said, they must be strictly construed. Plain- require such an abstract to be filed. It may tiff lays stress on the initial clause of section 2 of Ordinance No. 5, which provides "that in addition to the fees allowed by law and ordained to the city officers," etc. But the effect accorded that clause by plaintiff cannot be allowed, for the reason that no fees are ordained to the police judge in any of the provisions of the ordinances. It is contended in the brief of plaintiff that, since the police judge received no other compensation than the fees of the office before the enactment of Ordinance No. 5, the clause under consideration was a recognition of his right to continue in the enjoyment of such fees; but the fact, if it be a fact, on which that argument is based, is not pleaded either in the petition or answer, and is not conceded by defendant whose counsel in their brief decline to go into the issue thus tendered by their adversary, for the stated reason that "there is nothing in the pleadings to show that prior to the time of the passing of Ordinance No. 5, fixing salaries of city officers, the police judge was entitled to any fees." [5] In this state of the record, we cannot go into the question-raised only in the brief of appellant-and must confine our attention to the pleaded facts.

The learned trial judge took the proper view of the case, and it follows that the judgment must be affirmed. All concur.

DAVIS v. BANK OF ALTON et al.

be claimed by appellant that this case is brought here on a complete transcript, and, as such transcript is on file with the clerk of this court, it is not necessary to print an abstract of the record, such as is required when the appeal is by the 'short form.' In this he is mistaken." Whiting v. Lead Co., 195 Mo. 510, 92 S. W. 883; Fischer v. Mayor, etc., of Liberty, 112 Mo. App. 686, 87 S. W. 601; Hayes v. Foos, 223 Mo. 421, 122 S. W. 1038. "If the failure to file an abstract of the record was only a violation of the rules of this court, we might feel inclined to go to the transcript in the office of the clerk, and try to ascertain therefrom the points before us for review. But the Legislature has enacted a statute which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, requires parties appealing to print an abstract of the record, and we are not at liberty to ignore this statute any more than we are any other statutory duty that the Legislature has prescribed for our guidance. If the decisions of the Supreme Court requiring the printed abstracts to be filed were recent, so that it might be said that the attorneys throughout the state were not familiar therewith, a different question would be presented. But for many years the Supreme Court has so construed this statute. Clements v. Turner, 162 Mo. 466, 63 S. W. 84."

The appeal will be dismissed. All concur.

(Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri. May UNION BANK NOTE CO. v. AJAX PORT

8, 1911.)

APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 592*) — RECORD-AB-
STRACT.

Where appellant filed no abstract of the record, and it does not appear that a motion for new trial or bills of exception were filed, the appeal will be dismissed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2618, 2020, 8126; Dec. Dig. 592.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Oregon County; W. N. Evans, Judge.

Action by C. L. Davis against the Bank of Alton and another interpleaded. From a judgment for plaintiff, interpleader appeals. Appeal dismissed.

LAND CEMENT CO.

(Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri. May 1, 1911.)

1. CORPORATIONS (§ 432*)-AGENTS-POWERSEVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.

In an action against a corporation for that the secretary who ordered the work had printing prospectuses, evidence held to show authority to bind the corporation.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1737; Dec. Dig. § 432.*1 2. CORPORATIONS (§§ 661, 662*) — FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS-VALIDITY.

Where a foreign corporation, doing business in the state without having first obtained a license required by Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1024, 1026, entered into a contract, it could neither enforce such a contract in any of the courts of

E. P. Dorris and T. J. Braswell, for appel- the state, nor set up its violation of the law as a lant.

GRAY, J. The appellant has filed no abstract of the record in this court. We are not advised that a motion for new trial or bill of exceptions was filed.

In Grubbs v. Watkins, 142 Mo. App. 11, 125 S. W. 214, we said: "Section 813 of the Revised Statutes of 1899 requires that a printed abstract of the record be filed with the Iclerk of this court. The rules of this and all of the other appellate courts of this state

bar to an enforcement of the contract against it. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2563-2570; Dec. Dig. §§ 661, 662.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; R. B. Middlebrook, Judge.

Action by the Union Bank Note Company against the Ajax Portland Cement Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. A. Braley, for appellant. Lathrop, Morrow, Fox & Moore, for respondent.

.

4. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 208*)-REM- | to demand a change of climate, and that the EDIES OF CREDITORS-PERSONS ENTITLED TO note for the purchase money was assigned to ASSERT INVALIDITY. A deed executed by a debtor to defraud her for the reason that the property had been creditors is void as to a creditor's demand bought with her separate money and really which arose between the execution and delivery belonged to her, though the title had been of the deed and the filing of the deed for record. allowed to stand in the name of her husband. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 631, 633; Dec. Dig. But the evidence of defendant contradicts § 208.*] this version, and strongly tends to show that Appeal from Circuit Court, Daviess Coun-signment of the note made by plaintiff's husthe conveyance of the property and the asty; Arch B. Davis, Judge.

Action by George Ann Carrell against Porter F. Meek, Sheriff of De Kalb County. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Chas. C. Crow and John S. Boyer, for ap pellant. Hewitt & Hewitt, for respondent.

in addition, paid him $150 in money. That deed was executed, acknowledged, and delivered May 13, 1909, and was filed for record May 18th. The execution issued on the Clark judgment was levied on the property described in these deeds.

himself of the title to his own property. It band were for the sole purpose of divesting appears that he had become involved in some sort of trouble with the wife of a barber, and was apprehensive that she would commence a damage suit against him and prosecute it to a successful issue. We think the weight of the evidence sustains the conclusion doubtJOHNSON, J. This is a suit in equity to less entertained by the trial court that in enjoin defendant, the sheriff of De Kalb the transaction Carrell was merely running county, from selling land belonging to plain- to cover to escape his irate pursuer, and that tiff, under an execution issued to enforce the the stories about plaintiff's money and her collection of a judgment recovered against condition of health should be discredited. the husband of plaintiff. A temporary order The barber's wife failed to bring the suit, was issued and served, a change of venue Carrell and his wife did not leave Clarkswas taken to Daviess county, and a trial of dale, and Carrell's brother did not file the the cause in the circuit court of that county deed for record until two days after the asresulted in a judgment dissolving the in-sault on Clark. About three months after junction, dismissing the bill and assessing that event and during the pendency of damages on the injunction bond. Plaintiff Clark's suit for damages, Carrell's brother appealed. and his wife deeded the property to plaintiff [1] The execution in question was issued for the expressed consideration of $6,000. on a judgment for $250, and costs recovered | Plaintiff returned to him the $6,000 note, and, in the circuit court of De Kalb county May 6, 1909, by Isaac Clark against Burr H. Carrell, the husband of plaintiff. On February 18, 1909, Carrell assaulted Clark, and the judgment mentioned sustained the cause of action Clark alleged inured to him from the assault. Carrell and his wife lived at Clarksdale, De Kalb county. He had been in the dramshop business, but retired some time before 1908, and was engaged in no active business during the period of the events we shall review. He owed no debts, and owned several improved business lots in Clarksdale, from which he collected and used the rents. On July 16, 1908, plaintiff and his wife conveyed this real estate (all he owned except his homestead) to his brother, L. J. Carrell, a farmer living near Clarksdale. The consideration expressed in the deed was $6,000, the reasonable value of the property. In payment of the consideration his brother delivered to him a promissory note for $6,000, due in one year signed by his brother and his brother's wife. The deed was acknowledged on the day of its date, but was not filed for record until February 20, 1909. On the day following the execution of the deed Carrell indorsed and delivered the $6,000 note to plaintiff. There is evidence to the effect that this transaction was in good faith. The explanation offered in plaintiff's evidence is that the sale was made on account of plaintiff's health which, at the time, seemed

[2] If it were true, as plaintiff contends, that the conveyances by which the record title of the property was transferred from husband to wife were executed in good faith for the honest purpose of investing the wife with the title to property purchased with her separate money, and were not made in whole or in part with the fraudulent intent to hinder and delay Clark in the collection of his demand after it had ripened into a judgment, we would agree with the contention of counsel for plaintiff that she is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the casting of a cloud on her title. The right to such relief is expressly conferred by statute. Section 2534, Rev. St. 1909; Neeley v. Bank, 114 Mo. App. 467, 89 S. W. 907; Payne v. Savings Ass'n, 126 Mo. App. 593, 105 S. W. 15. The rule thus is correctly stated in 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 163: "The sale of lands on execution against one who never had any title thereto, or interest therein, will not cast a cloud upon the title of the true owner. But it is otherwise when the judgment debtor had at some time an interest in the lands." But we find that neither conveyance was made in good faith. Both were the

NIXON, P. J. Appellant was convicted upon an information under section 4753, R. An indictment under Rev. St. 1909, § 4753, S. 1909, charging "that Will Hogle on the punishing every person who shall permit any gaming table, etc., to be "set up or used" for day of May, 1909, at the county of the purpose of gaming, which alleged that ac- Dent and state aforesaid, did then and there

unlawfully permit certain gaming devices | form the defendant of the offense he was and gaming tables, to wit, one crap table, called upon to meet. commonly so called, upon which dice are used, one poker table, commonly so called, upon which are used poker chips, commonly so called, and cards, commonly called playing cards, which said gaming tables and gaming devices were adapted, designed, and devised for the purpose of playing games of chance for money and property, to be set up and used for the purpose of gaming, in a certain building there situate and under the control and occupied by him, the said Will Hogle, against the peace and dignity of the state." Upon trial in a justice's court defendant was found guilty, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $50. After appeal taken, trial anew was had in the circuit court, where the accused was again found guilty and his fine fixed at $100. He has appealed.

[3] 2. Appellant contends that the information contains four separate and distinct charges: "That the defendant unlawfully permitted one crap table upon which dice are used, and one poker table upon which cards are used, to be set up, and used"; that the charge that the two tables have been set up contains two offenses; and the charge that the two tables have been used contains two offenses. At the close of the evidence, defendant moved that the state be required to elect whether it would prosecute the defendant for permitting a gaming device to be set up, or for permitting the gaming device to be used, which motion was denied. The statute (section 4753, R. S. 1909) provides: "Every person who shall permit any gaming table, bank or device to be set up or used for the purpose of gaming," etc. It [1] 1. Before the introduction of any evi- was held in State v. Pittman, 76 Mo. 56, dence, defendant moved to quash the infor- that, where a criminal statute uses disjuncmation "for the reason that it does not lo- tive language in defining an offense, the incate any building, nor where said gambling dictment may be drawn in the conjunctive. tables were kept." Appellant's contention is Thus, where the statute provides a punishthat the location of the "building" must ap- ment to every person who shall "set up or pear on the face of the information. We had keep a common bawdyhouse," a charge that a similar question under review in the case defendant "did unlawfully set up and keep a of State v. Newman, 132 S. W. 753, where common bawdyhouse" was sustained. The the indictment charged that the defendant substitution of the word "and" for the word "at the county of Butler, state of Missouri, "or" was immaterial, said the court. State on or about the 21st day of January, 1909, v. Bregard, 76 Mo. 322. In the case of State did then and there unlawfully set up and v. Cannon (Sup.) 134 S. W., loc. cit. 514, Kenkeep a common house of assignation." De- nish, P. J., said: "Complaint is made that fendant moved to quash because the location the court erred in overruling defendant's moof the house was not set out and described tion to require the state to elect upon which with sufficient particularity. Our language of the several charges contained in each in that case effectually disposes of the con- count of the information it would proceed to tention in this: "The general rule is that it trial. Each count charged the setting up is sufficient, in an indictment charging the and keeping of one gaming table only, and commission of an offense created by statute, the averment that the defendant enticed and to follow the language of the statute; and permitted divers persons to bet and play this indictment fully complies with that re- thereon did not make the count double, and quirement. In the case of State v. Raymond, the motion to elect was properly overruled." 86 Mo. App. 537, an indictment, based on the In State v. Fletcher, 18 Mo. 425, the contensame statute as that on which the indict- tion was made that the offense consists in ment in the present case rests, charged that permitting the gaming device "to be set up the defendant on a certain date, 'at the coun- or used," and not in both setting up and ty of Bates and state of Missouri, did then using. In denying the soundness of this and there unlawfully keep and maintain a contention, the court said * There bawdy house,' etc., with no more particular is no objection to charging several different description of the 'bawdyhouse.' The court acts, either one of which is an offense under said: 'It has been held in this state that it the statute which creates it, in one indictis sufficient that the indictment charges the ment, although the statute uses the disoffense to have been committed in the coun- junctive form in describing the offense." ty where the prosecution is commenced.'" See, also, State v. Ramsauer, 140 Mo. App. 401, 124 S. W. 67.

[2] Again, as we said in the case of State v. Seiberling, .143 Mo. App., loc. cit. 321, 127 S. W. 106, the same nicety is not required in drawing indictments in cases of minor offenses as is required in charging commonlaw felonies. State v. Fletcher, 18 Mo., loc. cit. 427; State v. Nelson, 19 Mo., loc. cit. 396. We are of the opinion that the charge

66 # *

[4] The trial court in the only instruction given for the state withdrew from the jury the charge as to permitting a poker table to be set up and used and instructed alone as to the crap table. By no reasoning, therefore, can it be maintained that prejudicial error ensued by reason of the form of the information.

[5] Besides, there was no motion or request to require the state to elect on which charge it would proceed, whether for per