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bound to defray all the expenses of the State in peace and war: and, while the hereditary revenues remained entire, and the feudal services belonged to them, the Sovereigns of this country could well support this burthen. Repeated dilapidations, however, reduced the former in process of time; and as the feudal scheme fell into disuse, the other great branch of the Monarch's resources was lopt off also; so that from time to time he was, happily for the liberties of the națion, compelled to ask supplies from Parliament; and, by degrees, one after the other, all the great branches of publick expenditure were transferred from the Crown to the Country.

The Sovereign being thus exonerated from his payments, it was natural to expect that he should also relinquish those funds which had been allotted to him to make those payments ;– that having no longer, for example, to pay the Army and Navy, he should no longer retain the perquisites of Admiralty and Prize which had been destined to support those services, but should transfer to the publick, to whose shoulders he had shifted the burthen, those profits which are inseparably connected with it. This part of the process, however, was altogether omitted. Notions of right and prerogative were conveniently enough introduced. The King was said to have those branches of revenue by a high title, and that they were inherent in the Crown by yirtue of his Royal prerogative; no account being taken of the material circumstance, that, while so possessed by the Crown, they had been burthened with disbursements now undertaken by the State. However, things were suffered to go on in this unfair and unsatisfactory manner for a long course of years. Several attempts, no doubt, were made to arrange matters equitably and amicably between the parties. As soon as Parliament began to show a due jealousy of the Executive, and a proper vigilance over the public purse, the nature of these hereditary revenues came to occupy their attention; but rather with a view to their vexatious origin, than their large amount. The worst of the whole, wardship, or the King's right of seizing or granting the guardianship and estates of infants,-purveyance, or the power of seizing cattle, carriages, and provisions for the Royal household, -and the various feudal'incidents of tenure by Knights' service, were so extremely oppressive, that the full exercise of them could not be borne; and even a mitigated exercise was wholly destructive of liberty. Early in James I.'s reign, we accordingly find a treaty entered into between Parliament and the Crown, by which a commutation was intended to be stipulated; and the learned, ingenious, and indefeasible Monarch estimated the value of his right by a sufficiently recondite process of calculation. He observed, that there were Nine Muses, the patronesses of poets, who were always poor; therefore, he must have more than nine score thousand pounds by the year, which the Commons had tendered him : Also, there were Eleven Apostles, deducting Judas, as unfit to be named among honourable contracting parties. Now, it was plain that ten, the medium between the Muses and Apostles, even if it were not also the number of the Commandments, ought to be the sum chosen :- And to this the Commons, moved by his Majesty's great wit and solid judgment, assented :- So that, had the treaty been concluded, he would have had 200,0001. a year, in lieu of the remaining feudal perquisites of the Crown. Upon the Restoration, in 1660, Charles II., de ring to gain the affections of his subjects, renewed the negotiation; and the memorable act was passed, abolishing the Court of Wards, Purveyance, &c.; in return for which, an hereditary Excise was settled on the Sovereign, beside other grants for his life; out of which he was to defray both the charges of his household and family, and those of the Civil government of the country. This is the first instance of anything like an arrangement of the Civil List. In James II.'s reign, a similar provision was continued ; and in the reigns of William and Anne, a more regular plan was pursued, which has ever since been followed, of voting, at the accession of each Sovereign, a certain yearly sum, to continue during the reign, to cover all the expenses of the Royal household and family, and many of the charges connected with the Civil government of the country

In consideration of these grants for life, each succeeding Sovereign has given up all claim to those branches of the separate property of the Crown which are technically termed its Hereditary Revenue ; that is, the Crown lands, the hereditary Excise, first granted in Charles II.'s time, in lieu of Warding and Purveyance, and the smaller branches arising from fines, &c. But, by some strange accident, very considerable branches of revenue, or perquisites exactly of the same nature, have been kept separate, and retained by the Crown, notwithstanding the provision made by the country both for the household and for all the other branches of the public service, formerly supported out of those hereditary and separate funds. It is hardly nesessary to remark, how wide and dangerous a door is thus opened to abuse, by the sums thus entrusted to the Crown and its ministers, without any Parliamentary grant or controul, and expended without even the form of laying estimates before the House of Commons. Other inroads of abuse are to be found in the Pension List, which the Executiye government is permitted to fill up to a large amount, without any

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check from Parliamentary investigation; and nothing can be more manifest, than the inconsistency of the whole Čivil List arrangement with the present form of the Constitution, and the shape into which the finances of the country have, for nearly a century and a half, been moulded. A new reign nécessarily brings forward this question in all its bearings; and a new Parliament as necessarily is summoned to form the plan for the King's life.

At this particular period, therefore, Mr Creevey takes his stand, and addresses his countrymen upon a subject important in every point of view, whether we regard its financial or its constitutional bearings. It cannot be doubted that his Tract possesses very great merit. The argument is conducted with a degree of plainness, and force, and manliness, seldom to be met in union with so much temper and moderation. The arrangement is lucid and natural; the topics succeed one another in great abundance, and with striking rapidity; there is nothing superfluous, and nothing left unexplained. The style is admirable; clearness, precision, and the excellent taste which consists in avoiding all ornament where the subject requires none, as well as where it admits none--are the characteristics of this pamphlet; which deserves to be placed along with the celebrated political writings of Dean Swift--only that its matter is far more important, and its principles more enlarged. We hasten to present the reader with an abstract of so striking and useful a composition; premising, that though it was published in the contemplation of a general election, as a guide to electors, it is now addressed, with equal propriety, to the Members elected to serve, and contains the soundest' advice upon their publick duties.

Our author begins with stating, that the Commons' House of Parliament is, by the language and the spirit of the Constitution, the guardian of the publick purse; that, formerly, it was so in fact, as well as in name; and that the causes may be easily traced, of the present discrepancy between the theory and the practice of the Constitution-between the character and functions of our representatives who made the glorious stand against the Crown in James the First's time, and the well known habits of the same personages in these our times. How comes it to pass, that the people, the electors of the empire, instead of finding comfort and protection from their representatives against the encroachments of Royal authority, and the imposition of new burthens, as they heretofore were wont to do, now find themselves involved in a constant struggle with those very representatives, who, from their guardians, have become the Crown's

allies; and, from checks to the increase of taxes, are converted into ready instruments of taxation ? After noting a remarkable exception to this position, (the defeat of the Property-tax in 1816, which he ascribes to Mr Brougham giving time to the voice of the nation to make itself heard), and drawing from this fact the consolatory inference, that the country can still, when it pleases, prevent abuses of its property or violations of its rights, he goes on to examine the causes of that great and lamentable change in the complexion of Parliamentary proceedings, which bids fair to destroy our ancient Constitution.

In pursuing this important investigation, the author unfolds the whole mystery of undue influence, or, as it has sometimes been termed, indirect influence, in a manner exceedingly striking; and we regard this disclosure as the more valuable, because the public out of doors have never before been instructed respecting the secret springs of corruption, or that machinery in Parliament which is found so effectual a check to all reformation, and so powerful an ally to bad government. He shows clearly, and by evidence the most incontestable, how the machine works ;-how well for those concerned-how fatally for the people at large.

The first head of the account is the enormous Debt of the country. In the year 1760, at the late King's accession, the whole annual experises of the debt, interest, and other charges, amounted to only 3,302,6731., as appears from the statements in the Commons' Journals. At the present time, 4,283,6001. are paid for collecting the Taxes alone; and 3,392,3261. is the expense of collection in Great Britain, as appears from the last Finance Accounts laid before Parliament. Who then (asks our author) disposes of this large yearly sum paid to the collectors ? Who names to those lucrative places? Nominally the Crown, but really the House of Commons.

• Does any man doubt this fact? If a gentleman represents a town of any commercial importance, and supports the Government by his vote in Parliament, does he not attend regularly at the Treasury, and demand, as a matter of right, the filling of all vacant appointments in the customs, excise, stamp-office, &c. of the town he represents, with his own relations, friends, or political supporters? In the like manner, if he represents a county and supports the minister, is not the valuable appointment of Receiver of the Land-tax, with other such things, considered immediately as his own private property; and don't we invariably see those appointments come into possession of his brother, or his son, or some family or political connexion ? It is only a few years ago that Mr Wilberforce was reproved in the House of Commons by Mr Canning,—was taxed by bim, as it were, for ingratitude in opposing the Government on that occasion, upon the sole ground that Mr Wilberforce was as regular a suitor at the Treasury for the disposal of offices in the revenue in favour of his friends, as any other ministerial member; and on that account, that they. the ministers, had an equal right to his vote and support. Here was no dispute, no difference of opinion, respecting the fact ; on the contrary, you have the admission, from the gravest and highest authorities, that the distribution of this four millions of money, paid for the collection of the taxes, is considered the absolute right of all members of Parliament who support the Government, and to be by them disposed of in favour of their families, friends, and supporters.

• This then (he adds) I consider to be the first and great operating cause by which our representatives are removed from the reach of their constituents: From the very sources of our own miseries they have discovered the means of procuring wealth and emolument : Whilst we, the people, are ground to the earth by the taxes, the families and connexions of our representatives are absolutely supported by the very collection of these taxes.' pp. 4-6.

The next source of influence, and cause of estranging the representative from his constituent, is the East India Company and its patronage, military, civil, judicial and commercial; proportioned to a population of fifty millions of souls, and a revenue of sixteen millions of money. In 1784, by Mr Pitt's famous India Bill, the Company was put under the controul of the Crown; and from that moment, Indian patronage has flowed into the House of Commons in a deep and constant stream. He gives a striking and memorable example, well calculated to show the practical bearings of this head upon the question, and to exhibit the steps by which votes in Parliament are actuaily gained through the political arrangements of the State. No one doubts the tendency of patronage to promote influence, and affect the proceedings of our representatives; but our author shows at once the very way in which it does so.

• We all remember, or at least every one ought to remember, what happened in the House of Commons in 1809. It then appeared in evidence before Parliament, that Lord Castlereagh, being at the time Minister of the Crown, presiding over the government of India, had actually disposed of one of the Company's appoinrments, a writership, by way of barter or exchange, for a seat in the House of Commons, which seat was to be filled by Lord Castlereagh's friend, Lord Dun. lo, now Earl of Clancarty. And when this case was brought before the House of Commons by Lord Archibald Hamilton, as a grave matter of charge against Lord Castlereagh, and after Lord Castlereagh had fully admitted all and each of the facts of the case to be strictly true, the House of Commons did nevertheless, upon serious debate and division, fully absolve Lord Castlereagh from every kind of blame in this transaction. So here, again, we have a solemply re

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