of his enemy with his voice-and of stating explicitly, for the satisfaction of his wary adversary, the reason of his keeping his colours aloft. Now, in addition to considering this as humiliating a situation as a ship could be placed in, we are averse to any forced exhibition of resolution, which may, in the end, reduce us to conduct very far from our duty as men and as officers. Had accident not killed Captain Blythe early in the engagement, the probability is, that many more lives would have been sacrificed to his pride of feeling, long after resistance would have been useless. We certainly think it always the safest for an officer to err on the side of resistance, and would advise our countrymen to adhere to their guns, so long as there is a remote chance of using them to advantage; but we dislike that kind of forestalling courage, which ties one up to do a duty, after the manner of the low Irish who forswear getting drunk, for it may compel one to acts his conscience must disapprove; or, as in the case before us, may sometimes make one look-extremely foolish.

But one other instance occurs to our arms, of unsuccessful combat in this war, where ship was opposed to ship, and this was the capture of the Argus by the Pelican. Both vessels were brigs,the Englishman an 18 gun sloop, carrying 18 thirty-two pound carronades, and 2 long twelves, with the usual complement of men: -The Argus was a much smaller and lighter vessel, having been built for, and until the commencement of the war, carrying, 16 twenty-four pound carronades and 2 long nines,-two more carronades had been crowded on her, by using the bridle ports ;-in number of guns therefore the vessels were equal.-But in cousequence of the crew of the Argus being weakened by the prizes she bad manned, it is understood there was a material difference in the number of their men. The Pelican was undeniably a much heavier vessel than the Argus-and it was not to be expected that a brig of the description of the American vessel, could successfully contend against a heavy sloop of 18 guns, manned and equipped for the express purpose of falling in with her antagonist. At the same time that we assert the difference in favour of the enemy to have been at least as four to three, we acknowledge that the enemy did his duty manfully, and conquered the Argus in a very reasonable time; and in so doing, overcame a man who had no superior of bis years in the American navy. We regret to add, that his own life was the forfeit of his defeat.

The action between the Peacock and Epervier was conspicuous for nothing, but the feebleness of the defence of the latter.-The Peacock was one of our new vessels built during the war: they were all corvettes of a larger size and more guns than vessels of their grade had been before in our service,-most of them carried 22 guns-thirty-two pound carronades-and from 150 to 170

men. The Epervier was much smaller, and had but 18 guns and 120 men, or thereabouts,-the metal was the same. On this action we will only remark, that the Peacock could not have done much more-nor the Epervier much less.

The two actions of the new Wasp followed soon after each other. The defence of the Reindeer, a brig of 18 guns-twenty-four pound carronades-was one of the best things of the enemy during the war, and the conduct of Captain Manners, her commander, conspicuous for judgment and personal intrepidity. It reflects the more credit on Captain Blakely, who maintained his superiority of force, by a corresponding superiority of effect. The battle lasted but 19 minutes, and the English ship was surrendered by a master's mate.

The Avon, though a heavier vessel and with heavier metal-bcing but little, if any, inferior to her antagonist-made a much less creditable resistance, as the Wasp received but little injury from her fire. It will be remembered that Captain Blakely was compelled to abandon his prize, by the coming up of the Castilian and Tartarus; and the English government endeavoured so to use this circumstance as to inculcate the idea that the Avon had not yielded, but had, if any thing, forced the Wasp to retire. We should have thought this Little-Belt kind of victory would not have gone down with the people, after the number of combats which had been fought confessedly to their disadvantage-but it seems that if John Bull is ever to be choked, it will not be with any thing he swallows; -for a short time there was a faint murmur of rejoicing through the land, and the story was so much improved, that they sunk the Wasp by a broadside from the Castilian, added to the damages she sustained from the Avon. A cartel, however, soon dispelled these high raised hopes; and an English merchant Captain, a prisoner on board the Wasp at the time, gave public vent to his spleen by certifying, that she received no injury from either of her enemies.

One more prize was sent in by this ship, and all afterwards is mystery. She was left near the Western Islands in high condition, and with her crew in good spirits, anxious for another trial with the enemy; and from that time we have no account of her. She probably was lost in a gale, or ran under in a squall.

The Constitution was destined to add another laurel, to the wreath,' in her capture of the Cyane and Levant. The former of these vessels is a small frigate carrying 22 thirty-two pound carronades below, and 12 eighteens on her quarter-deck and forecastle. The Levant is a corvette of 22 thirty-two pound carronades. The reader will always bear in mind that every vessel armed with carronades, is provided with two or more long guns to use as chaseguns in cases of necessity, and which we include in our estimate of

force: these are always of less calibre than the short guns, to preserve the proper weight of metal. Although the Cyane and Levant, united, had 56 guns,-two more than the Constitution could fight-they were by no means an equal match for her. Their ability to annoy was equal to that of the Constitution, but their capability to endure fell far short of hers. One or two well directed broadsides from the Constitution ought to destroy the efficiency of vessels such as the Cyane and Levant: and Captain Stewart appears to have done with his ship, exactly what he ought to have done-He took them both, after a short fight, and with little loss: and the result has excited no other emotion in us, than curiosity to know what his countrymen think now of the veracity of Captain Bingham, who more than insinuated that with one vessel of the force of the Levant, he beat off the counterpart of the Constitution! If the war had no other effect, it has established the certainty of Commodore Rodgers' statement upon that occasion, and falsified that of his opponent.We may be excused here, a digression on that obsolete question, for a moment, as it marks the disposition of the English people to credit their own statements, in opposition to all others, and even to probability. A man appeared before the Mayor of Bristol or Liverpool (we forget which) and made oath that he was on board the President in her rencontre with the Little Belt-and that the former ship did actually commence the action, by firing a whole broadside into the latter. The tale was told with much of circumstance, with the names of subordinate officers, and particularly of one of her lieutenants. This affidavit was published in all the English prints as corroborative of the statement of Captain Bingham: and none of their editors discovered that the oath as effectually gave the lie to their own officers, as did the official account of Commodore Rodgers. Captain Bingham, we know, makes the President the aggressor, but in an entirely different manner, from this oathtaking seaman :-we will only add that no such lieutenant, as named by him, was ever in the navy, much less the ship.

The closing action of the war, was between the Hornet and Penguin. This was a very equal combat, and decided in our favour in as short a time as could be hoped for.-The English commander seemed willing to atone for his want of discipline, by his personal efforts; and it is said that when her first lieutenant endeavoured to board the Hornet, his men refused to follow. Guns, men, and metal, were all very nearly equal.

We have passed by the actions on the lakes, as the official accounts of these engagements give the most minute statements of the force on either side; and as they were battles fought, as it were, in the heart of our country, the community were in some degree witnesses to the events, and their attendant circumstances. The result, no one in either country has now to learn. But in their eagerness VOL. II. 5

to palliate defeat, their writers seize upon every incident with avidity, which can possibly admit of a construction in their favour. Thus it happened that Captain Young, of the army, was on board the vessel of Captain M'Donough, and made a report of the action to his commanding officer. This has been interpreted into so large a reinforcement of soldiers, as to give to the army a portion of the credit of the victory. That is doubtless as it should be, but in a way the English writer is not perhaps aware of:-There were no marines in our squadron,-by looking at the returns, he will see no marines hurt-no officer's name mentioned belonging to them;-there being none, to supply their places a company of soldiers was put on board the vessels-Its commander was amenable to his own officer, and very properly reported the battle and its effects on his command, to his proper chief.-It is excessively weak, at this time of day, for the British to pretend their inferiority to the squadron of M'Donough;-they were the assailants-had thousands of men within a mile of their ships--and whose whole movements were suspended until Captain Downie declared himself ready for the undertaking. To undervalue an enemy, who had so often overcome them, is a greater folly than we can believe them to have been guilty of. We believe, but without knowing it, that in both engagements on the Lakes, the enemy was, to say the least, our equals in force; and there are many things to confirm this belief, besides the assertions of the honourable men who led our arms on those memorable days.

Neither have we touched upon the loss of the President and Essex, both vessels having been captured by more than one ship. But, leaving the officers of the Pomone and Endymion to quarrel about the honour of taking the former vessel, and the officers of the Majestic and Tenedos, while they finger their prize money, to laugh at both, we will write a few lines concerning the affair of the Essex. It appears by the official letter of Captain Porter, that both the Essex and Phoebe mounted more guns, than properly belonged to their respective rates. He describes the Phoebe to have had 46 guns in regular broadside, and 30 of them to have been long eighteens. To carry this number, we presume she had guns in her bridle-ports and gang-ways. But the important point to be remembered in this engagement is, that the Essex fought chiefly with 6 twelve pounders, opposed, in one ship alone, to 30 eighteens,her carronades being useless, from the distance at which the enemy chose to keep his ships. The Essex, in running off the coast, had lost her main-top-mast in a squall, and consequently was at the mercy of Captain Hillyar, who was in full chase at the time. We do not say, we think it was the duty of the English officer to run his vessel close along side of the Essex, knowing her to be a ship of inferior force and armed chiefly with carronades; on the contrary, we

think he was right-his method was the best one to ensure success, and that is always the primary object to be considered by an offieer. But we do say, that whenever an. Englishman boasts, in the extremely offensive manner so peculiar to his countrymen, that uncalculating and headlong gallantry are the characteristics of his nation-and that every British officer remembers the standing order of Nelson, that "no captain can go wrong who lays his ship yard-arm and yard-arm with his enemy"-he should be reminded, that Captain Hillyar is an exception. Captain Porter has not gained great reputation as an author; and, perhaps, when we take into view the lax morals deducible from his work, the opinion of his countrymen on his merits with the pen, is a just one ;--but certainly he is more expert with the sword. No one has been found hardy enough to say, that his defence was not bravely continued; -but some have called it desperate. Nil Desperandum' is a good motto for the commander of a ship, under any ordinary circumstances of disadvantage, and although we view the condition of the Essex as peculiarly unfortunate, there does not seem a period at which there was not some hope of saving the crew, if not the vessel, from capture. The first object of a commander is victory, -when this is denied him, he should turn his thoughts to the best escape. The resistance of the Essex appears to us, to have been persevered in to the last moment, we admit, but not a moment too long. The contents of that officer's book have disposed one portion of the community, to quarrel with every thing he does; and there is another portion, always ready to quarrel with any thing that endangers the life or honour of an Englishman. Thanks to the European critics, and our own right arms, these sticklers for the fame of Old Albion have become very rare. We beg Captain Porter to be consoled, as, if the accusation be admitted, fighting too much, is a more pardonable offence than fighting too little.

We will close this glance at our naval conflicts, by turning the attention of the community to an occurrence, but little noticed at the time, yet fraught with consequences of vastly more importance than any that resulted from the most brilliant of the preceding actions, and conspicuous for a gallantry and self-devotion which should place the name of Thomas Ap Catesby Jones on the fairest scroll of our naval records. This officer, then a young lieutenant, (now a master commandant,) was in command of a division of five gun boats off New-Orleans, at the time the enemy made his descent upon Louisiana. The defenceless situation and hair-breadth escape of that State are well known at the present hour,—but it is not known, that the manoeuvres of this little flotilla retarded the operations of the British, for two days; and that when compelled to fight, its defence was so obstinate and so fatal to the assailants as to make a strong impression with regard to the kind of foe they

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