12 c. GOVERNMENT HOUSE, Victoria, August 3, 1859. To the Legislative Council and House of Assembly of the Colony of Vancouver's Island: GENTLEMEN: I have to communicate for your information the intelligence of the landing of a detachment of United States troops on the island of San Juan, avowedly (see enclosed Nos. 1 and 2) for the purpose of forming a military post, and of asserting the sovereignty of the United States to that island. Having received no information from any quarter that the United States ever contemplated taking military possession of any part of the disputed territory while the boundary line remained unsettled, I am forced to believe that the late unwarrantable and discourteous act, so contrary to the usages of civilized nations, has originated in error, and been undertaken without the authority of that government. That impression is corroborated by a letter (a copy of which is here enclosed) from the Honorable W. L. Marcy, Secretary of the United States, dated Washington, July 12, 1855, to Her Majesty's minister at Washington, which contains instructions from the President of the United States to the governor of Washington Territory, and displays, in the clearest manner, the conciliatory and moderate views entertained by his government on the subject of the disputed territory. Though the right of Great Britain to all the islands situated to the westward of "Vancouver" or "Rosario" Straits is, to our minds, clearly established by the first article of the treaty of 1846, and though those islands have, since the foundation of this colony, been considered as a dependency of Vancouver's Island, it is well known to you, gentlemen, that out of respect to the construction that has been put upon that treaty by the government of the United States we have abstained from exercising exclusive sovereignty over them. Convinced that any assumption, on either side, of exclusive right to the disputed territory would simply be a fruitless and mischievous waste of energy, neither detracting from, nor adding force to the claims of either nation, wise and considerate policy enjoins upon us the part of leaving so important a national question for settlement by the proper authorities, and of avoiding complications foreign to the views and wishes of, and probably embarrassing to both governments. Immediately on being informed of the landing of the United States troops at San Juan, Her Majesty's ship Tribune, under the command of Captain Hornby, was despatched to that quarter, and soon after a detachment of royal engineers and royal marine light infantry were ordered from New Westminster by Her Majesty's ship Plumper, Captain Richards, and those troops will be landed at San Juan to protect the lives and property of British subjects. You will observe gentlemen, from enclosure No. 1, that the captain in command of the United States detachment of troops, in a public notice, dated 27th of July, assumes the exercise of exclusive sovereign rights in the island of San Juan, while the President of the United States altogether disclaims such pretensions, and seeks at most to continue the joint right of sovereignty and domain in common with Great Britain. We may presume from that circumstance that the notice in question was framed in ignorance of the intentions of the United States government, and that the pretensions set forth will not be maintained. Entertaining such opinions, I have not failed to impress on Her Majesty's naval officers now stationed at San Juan the desire of Her Majesty's government to avoid every course which may unnecessarily involve the suspension of the amicable relations subsisting between Great Britain and the United States. At the same time, those officers have been instructed, and are prepared to assert the rights and to mainthe honor and dignity of our sovereign and her dominions. I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant, 12 d. [From the "British Colonist," Victoria, August 17, 1859.] Reply to Governor's Message about San Juan. VICTORIA, V. I., House of Assembly, Friday, August 12, 1859 Mr. Speaker, learning that neither Mr. Skinner nor Mr. Pemberton intended to insist on their motion as regards San Juan, had prepared a reply to the message. He considered that a great mistake had been made by the government in sending out men to settle the boundary. Common sense and dollars should have been sent. The dollar the Americans worship. If dollars had been used a different interpretation of the treaty might have been made. Why not have made the proceeding a mere mercantile affair and paid the commissioner? Then the island would have been ours and the Americans would have clearly seen the justice of our claim. But a general on his own authority had invaded our territory. His grounds for doing so were based on falsehood and carried out clandestinely. What more could be expected of a man who has spent a lifetime in warring with Indians? But what is to be done? His Excellency sends troops and ships. Why all this expense and show if for parade? Why were not the troops landed? Instead of fighting, Her Majesty's captains take to diplomacy. It shames me to think that the Satellite was running around after Commissioner Campbell. I am ashamed to think that post captains were holding a pow-wow with a subaltern of the American army. They should have landed their troops and avoided all degrading negotiations. But more troops have landed in spite of post captains and admirals. (Here he read some extracts from the Blue Book of British Columbia enjoining the necessity of accustoming the colonists to defend themselves.) Yes, a militia must be raised. We must defend ourselves, for the position we occupy to-day would make the iron monument of Wellington weep, and the stony statue of Nelson bend his brow. The reply to the message was then read. Mr. Yates agreed with a part of the address, but could not understand why the honorable speaker had said in it that the time to land troops has gone by. My motion is to learn why they were not landed. The time to land them was when there was no danger of blood being shed. Now, perhaps, the case is different. Mr. Pemberton. I am not sure that the time to land troops has gone by. If it has not, I recommend His Excellency to land them. That portion of the address in relation to militia I would leave out. If we asked the home government for arms for the militia, they would be likely to send us some old muskets from the Tower 150 years old. No allusion has been made to British subjects occupying the island. I think it necessary. Mr. Speaker. I think there was a council on board the flag-ship. His Excellency was present. Negotiation was the object, perhaps, as American officers had arrived on the Shubrick. I would not hold any negotiations with so dishonorable a man as Campbell. I have not said anything in the address about San Juan as the key to British Columbia. I leave that to His Excellency. Mr. Yates preferred negotiation to war. I believe the powers that be have been too slow, and put the Governor in a false position. My motion is to learn who is to blame. Mr. Pemberton believed a few soldiers, if supported by a man-of-war, could land without danger of collision. Mr. McKay was favorable to landing troops at all hazards. Mr. Speaker had no doubt the naval officers had said: "N-o-w, Mr. Pick-ett, will you--al-low-- us to land?" Mr. Pemberton thought the colony would be benefited by the difficulty. A large naval station would be built here, and everything would be removed from Valparaiso. Mr. Speaker thought the honorable member very patriotic in taking such an interested view of the question. He cared nothing for the paltry local advantages. It is a national question, and in that light alone he looked at it. Mr. Pemberton proposed the occupation of Lopez Island by British troops. After some amendments to the address, the following to the governor's message was then adopted: ADDRESS. The House acknowledges the receipt of your excellency's communication of the 3d instant relating to the clandestine invasion of San Juan Island by United States troops, and the steps to be adopted in relation thereto. Since that communication it is well known that additional forces have been landed.. The House would therefore inquire why the British forces were not landed to assert our just right to the island in question, and to uphold the honor of our country and our Queen. The House would most urgently impress upon your excellency to enforce upon Her Majesty's government the necessity of demanding from the government of the United States not only immediate withdrawal of those troops, but also strenuously and at all risks to maintain her right to the island in question, and also to all other islands in the same archipelago, now so clandestinely, dishonorably, and dishonestly invaded. It is not for our country to be wantonly and insolently insulted, but redress must be demanded. The weakness of the colony is its greatest danger, and, at the same time, an inducement for the repetition of similar offences by similar persons. Let it, therefore, be urged upon Her Majesty's government that sending out colonists rapidly from Great Britain is the surest way, not only of maintaining peace, but of preserving intact Her Majesty's possessions. Coupled with this, the House would propose that free and liberal grants of land be given to such emigrants after settling thereon for a certain time. 12 e. [From the British Colonist," Victoria, August 17, 1859.] WHY WERE NOT TROOPS LANDED AT SAN JUAN? On our first page will be found the assembly debate on the Governor's message in relation to landing soldiers on San Juan. From the severe strictures passed on our naval officers by the speaker, who is taken as the exponent of the government, it is evident that a serious difference of opinion as to our policy exists between the naval and civil authorities. It is difficult to imagine how so high an official could use such language except from information derived from official sources; and it is still more difficult to believe, as suggested by the chairman during debate, that the naval authorities had refused to land when they had no discretionary instructions. If they had full instructions to land, the unenviable position of the government, since the publication of the message, is justly chargeable to them. If, on the other hand, they were governed by discretionary instructions, the charges against the commanders of Her Majesty's ships for equivocal conduct is justly reprehensible. No future explanation, however, can explain away the palpable inference which will be drawn from the language used in debate. An error has been committed by somebody. Either the Administration should have been satisfied with a pacific policy, manifested by serving the United States authorities with a formal protest or an assertion of our sovereignty in the first place, and then have allowed the matter to rest till despatches were received from the imperial government, or it should at once have landed troops on the island, without making such a display of force or asking permission. We confess that we are not disposed to accept peace at any price; for if that were the case, cowardice would be the safest policy. We do, however, concur with the opinion expressed in the message that our forces should have been landed. The Americans took the ground that their citizens required protection, and that they landed troops with that object. Now, in order to protect British subjects on the island, we also should have done the same. Then our position would have been exactly similar to theirs. On this high ground, had bloodshed followed, we could have appealed to the world, with right on our side, certain of a verdict in our favor. As it is, the Americans have been allowed to strengthen their forces with men, munitions of war, and settlers, and actually occupy private property long in the possession of British subjects, whilst we, apparently divided in our councils, have made a grand and useless parade, and done nothing but render ourselves ridiculous. Whoever are the parties, or whatever are the causes why a vigorous and firm policy has not been pursued, it is certain an explanation is due to account for the charges made against the naval forces in our waters. In the mean time some action ought to be taken by the people to show the deep interest we have in San Juan, and that we are determined to protect our fellow-subjects on the islands. In addition, it is necessary to arouse cur sister colonies to the importance of the island to British America, and show to the imperial government the necessity of holding the island to guard the overland transit from Great Britain to her Asiatic dependencies. It matters not what may or may not have been said by British or American statesmen in relation to the reputed claims to Canal de Haro or Rosario Strait. We are forced to abide by the treaty. If the United States knew all about Canal de Haro at the time of the treaty, and that the line was deflected from the 49th parallel, so as not to divide the sovereignty of this island, then why was it not named as the boundary? On the other hand, had Rosario Strait been thoroughly known and fixed on as the channel by the negotiants, it would have been in the treaty. Finding neither one nor the other there; finding no ship channel or main channel named in the treaty, but finding four channels leading north from the Straits of Fuca, and that the only channel named in the treaty is that which separates the continent from this island, we see no way for a pacific adjustment, except making Washington Channel, between San Juan and Lopez, the boundary. That we justly claim. 13. General Harney to the Adjutant General. HEADQUARTERS Department of OregonN, Fort Vancouver, W. T, August 29, 1859. COLONEL I have the honor to enclose a copy of Mr. Marcy's despatch,* referred to in Governor Douglas's communication to me of the 13th instant, which was received on the night of the 27th instant, with a note from William A. G. Young, esq., Acting Colonial Secretary, a copy of the same being also enclosed. My communication of the 24th instant had been sent to Governor Douglas before Mr. Young's note and its enclosure were received. The instructions of * See Nos. 1 and 2 of these papers, pp. 144-'5. Ex. Doc. 29-12 this document from Mr. Marcy have no bearing upon the question at issue between the British authorities of Vancouver's Island and myself at this time; and my answer to Governor Douglas of the 24th instant would appear as it is, had this copy of Mr. Marcy's despatch accompanied the Governor's letter of the 13th instant. The spirit of Mr. Marcy's instructions, when carried out in good faith by the functionaries and citizens of both countries, I not only most heartily approve, but I am satisfied my conduct will stand the most critical and searching investigation in the support of that approval. From the time of my assuming the command of this Department until the occupation of San Juan Island, I was most careful neither to increase nor change the position of the force on Puget Sound, that there might be no misconceptions of my acts, on the part of the British, of the good faith which animated me in the observance of treaty stipulations. Time and again our light-houses were attacked, and the wives and children of our citizens on that coast were brutally murdered by British Indians. Reports reached me that these Indians had been instigated to these acts by the Hudson's Bay Company, in order to drive them from the lands which this immense establishment covet for their own purposes. I was well aware of the extent and power of this great commercial monopoly, second only to the East India Company, which has crushed out the liberties and existence of so many nations in Asia, and committed barbarities and atrocities for which the annals of crime have no parallel. I knew the exacting policy of the Hudson's Bay Company would not hesitate to adopt any measure deemed necessary to insure their success, for their history had shown this, and the history of our wars with England establish the fact that an Indian alliance is their first requirement. With all these truths before me, I was still reluctant to believe that the Hudson's Bay Company would attempt the violation of the solemn obligations of a treaty, or that the British authorities would permit any action to be taken by the Hudson's Bay Company, in case an attempt was desired by them. Judge, then, of my astonishment and mortification in my late visit to San Juan to find an unworthy advantage had been taken of my forbearance to outrage our people in the most insulting manner. For this thing was not done in a corner, but in open day. A British ship-ofwar lands Mr. Dallas, the chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company, who abuses one of our citizens in the harshest manner, and threatens to take him by force to Victoria for trial and imprisonment. Finding the citizen resolute in the defence of his rights, the Americans were informed the British Indians would be sent down upon them to drive them from the island. I shall substantiate these facts by the affidavits of American citizens of such position and character as cannot leave a doubt of their truth, and showing the attempted denial of Governor Douglas in his communication of the 13th instant is only a quibble. These affidavits would have been sent before this, but the disturbances at San Juan and the difficulty of communication in this country have delayed their completion. It is proper also that I should inform you that Captain Alden, of our navy, commanding surveying steamer Active, has reported to me a conversation which he held with Governor Douglas since the occupation of San Juan, in which conversation Governor Douglas stated that, in the event of a collision between the forces of the two countries, he would not be able to prevent the northern Indians from driving our people from the island. This intimation from Governor Douglas is significant, as indicating the conception of such an action originated before the occupation of the island, and was the foundation of the reports of our people throughout the winter, that I did not consider at the time of sufficient importance as to notice in my official reports. From all the events which have occurred before and since the occupation of San Juan Island, I am convinced the British government have instituted a series of acts aiming at the eventual |