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necessary. Direct reduction, therefore, is not alone sufficient: and the only simple and permanent means of balancing the parliamentary influence of the crown, is to increase that of the people. Formerly, the great proprietors were able to keep the monarchy in check; but the increasing influence of the crown on one hand, and the growing independence of the people on the other, have in this important particular, materially changed the state of our society. The crown and the multitude have risenthe influence of the great proprietors has sunk. They are no longer sure of being followed by the people, or capable of making head against the crown, without popular support.

If the influence of the crown were conducive to the safety of the monarchy, it might be doubted, whether this be the moment for reducing that influence, or providing securities against it. But the excess of this ministerial influence endangers, instead of securing the monarchy. The only danger to which that form of government can ever be exposed among us, is its becoming unpopular, and being thought inconsistent with liberty.

The house of commons itself has also need of being strengthened by popularity. The ascendant which that assembly has acquired since the revolution, has been attended with one change, which may ultimately prove fatal to its power. In becoming a governing senate, it necessarily lost much of the character of a popular representative. That national support which rendered it irresistible in all the struggles of the last century, was gradually withdrawn, and at length converted into a jealousy; of which, power, wherever it is seated, is the proper object. That assembly, as exercising their power, and as a political council, early and often forgot their old province as a house of commons. Fifty years ago it was said by Mr. Burke, that it could not then, to any popular purpose, be called a house of commons.' a In succeeding times, the deviations from their original character became greater and more frequent; and of late years, whether from their own fault, or from the skill and malice of their enemies, it can no longer be asserted that their power is founded on the confidence and attachment of the people. If this state of things should continue, their apparent strength will not long conceal their real weakness. The decay of their power will soon become visible, and it will perish in the first struggle. It will prove alike incapable of controlling the crown, or of protecting it against the violence of the multitude. A house of commons from which the people is long detached, cannot ultimately preserve even its existence. Against these dangers, the house of commons can have no safety but from a new infusion of that po

a Burke's Works, vol. i. p. 464, quarto Ed.

pular spirit which once enabled them to resist and depose kings, and call new royal families to the throne.

The Second part of our Plan, would be the adoption of more effectual means for the disfranchisement of delinquent boroughs. This is a part of the subject, on which the principles are very evident; but the means of carrying them into effect, are not so clear. The elective franchise is a political right conferred on individuals, for the public advantage: As such, it may be withdrawn for adequate reasons of general interest. But it is also a privilege and advantage to the holder; of which, without strong reasons, he is not to be deprived. It holds a middle station between office and property:-like the former, it is a trust; but it is one which ought not easily or often to be withdrawn. On the other hand, as the advantage of the holder is only one of its secondary objects, it has not the sacred and inviolable nature of property. The supreme power which gave it, may withdraw it -not indeed on light grounds, but without either that degree of delinquency, or that sort of evidence, which might be required in the forfeiture of a purely private right. It is not, either in principle or prudence, variable at will; nor is the Legislature bound, in its abrogation, to observe the rules of courts of judi

cature.

The disfranchisement of those boroughs which have been proved to abuse their franchise, is therefore founded on constitutional principles, as well as warranted by modern practice. Where corruption has prevailed to such an extent, and under such circumstances, as to render it possible that its prevalence would be permanent, Parliament has in recent times adopted measures, which produced practical effects nearly similar to those of actual disfranchisement. The first corrective statute, passed for this purpose, was that relating to New Shoreham, (11 of Geo. III. c. 55,) in which the individual voters, proved to be guilty of bribery, were disfranchised by name, and the right of voting at future elections for that borough was bestowed on the surrounding district, called the Rape of Bramber. In the cases of Cricklade and Aylesbury, (22 Geo. III. c. 31, and 44 Geo. III. c. 50,) the former part of the precedent was not followed. No offenders. were disqualified by name; but the right of voting for these boroughs was extended to the freeholders of the adjacent Hundreds. The object of these acts was chiefly remedial ;-to substitute a pure constituent body, for one that had been found corrupt. It may also be considered as in some measure penal; inasmuch as, in the two smaller boroughs, at least, the addition of so large a body of voters took away the whole value and efficacy of the franchise in the hands of the old electors. In effect, the right of voting was transferred from Shoreham and Cricklade to the sur

rounding country. Had the proceedings on which these acts were founded been considered as of a criminal, or even of a judicial nature, it would have been impossible to justify their provisions. If they had been viewed in that light, it must at once have been seen that they inflicted punishment on the pure voters for the offences of the impure, and on succeeding generations for the faults of the present. But they were measures of local reform; and the evidence necessary for them was, not that which justifies a conviction for a crime, but that which is sufficient to show the propriety of an act of legislation. Other notions, however, prevailed under the patronage of lawyers, who carried the narrowest habits of their profession into legislative discussions, who opposed the above measures, and defeated others equally necessary, of a like nature, with the force of great ability, and the authority of high station. The utmost subtilty of the rules of evidence was enforced; objections, merely technical, were allowed to exclude satisfactory information. The English law of evidence, singularly, and perhaps excessively narrow and exclusive in its rules, was permitted to control the inquiries of a Legislative Assembly. By these arts of Parliamentary pettifogging, corrupt boroughs have been so frequently rescued from the grasp of the law, that it now requires great zeal and patience to undertake the seemingly hopeless enterprise of assailing them : And it is apparent, that unless there be some material reformation in the law, or, at least, in the practice of Parliament, on this subject, it will be in vain to expect success even for these very limited reforms. The interest of many individuals is always engaged in the delinquent borough. The electors in the townsome of the proprietors in the neighbourhood-the jobbers who sell the burgesses-the candidates who have bought, or hope to buy them, supported by the fellow-feeling of those who have the like interest in other towns,-are a powerful and permanent phalanx, with whom it is very difficult for the zeal of a few volunteer reformers to cope. The jobbers are well versed in all the stratagems of political chicane. They know how to raise a clamour in one House, or to split hairs in another; they harass their adversaries by vexatious cavils, and tire them by protracted discussions; and they generally end in wearing out, if they cannot defeat, the most active and able reformers. The success of these low expedients, and the countenance shown them by the highest and gravest authorities, have done more, perhaps, than most modern proceedings, to lower Parliament in the general estimation -to disgust the faithful friends of the Constitution-to persuade many moderate reformers, that cautious improvement is as really, though less openly, resisted, than the wildest innovation-and to drive virtuous men, despairing of constitutional remedies, to the perilous experiments of indefinite change.

Our principles would naturally lead to a transfer of the forfeited franchises, as the cases arose, to unrepresented towns, of a population of 15,000 and upwards, till all these communities were fully and directly represented. But as the increase of the number of the house of commons is a great inconvenience, it would probably be more expedient, to employ the first ten forfeitures in reducing that assembly to its present number; to which twenty would be added, if the first article of the plan were adopted.

However admirable the result of a political system may be, it is a great misfortune that the means by which its institutions are executed, should be strongly disapproved by the plain sense and natural feelings of men. A scandal is always a great source of weakness. It lessens the attachment, and alienates the opinion of the majority; and may ultimately undermine the foundations of any government. The removal of a scandal is itself a sufficient reason for reform.

Some may perhaps wonder, that disfranchisement is so strictly limited to the cases in which corruption has been proved. Many of the moderate reformers have proposed to extend it much farther, and to apply it to all cases where there was no likelihood of a pure or independent exercise of the right of election. The plan of Mr. Pitt, proposed to purchase the elective privilege from fifty of the more inconsiderable boroughs who should be willing to part with it. Mr. Lambton, a gentleman equally respectable for character, talents, and public principle, proposes to abolish all corrupt, decayed, and dependent boroughs.

Besides the great ends in view, it might, in process of time, be subservient to other purposes. A colonial representation may one day be considered as a probable means of preserving the unity of the empire. Such a representation, combined with other means, might also open honourable seats for the moneyed interest, if measures of reform should be found to have too much narrowed their access to parliament. If some representatives were in time to be allowed to learned societies, it would not be a greater novelty than the grant of that privilege to the two universities by James I. If occasion were taken to give an additional member to the university of Dublin, one member to that of Edinburgh, and one to the other Scotch Universities, (the votes of each being proportioned to the number of students,) the direct share of science in the national representation would not be enormous. It would be easy to show, by other examples, the use to which the ample fund of forfeited franchise might in time be turned; but the above are perhaps more than enough, where the object is to suggest illustrations of a principle, not parts of a plan.

Our Third head will comprehend a few observations on the

representation of Scotland; which being of a nature quite unlike that of England, requires a separate consideration. The reader will observe, that this question is perfectly distinct from that of a Reform of the Scotch Boroughs, which has been prosecuted by Lord Archibald Hamilton with so much ability and perseve

rance.

In Scotland, there is no popular election: All the boroughs are in the hands of what would in England be called Close Corporations. The whole number of voters for the thirty-three counties of Scotland is about 2700; the greatest number in any single county does not exceed 300; and in some, they are we believe less than thirty. This is not the constitution of England. The English representation is a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy, in almost all their possible forms and degrees: to which the Scotch mode of election is as opposite as universal suffrage itself. The freedom of England is the security for the good government of Scotland; but the English constitution in its highest sense, has not been communicated to the Scottish nation. We are not so sunk in Toryism, as to imagine that it is possible to have the English constitution without popular election. Of all the practical irregularities in our government, perhaps the condition of the people of Scotland is the most striking. The most timid reasoners have generally confessed, that political privileges may be diffused in proportion to the diffusion of morality and knowledge: Yet the body of the people of Scotland, celebrated throughout Europe for intelligence, for virtue, for a sober and considerate character, are rigorously excluded from all direct influence on the national councils.

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The right of election in Scotch counties, is so foreign to the present usages of England, that it may be difficult to give an account of it, in few words, to an English reader. It is confined to those who hold land, to a certain extent, directly of the king. 'Hence,' says Mr. Wight, whose work is an authority on Scotch election law, many persons are possessed of large estates, who are incapable to elect or be elected commissioners to parliament, because they only hold them of subjects superiors.'-If A, being a tenant of the crown in capite, conveys all his land to B, to be holden of himself, A remains the tenant of the crown, and retains as such, a right to vote for the land, though the use and profit of it be completely transferred to B. B, the proprietor, has no vote; while A, who continues to be his superior, is the voter. Superiority, to which the right of suffrage is annexed, may be entirely separated from any beneficial interest in the land. Votes in right of land, may thus be possessed by those who are not landholders. Many voters in most counties in Scotland are in this predicament; and there does not seem to be any legal impeVOL. II.

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