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ed to occur in naval warfare. The action was fought running, be fore the wind; and a disadvantage suffered by the Frolic, of having her main-yard below to fish, may be considered as counterbalanced by the circumstance of the Wasp losing her maintop-mast by the first broadside of her enemy: neither circumstance. was however of much moment, as it was blowing heavily at the time, and neither vessel could carry whole sail during the fight. This battle was marked by the same deadly character as the former, and was perhaps more fatal to the captured than any one on record, for the length of time it lasted. The Wasp lost in 45 minutes, 10 killed and wounded-The Frolic nearly 100, and this without any extraordinary advantage of a raking position— one single gun only being fired after the Wasp had gained the bow of her antagonist.-Much speculation was excited by this action; and the ingenuity of the British nation expended itself in accounting for successes, which had their rise in the effects of a strong stimulus to exertion, acting upon a corps of select officers, and communicating itself, in the shape of discipline and enthusiasm, to the men they commanded.

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The capture of another frigate speedily followed that of the Frolic and at this time, with our feelings softened towards our late foe by the charities which have grown out of a peace of five years, we look back with a smile at the theories of her writers and politicians on the causes of our successes and their own disasters. Among others, we find the ingenious expedient of placing Kentucky riflemen in the tops of our ships, for the purpose of picking off the crews of the British vessels-We need not say, no such plan was adopted, for any man in the least acquainted with ships knows. the rifle to be a much inferior weapon to the musket, as it takes more time to load, does not admit the use of cartridges, and its aim is. entirely destroyed by the motion of the vessel-all firing on board ship being much like shooting flying, a matter of calculation and not of sight. But we cannot avoid the smile, when we think of a dozen Kentuckians in the tops of the little Wasp, rolling off before the wind, and can easily fancy them more annoying (by the disturbed state of their stomachs,) to their friends beneath them, than to their enemies along-side. The same difference in guns and metal existed between the Macedonian and United States, which we have mentioned between the Constitution and Guerriere— with the exception of the United States having forty-two pound carronades instead of thirty-two pounders. The difference in the size of the ships was rather greater, and the United States had about 170 more men-The fight was of longer duration, owing to the English ship keeping the wind and outsailing the American.-Still Captain Carden had no intention to avoid the engagement, but had merely a peculiar method of his own in bringing it on. This gentleman was well acquainted with the force of the United States,

notwithstanding the pretty air of surprise he assumes, in his letter, when he is carried on board his conqueror: Commodore Decatur was personally known to him, the two ships had lain near each other in Hampton Roads for some weeks, not a twelvemonth before, and the officers were in the habits of daily intercourse-But it was not until experience had proved their efficacy, that the English officers would own the superiority of twenty-fours over eighteens in frigate actions; and they were fond of thinking the advantages of experience and approved skill on their side, would more than counterbalance the strength of a ship or the weight of her metal.The difference in force between these two vessels was, however, of less moment than would be at first supposed :-it has been mentioned that the Macedonian kept close on a wind, and it was only by picking her to pieces at long shot, that the United States was able to get her for a short time within the reach of her grape ;-during most of the time the battle was fought with the long guns,-and the English were able to, and did, supply their loss at the guns from their marines. This engagement was certainly decided by gunnery -for had the same difference in skill existed, and the Macedonian been a 74, she must have struck. The United States had five or six shot in her hull and one or two light spars carried away, and 12 killed and wounded. The Macedonian was entirely crippled in her spars-had more than 100 round shot in her hull, and more than 100 casualties. There is one or two circumstances, connected with the capture of this ship, which give a different idea of the authenticity of British official accounts and British tribunals, from that which a very large portion of our countrymen were fond of entertaining, before the late war assisted to remove the veil from their eyes. Captain Carden asserts the impossibility of bringing the United States to close action, (having the wind himself,) because his enemy steered two points free :-now it is evident to every nautical man that by steering a few points more free himself, as the Macedonian greatly outsails the United States, and the distance between them was only a mile, he could have chosen his own manner of engaging, or compelled Commodore Decatur to a complete run-away. Of the latter alternative, there was but little danger with his antagonist, and of the fact of superior sailing, we were ourselves eyewitnesses, although the prize was under jury masts at the time. The United States had an enormous head and poop, both of which hurt her sailing extremely; and perhaps in some measure contributed their share in inducing the Englishman to pronounce her a 74 in disguise.-The other circumstance to which we allude, was the judgment of the Court which sat, as is customary, to decide on the conduct of the officers and crew of the captured vessel: In speaking of the crew, they pass the highest commendations on their conduct, in resisting the base artifices of

the Americans to entice them from their allegiance to their natural prince and country. God forbid that we should, in any manner, assist to sully the lustre of the boasted loyalty of the common British seaman; but (as we happened to have our own feet wet with salt water on a certain occasion) we have seen a little of English seamen, and English character; we have been used to think from what, in the course of many years, we have witnessed, that if there were a purgatory and a paradise in the high toned religious feelings of this virtuous and estimable class of men-a British man-ofwar is the former, and the shores of America the latter.-In the particular instance before us, it is a well known truth, that as we were anxious to keep the prisoners for the purpose of exchange, they were landed at New-London, and the effervescence of their loyalty was so great as to burst down the side of the building they were quartered in-and, for several days, those who got free were to be seen along the highways making their best course to NewYork-a port at that time more distinguished for the number of its privateers against the English trade, than for any trade of its own. It is highly probable, however, that those who were caught, and compelled to an exchange, gave the best account of themselves to the court; and it may be equally probable that the high-minded and honourable gentlemen, who composed the tribunal, had an abundance of testimony to support the opinion expressed in their decision-inasmuch as nothing less could have overcome their known national propensity, to believe the worst of their countrymen, and the best of foreign nations.

The capture of the Java soon succeeded that of the Macedonian ; and the reader is referred to the statement of force in the action between the Guerriere and Constitution, as showing the difference in this engagement, with two exceptions:-Although the Java had the same number of guns, and carried the same metal with the Guerriere, she was not so large a vessel; but having a sloop of war's crew on board, she was much better manned, and in this respect her numbers rendered her, to say the least, equal to the Constitution. And the result goes fully to prove, that something more than English spirit, English loyalty, or English skill, is necessary to give victory to their efforts :-wood and iron, after all, assert their value in the contest; and we should consider this battle as conclusively refuting the favourite nautical opinion of the enemy, that their 38's were equal to any single decked ships that floated, -had not their own Admiralty, on learning the fate of the Java, admitted the error of their opinion, by ordering the commanders of their 38's, when meeting our 44's,-in plain English, to run. away. We say ordering, out of respect to the English officers; for unless we are correct, as was stated openly at the time, it is pretty certain they did it without orders. The Constitution laboured

under heavy disadvantages in this action;-she was to leeward, and had her wheel shot away very early in the fight. Commodore Bainbridge was compelled to work his ship up under the guns of his enemy, and to steer his vessel by the wheel-ropes-passing his orders below by a chain of men placed for that purpose. It would be unjust to a man who lost his life in serving his country, not to mention, that the defence of Captain Lambert was a brave one, and the ship given up only when it would have been madness to attempt longer to defend her. Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, the impression is irresistible on our minds, that in most of the actions during the war, the English were much more characterized by courage than skill: In this engagement, as in all the others we have spoken of, the disparity of loss was entirely disproportioned to the difference in force.

In the action between the Hornet and Peacock, which soon followed, this disparity was yet more evident. The vessels were nearly of a size: The former was a ship carrying 18 thirty-two pound carronades, and 2 long nines; the Peacock was a brig carrying 16 twenty-four pound carronades, and 2 long sixes; she had changed her metal, some time before, for channel service, and, her commander, perhaps entertaining the old opinion, of the little moment of a few pounds more or less of iron in small vessels, had neglected replacing her thirty-twos. Had her metal been fourfold, it would have made no difference-for we assert, on the best of testimony (that of our own eyes) not a single round shot of the Peacock touched the hull of the Hornet, excepting one that grazed her larboard bow. This was a complete triumph of gunnery and manœuvring; and was perhaps sooner decided than any fight ever was in naval warfare, where boarding was not resorted to. In number of men the vessels were nearly equal-perhaps a dozen in favour of the Hornet. We know (for we heard them) that the prisoners affected to believe the Hornet was a much larger vessel, every way, than their own; and on their arrival in New-York, they found many proselytes to their opinions, by saying, she was so large they mistook her for the John Adams, a vessel they had been in company with before the war, and carrying 24 forty-two pound carronades, and 200 men. This kind of logic satisfied many people, -but, after all, it was not the John Adams, but the Hornet that whipt them; and the latter is a vessel about one third smaller and lighter every way, than the former. Now we confess our stupidity, perhaps, when we say, that we do not see what the belief of those gentlemen proved, unless it was, that (owing to circumstances we will not presume to intimate) they saw double :-We will not venture to say they were frightened—but this much we will say, that had they been so, their ship could not have been worse manœuvred, nor worse fought than it was; and we humbly suggest to

them the expediency, under all circumstances, of omitting, in future, that part of their narrative which states their mistaking, within half musket shot, a medium sloop of 18 guns-for a razeed frigate.

So far our success had been uniform; and our national vanity rose in proportion. We began to exchange characters with our enemy-to believe in our own invincibility-and imagine that Victory must ever be the accompaniment of Battle :--but a reverse of fortune soon taught us that we were subject to its vicissitudes. That ill-fated ship, the Chesapeake, has twice given a lesson to the navy, which renders her a vessel of more importance to our service, however humbling she may have been to our pride, than the Constitution with all her boasted victories. Let us endeavour to profit by them. She tarnished the reputation, and blasted the hopes of the gallant and injured Barron-and it was on her deck the high-souled Lawrence shed his blood, a victim to the overweening prepossessions of his countrymen. It is enough for us to say, here, that in every thing but circumstance, the combat was a fair one ;-the vessels of very equal force equally manned, and of equal size; she was desperately defended, and bravely carried :but we will leave to another pen the incidents of this unlucky action-linked as we were to the regretted Lawrence by no ordinary feelings. We have witnessed his coolness in danger-were familiar with his lofty and generous spirit-and have experienced his kind and liberal friendship, in too many instances-to speak of his services with that impartiality which the subject requires.

In the engagement between the Enterprise and Boxer, fortune soon after smiled upon our arms. This was, also, as nearly an equal fight, as can be expected to occur in sea-service :—it was well contested for the size of the vessels, and decided in favour of the one on whose side there was a small difference of force. The Enterprize had two guns more than the Boxer-the same metal— a few more men—and was rather a heavier vessel-sufficiently so, we think, to have made it discreditable not to have conquered. But we did conquer, and in the handsomest manner;—both commanders lost their lives in the contest-and there is no praise justly paid to the gallant Burrowes, which is not also due to his less fortunate rival. We will here allude to one circumstance, which, in its termination had an effect, the very reverse of brilliant, and which, we think, grew out of mistaken notions of duty and honour: Captain Blythe nailed his colours to the mast; and when necessity compelled his second in command to ask for quarters, he was deprived of the ordinary means of doing so by lowering his flag-but was subjected to the mortifying necessity of hailing, to ask mercy

a For we consider the difference of two or three guns in favour of the Shannon, as of little consequence in vessels of their force.

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