ment, however wise may be the general principles by which such movement is prompted-or however pure may be the intentions of those who take part in the attempt. On the contrary, the tendency of all our views is to impress the conviction, that all such enthusiastic and premature attempts at perfecting the condition of man-or the institutions amidst which he lives, tend only to retard the end which they profess to have in contemplation,—that the progress, in short, for which we look, must be gradual and quiet—and that it proceeds essentially on the supposition, that not only vast improvements in knowledge and in art must be made, previous to its being realized, but that long ages must revolve-far longer, indeed, than the ordinary anticipations, even of the wisest of mankind, have been in the habit of conceiving-before any great portion of the improvements for which we look can be introduced among men.

But, grant that the human race are actually destined for existence during such indefinite ages -that what they have hitherto passed through has been but the opening of a course which is to be continued throughout ages, which even the utmost flight of the imagination of man is unable to overtake—and that, during all this boundless lapse of time, the improvements in knowledge and

in art, and in social institutions, will be going forward-and then, there is nothing in the supposition of the new character which we have ventured to suggest as the destined inheritance of our race, that can in the slightest degree awaken our doubt or disbelief-however much the prospect of it is assuredly fitted to call up our noblest feelings of delight-of gratitude—and of triumph.

SOLUTION OF SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT.

THE questions alluded to in the title of this section, are the following-which have frequently employed the thoughts of speculative men-but, respecting the true meaning of which, much vagueness of conception seems still to exist-viz. what is the relation which man bears to the system in the midst of which he has his place-what is the proper sense of "the perfectibility of human nature" --what are we to understand by expounding the mystery of the universe-and what is the true idea of time, and the uses to be gained from just notions respecting it.

1. Relation of man to nature. The first idea that seems to have been universally entertained

on this topic is, that man is merely an inhabitant or spectator of the world around him-sent into it to wander over its surface-to study its productions and appearances-and to avail himself of their uses-but without any common bond of nature or essential constitution between him and it -and therefore, merely occupying it as an inhabitant or spectator-or student of its arrangements—or employer of its productions.

By a more attentive observation, however, of the nature of man, and of its relation to the system amidst which he is stationed, it was gradually ascertained, that the loose relation already stated could not comprise the whole of his connection with it-for man, it was found, was most wonderfully and nicely adapted in his powers to the laws and productions of the world in which he finds himself, and that, therefore, he could not, at any rate, be considered as merely an inhabitant thrown as it were accidentally amidst arrangements which had no relation to his powers, but an occupant of a home, all the parts of which were most perfectly and wisely fitted to the peculiar powers and wants of the tenant by whom it was to be inhabited.

By a still closer and finer attention to the nature

of man and the system around him it was further made probable, that nature, or the peculiar arrangements amidst which he is stationed, are to him what they appear, simply in consequence of the peculiar powers of perception and sensation with which he is gifted---insomuch, that had his powers been different-either more or less in number-or furnished with higher or lower degrees of perfection, the whole system of things would have assumed a different aspect to him-or the world, as he now views it, would, in fact, to him, have had no existence-but a quite different scene Iwould have been that in which he found himself stationed by the appointments of creative

power.

This idea has been carried even to a still greater length-and in the refinements of speculative minds, has been transferred into the conclusion that the supposition of actually existing external things is entirely without foundation—that the whole system of nature is merely an ideal creation of the conceptive faculties of man-or that he not only makes to himself his own world, so far as its peculiar forms and arrangements adapted to his appropriate powers of perception are concerned—but is himself the architect, by his powers of conception,

of all the real structure which, by a delusion practised on himself, he vainly fancies to exist around him.

This last form of the general supposition may safely be considered as but one of those extravagancies to which speculative minds, when engrossed with some new or pleasing idea, have on other occasions so often lent their sanction, and by the indulgence of which they have often done injury to the cause of truth they were most anxious to defend. Yet the truth seems to be, that there is a middle view between this latter extreme and the ruder conceptions of the vulgar mind which may be safely adopted—and which, as it seems to rest upon unexceptionable grounds, opens up also some most beautiful and instructive views of the entire order and constitution of things. The opinon to which we allude, but which would require far more space than we can at present afford for its illustration, is that which asserts that, as on the one hand, there is a gross and rude misconception of the nature and constitution of things in the supposition, which yet seems to be the first and most universal adopted by mankind-by the wise as well as by the unlearned— that what we commonly call Nature, as distinct from the living soul of man, is merely a collection of dead, or as it is commonly termed, inert matter,

P