisher and Roberts Vaux, be appointed to apply to the councils of Philadelphia, to ascertain whether permission will be given to the managers to erect a temporary wooden building on one of the lots belonging to the Hospital, in the event of the city's being visited by the epidemic cholera, for the accommodation of surgical and other patients not af flicted with that malady, which it may nevertheless be improper and unsafe to admit into any of the apartments now used by the patients of the institution." From the minutes, ROBERTS VAUX, Secretary. A printed report of the medical gentlemen of the city, was received and lid on the table. Several petitions were presented and referred to the paving committee. Mr. NEFF, as chairman of the committee to whom was referred the communication of J. Livezey, made the following report and resolution which were agreed to. The committee appointed on the 4th inst., to whom was referred the communication from John Livezey, praying councils to sell to him the lot adjoining Race street wharf-Report, That they have viewed the premises, and are of opinion that said lot is so connected with the wharf, that it ought not to be sold at present; therefore offer the following resolution: Resolved, That the committee be discharged from further consideration of the subject. Mr. PETTIT, read in his place the following ordinance which was laid on the table. An ordinance relative to the Pennsylvania Hospital. Section 1. Be it ordained and enacted by the citi zens of Philadelphia, in Select and Common Council assembled, That the managers of the Pennsylvania HosThere is a mistake in every part of this allegation.pital be, and they are hereby authorised to erect a tem The remark which the court did make, was addres-porary wooden building on one of the lots of ground sed to the whole Jury, and not to any particular Juror. belonging to the institution, within the city of Philadel It arose on an occasion, having no relation to the ques-phia, should the city be visited by epidemic cholera, tion asked as above by the Juror; nor according to my for the accommodation of surgical and other patients recollection, was it at the time when that question was not afflicted with that malady, when itmay neverthe |