allies; and, from checks to the increase of taxes, are converted into ready instruments of taxation? After noting a remarkable exception to this position, (the defeat of the Property-tax in 1816, which he ascribes to Mr Brougham giving time to the voice of the nation to make itself heard), and drawing from this fact the consolatory inference, that the country can still, when it pleases, prevent abuses of its property or violations of its rights, he goes on to examine the causes of that great and lamentable change in the complexion of Parliamentary proceedings, which bids fair to destroy our ancient Constitution.

In pursuing this important investigation, the author unfolds the whole mystery of undue influence, or, as it has sometimes been termed, indirect influence, in a manner exceedingly striking; and we regard this disclosure as the more valuable, because the public out of doors have never before been instructed respecting the secret springs of corruption, or that machinery in Parliament which is found so effectual a check to all reformation, and so powerful an ally to bad government. He shows clearly, and by evidence the most incontestable, how the machine works;-how well for those concerned-how fatally for the people at large.

The first head of the account is the enormous Debt of the country. In the year 1760, at the late King's accession, the whole annual expenses of the debt, interest, and other charges, amounted to only 3,302,673., as appears from the statements in the Commons' Journals. At the present time, 4,283,600l. are paid for collecting the Taxes alone; and 3,392,3267. is the expense of collection in Great Britain, as appears from the last Finance Accounts laid before Parliament. Who then (asks our author) disposes of this large yearly sum paid to the collectors? Who names to those lucrative places? Nominally the Crown, but really the House of Commons.

Does any man doubt this fact? If a gentleman represents a town of any commercial importance, and supports the Government by his vote in Parliament, does he not attend regularly at the Treasury, and demand, as a matter of right, the filling of all vacant appointments in the customs, excise, stamp-office, &c. of the town he represents, with his own relations, friends, or political supporters? In the like manner, if he represents a county and supports the minister, is not the valuable appointment of Receiver of the Land-tax, with other such things, considered immediately as his own private property; and don't we invariably see those appointments come into possession of his brother, or his son, or some family or political connexion? It is only a few years ago that Mr Wilberforce was reproved in the House of Commons by Mr Canning, was taxed by him, as it were, for ingratitude in opposing the Government on that

occasion, upon the sole ground that Mr Wilberforce was as regular a suitor at the Treasury for the disposal of offices in the revenue in favour of his friends, as any other ministerial member; and on that account, that they. the ministers, had an equal right to his vote and support. Here was no dispute, no difference of opinion, respecting the fact; on the contrary, you have the admission, from the gravest and highest authorities, that the distribution of this four millions of money, paid for the collection of the taxes, is considered the absolute right of all members of Parliament who support the Government, and to be by them disposed of in favour of their families, friends, and supporters.

• This then (he adds) I consider to be the first and great operating cause by which our representatives are removed from the reach of their constituents: From the very sources of our own miseries they have discovered the means of procuring wealth and emolument : Whilst we, the people, are ground to the earth by the taxes, the families and connexions of our representatives are absolutely supported by the very collection of these taxes.' pp. 4-6.

The next source of influence, and cause of estranging the representative from his constituent, is the East India Company and its patronage, military, civil, judicial and commercial; proportioned to a population of fifty millions of souls, and a revenue of sixteen millions of money. In 1784, by Mr Pitt's famous India Bill, the Company was put under the controul of the Crown; and from that moment, Indian patronage has flowed into the House of Commons in a deep and constant stream. He gives a striking and memorable example, well calculated to show the practical bearings of this head upon the question, and to exhibit the steps by which votes in Parliament are actually gained through the political arrangements of the State. No one doubts the tendency of patronage to promote influence, and affect the proceedings of our representatives; but our author shows at once the very way in which it does so.

'We all remember, or at least every one ought to remember, what happened in the House of Commons in 1809. It then appeared in evidence before Parliament, that Lord Castlereagh, being at the time Minister of the Crown, presiding over the government of India, had actually disposed of one of the Company's appointments, a writership, by way of barter or exchange, for a seat in the House of Commons, which seat was to be filled by Lord Castlereagh's friend, Lord Dunlo, now Earl of Clancarty. And when this case was brought before the House of Commons by Lord Archibald Hamilton, as a grave matter of charge against Lord Castlereagh, and after Lord Castlereagh had fully admitted all and each of the facts of the case to be strictly true, the House of Commons did nevertheless, upon serious debate and division, fully absolve Lord Castlereagh from every kind of blame in this transaction. So here, again, we have a solemnly re

corded decision of the House of Commons, that Indian patronage, like the collection of the English revenue, is just and lawful prize to members of the House of Commons, and that it is to be used by them for whatever purposes they chuse, whether of private emolument or public corruption, without the slightest attention to the complaints or remonstrances of their constituents. Can any man think of this last mentioned case, and at the same time doubt, that the House of Commons is changed in its nature from what it formerly was; or can he doubt that this enormous Indian patronage, so divided as it now is with the Crown, is one of the many and great causes that has produced this fatal change in the practice of our Constitution?' pp. 7, 8.

We certainly do not mean to diminish the weight of this statement, when we observe, that the existence of the Company, with all the evils and anomalies which it occasions, recommends itself as a benefit in the choice of evils, to every one who regards the freedom and stability of the Constitution. It operates injuriously in a mercantile point of view; and the whole scheme is extremely anomalous in its nature. But let us only reflect in whose hands the undivided patronage of India must be, were the Company's government subverted, and the territory vested, like Jamaica or Ceylon, or the Cape, in the Crown. At present, the Directors have a large share of the patronage uncontrouled by Government; and Ministers are obliged to rest satisfied with a comparatively moderate proportion. Were the Company abolished, the whole patronage must of necessity vest in them. The arrangement to which our author refers in the passage last cited, had the effect, probably the purpose, of transferring a part of this patronage from the Directors of the Company to the Ministers of the Crown. In this respect, it exactly resembled all the other reforms introduced into the practice of the Constitution by Mr Pitt, and which we described more at large in a former Number (April 1810). It carried the long arm of the Treasury into the subordinate department, and increased, pro tanto, the Ministerial patronage. Our author has shown how this may be used in swaying the House of Commons.

He next proceeds to the list of places held under the Crown by members of Parliament; and it appears from the Third Report of the Finance Committee, a body selected by the Ministers themselves, though nominally voted by the House of Commons, that seventy-six members hold places, the salaries of which are 156,6067. a year.

Under these circumstances,' he asks who can wonder at the separation in interest which we so evidently perceive between our representatives and ourselves? Fancy to yourselves the ordinary occupa

tion of a day in London by most of our representatives. During the morning you may find them at the Treasury in pursuit of appointments in the revenue in favour of their brothers, or cousins, or friends, and parliamentary supporters; or at the Board of Controul, or India House, soliciting writerships and cadetships for their sons and nephews. In times of war, the Admiralty and Horse Guards are equally beset by these parliamentary visitors, for commands and commissions. Follow the same persons in the evening to the House of Commons, and there see them joined by that solid body of reserve, the seventy-six placemen, who have 156,000l. divided amongst them; and now let me ask you, if in a company thus composed, the Minister of the Crown should be pleased to propose a tax upon malt, or any other article in which we (the people) are deeply interested,what chance, I say, do you suppose we have of escaping this burthen, however unanimous our voices may be against it? We know, to our own sorrow, and to the shame of our representatives, that we should have none. Who can wonder that it should be so, after what I have stated to you?' pp. 8, 9.

Next follows the great fund, called, in common parlance, the Droits of Admiralty, but made up of various perquisites of the Crown chiefly during war. These perquisites were originally vested in the Sovereign, to enable him to provide for the expense of defending the realm, and clearing the seas of pirates, That this was the original destination of the fund, requires but little proof either from reason or authority. But the former being obvious, as all such revenues must, in the nature of things, have had this condition annexed to their enjoyment, a few examples of the latter may suffice; and we advert to this point the rather, because it did not fall in with our author's plan to dwell at all upon it. Lord Coke says, that wreck (one of the droits of Admiralty) is the Crown's at common law, and that the stat. of West. 1. is only declaratory; but he admits that this reason for it has been given, namely, because the King is bound to clear the narrow seas of pirates, and that wreck is to defray the expense thereof. 2. Instit. 167. Holborne, in his Argument on Shipmoney, lays it down as clear and known law, that the King hath the natural profits of the sca, as royal fish, and all others if he would take them, for guarding the seas; and so of letters of marque, prizes and impositions.' 3. Howell's St. Tr. 1004. Mr Justice Crawley (in the same great case) holds the customs to be clearly for the expenses of defence; and only gives as a reason why the fish are not, because they are too small an article for such a purpose (ib. 1081), his Lordship not having lived to see the droits swell in one reign to the enormous sum of above nine millions. Further, it may be remark, ød, that whatever is laid down respecting Prize, applies equally

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to Droits; these being merely incident to right of prize, and prize being, by law, as completely vested in the Crown as droits; in so much, indeed, that before the usual grant and prize acts at the beginning of each war, all prize vests in the Crown exclusively-that, if not voluntarily or parliamentarily granted, it continues in the Crown-and that, even after the grant, the Crown may release any prize property, without the consent of the Captors, even after adjudication in the Courts of Admiralty, and up to the last moment of appeal, before final judgment. For the proof of these positions, we refer to the well known cases of Home v. Camden, in Dom. Proc. by error from C. P. 2. H. B. 359. and Elselu. Maas. 5. Rob. 182. Now, what do the learned Judges lay down of the right of prize? We cite Sir William Scott, no very strenuous opposer of the Royal prerogative, nor a specimen of what Bacon calls that odious thing, a popular Judge. Prize,' says he, is the creature of the Crown,-according to all writers," Bello parta cedunt reipublicæ."-" It is given for this purpose, that the power to whom it belongs to decide on peace and war, may use it in the most beneficial manner for the purposes of both.' - It is not held' (he afterwards says) by the Sovereign himself as private property.' 5. Rob. 182. Again-Old Stores form another branch of the droits; and were always held as such until the 45 Geo. III. transferred them to the service of the Navy. Yet what says the law on that branch of the fund in question? A grant of them having been made by James I. to the Earl of Devonshire under the Privy Seal, (the Report says, but it appears to have been the Sign manual), he sold them and died, and his exccutors were sued in the Exchequer for the value. The matter was referred to the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, whose opinion is thus delivered by no less a reporter than Lord Coke. The King's treasure, the liga⚫ment of peace, the sinews of war, the preserver of the honour and safety of the realm, and his other valuable chattels—are so necessary and incident to the Crown, that they shall go with it to the successor of the King, and not to his executor; ⚫ and the only warrant sufficient to issue any treasure, must be under the Great or Privy Seal.' 11. Rep. 91. 6. Lord Clarendon relates an opinion given by himself to Charles II., when he appointed Lord Ashley, afterwards the famous Shaftesbury, as treasurer or receiver of the proceeds of the Dutch prizes, by warrant under the Sign manual, and made him only accountable to himself. If,' said the Noble Historian, your Majesty's treasurer hath the keeping of this fund without the most formal account, you may be abominably cozened-nor can it in any other way be prevented. And afterwards, to the Lord

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