regard to the boundary between Her Majesty's possessions and those of the United States on the northwest coast of North America as fixed by the treaty of 1846. Circumstances prevented that intention from being acted upon previously to the change of government, and it is now my duty to convey to you

those instructions.

Your lordship is no doubt aware that the British and American commissioners appointed in 1856 to survey and mark out the boundary differed in opinion as to that portion of it lying between the Gulf of Georgia and Fuca's Straits. As far, indeed, as there is only one channel separating the continent from Vancouver's Island, no doubt can be entertained as to the true boundary, which, according to the treaty, runs from the 49th parallel of latitude down the centre of the Gulf of Georgia to its southernmost point, and no question can arise as to that portion of the boundary which is to be drawn through the centre of the Straits of Fuca to the ocean. But with regard to the intermediate portion of the boundary the commissioners differed in opinion, the British commissioner conceiving that the line should be traced through the channel known as Rosario Straits, while his American colleague maintained that it must be sought for in the Haro Channel. The commissioners defended their respective positions in a correspondence of some length, marked by much ability on both sides. Neither commissioner, however, was prepared to defer to the arguments of the other The American commissioner rejected an offer to compromise the matter subse quently made to him by his English colleague, and the commissioners, consid ering that under these circumstances it was useless to continue their correspond ence, signed, on the 3d of December, 1857, a minute recording their disagreement, and adjourning their proceedings until circumstances should render it necessary for them to meet again.

It is much to be regretted that there was not annexed to the treaty of 1846 any map or chart by which the true meaning of the expressions made use of in the first article of that treaty could have been authoritatively ascertained. The British commissioner was clearly of opinion that both the boundary intended by the plenipotentiaries who negotiated the treaty of 1846, and also the channel spoken of in the treaty, is the channel known as Rosario Straits, and Her Majesty's government fully share that opinion; but inasmuch as it is now proved that there are several channels connecting the Gulf of Georgia with Fuca's Straits, that circumstance afforded to the American commissioner the means of contesting the view of the case taken by his English colleague, and the result has unfortunately been, that a question which Her Majesty's government had hoped was finally set at rest by the treaty of 1846, remains still a subject of discussion.

It may be convenient that I should here pass in review a few of the arguments which led Her Majesty's government to the well-founded belief, that the boundary between the British and American possessions, as fixed by the treaty of 1846, is the Rosario, and not the Haro channel.

The words of the first article of that treaty are as follows:

From the point on the 49th parallel of north latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing treaties and conventions between Great Britain and the United States terminates, the line of boundary between the territories of Her Britannic Majesty and those of the United States shall be continued westward along the said 49th parallel of north latitude to the middle of the channel, which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca's Straits to the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the navigation of the whole of the said channel and straits, south of the 49th parallel of north latitude, remain free and open to both parties.

The treaty, therefore, in dealing with the space separating Vancouver's Island from the continent, speaks of two divisions only, viz: the "channel" and the "straits"-the channel being that commencing in the Gulf of Georgia, and those straits being the Straits of Fuca. The information acquired by subsequent surveys shows that it might have been more correct to have divided that space into three portions, viz: the Gulf of Georgia, the Straits of Fuca,

and the intervening channel or channels by which the Gulf of Georgia and the Straits of Fuca are connected. A glance, however, at Vancouver's chart, which is the only map that the British government, and, it is believed, the plenipotentiaries of the two governments had before them, at the time when the treaty of 1846 was negotiated, will suffice to show why the treaty speaks only of the "channel" and the "straits." Vancouver's chart depicts the channel through which he sailed as being an uninterrupted water line, passing in a southerly direction through the Gulf of Georgia, and the passage known by his name, but since called Rosario Straits, into the Straits of Fuca; and on the assumption suggested by a study of that map, that the channel discovered by Vancouver was the main artery connecting the Gulf of Georgia with Fuca's Straitsthere was no necessity for mentioning the channel which was to serve as the boundary between the British and the American possessions, otherwise than in the terms used in the treaty.

For the same reason the treaty designates as "southerly" the direction which the boundary line is to take, from the westernmost point of the 49th parallel of latitude, considered with reference to Vancouver's chart. The term "southerly" is a sufficiently accurate description of a boundary line to be traced through the centre of the Gulf of Georgia, and of the passage navigated by Vancouver into the Straits of Fuca.

But if the boundary line had been intended to pass through the Haro channel, the treaty must have been otherwise worded. The Haro channel could not have been regarded or described as a portion of the channel commencing with the Gulf of Georgia, for it is neither the channel discovered by Vancouver, nor is it in regard to its general configuration a continuation in a southerly direction of the Gulf of Georgia. Moreover, it was not at that time known, at all events, by Her Majesty's government to be navigable for shipping; but, on the contrary, it was supposed to be a dangerous, if not an unnavigable strait.

The Gulf of Georgia extends as far south as the latitude of Orcas and Lummi islands; consequently the boundary line between the British provinces and those of the United States, which, in accordance with the clearly expressed words of the treaty, runs down the centre of that gulf, must, if it is to be diverted from the southernmost point of that gulf into the Haro channel, take for some distance, not a southerly, but a westerly direction, describing for that purpose an acute angle before the southerly course spoken of in the treaty could be resumed. Consequently, if the plenipotentiaries had intended that the boundary line should pass through the Haro channel, they would undoubtedly have specified that channel by name, in order to distinguish it from the channel—that is to say, the channel used by Vancouver-the channel, namely, which was the continuation of the Gulf of Georgia; and they would also have added some modified qualification of the word southerly, from which it may be inferred that the boundary channel was intended to be one contiguous to the main land.

Another argument may be adduced in support of the view taken by the British commissioner, from the fact that the Canal de Haro, so far from being a continuation of the channel through the Gulf of Georgia, is rather a distinct and independent channel running parallel to that gulf, and having its commence ment in the straits separating Saturna and the other islands in that quarter from Vancouver's Island.

But all these points were so ably argued by Captain Prevost, the British commissioner, that Her Majesty's government do not think it necessary to restate them in this despatch. They think it sufficient to refer to his reports, and to state in general terms their conviction; that, whereas the channel through Rosario Straits does, in all essential points, answer to the plain meaning and intention of the treaty, the Haro channel does not do so.

The commissioner of the United States rested his view of the interpretation to be given to the first article of the treaty mainly on the expression made use

of by Mr. McLane, the American minister at this court in 1846, in reporting to his government the terms of arrangement which he thought the British government would probably offer, and on the language employed by Mr. Benton in the Senate when the treaty came under discussion before that body. It appears that both Mr. McLane and Mr. Benton indicated the Canal de Haro; Mr. McLane as that which he thought the British government would offer as the boundary line; Mr. Benton as that which the government of the United States had understood as the boundary.

Her Majesty's government have not failed to consider, with the attention it deserves, the arguments to be drawn from those statements in favor of the position of the American commissioner; but, while those statements may be taken as evidence of what were the views of Mr. McLane and Mr. Benton, Her Majesty's government cannot accept them as necessarily proving what were the intentions of the plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty, or what is the fair construction of the treaty itself.

Her Majesty's government, indeed, do not think that they should be asked to do so, seeing that the words of the treaty, which ought to be the guide, do not properly admit of that interpretation; and that it is beyond dispute that the intentions of the British government that the line of boundary should be drawn through Vancover's channel.

With reference to this point I have to state to you that the Earl of Aberdeen, to whom I have referred, informs me that he distinctly remembers the general tenor of his conversations with Mr. McLane on the subject of the Oregon boundary, and it is certain that it was the intention of the treaty to adopt the mid-channel of the straits as the line of demarcation, without any reference to islands, the position, and, indeed, the very existence, of which had hardly, at that time, been accurately ascertained; and he has no recollection of any mention having been made during the discussion of the Canal de Haro, or, indeed, any other channel than those described in the treaty itself. I also enclose a memorandum drawn up by Sir Richard Pakenham, the negotiator of the treaty of 1846.

Such being the state of the question, and Her Majesty's government being anxious to see it finally settled in a manner satisfactory and honorable to both parties, Her Majesty's government have had to consider the advice which it behooves them to tender to the Crown with a view to so desirable a result.

This duty has been rendered, in the present case, a comparatively easy one. Her Majesty's government cannot doubt that their desire for a mutually satisfactory and honorable settlement of the question is fully reciprocated by the government of the United States, and they feel confident that the gradual disappearance, one after another, through the good sense and conciliatory spirit shown by both governments, of these points of difference, which the President of the United States, in a former message to Congress, described as irritating questions, has left no room for doubting that this sole remaining question can also be satisfactorily adjusted.

Her Majesty's government trust that, as between this country and the United States, the day for tedious arbitrations, and still more, for hostile demonstrations, is gone by; they see no reason why this, and, indeed, any other question which may from time to time arise, should not be settled by direct and friendly communication between the two governments. The true and just interpretation of treaty engagements is the only law by which Her Majesty's government claim to be governed in their dealings with the United States; the force of argument is the only force to which they desire to appeal; and when the interpretation is asserted to be doubtful, or the argument fails to convince, her Majesty's government conceive that the only alternative which befits two great nations, bound to each other by such ties as those which unite Great Britain and the United States, is to endeavor to adjust the difference by mutually honorable compromise of conflicting pretensions.

Now the result of the survey upon which Captain Richards, of Her Majesty's ship Plumper, has been lately engaged, as set forth in the enclosed chart, shows that, in addition to the Rosario Straits and to the Haro Channel, there exists a third navigable passage connecting the Gulf of Georgia with Fuca's Straits.

This third channel is indeed reported by Captain Richards to answer, in respect of its central position and southerly direction, to the channel described in the treaty; and assuming it to have been the intention of the plenipotentiaries that the several channels connecting the Gulf of Georgia with Fuca Straits should be considered for the purpose of the treaty as one channel, it may fairly be argued that this central passage would not only satisfy the requirements of the treaty, but would divide between the two countries, in proportions which each party might consent to, the cluster of islands by which the channel is intersected. The advantage of such a line would indeed be with the United States, for there are only three islands of any territorial importance situated between the Haro Channel and Rosario Straits, namely, Orcas and Lopez islands and the island of San Juan; and by the adoption of the central channel as the boundary line, the two first named islands would belong to the United States, while only the island of San Juan would remain to Great Britain.

Your lordship will accordingly propose to the United States government that the boundary line shall be the middle channel between the continent of America and Vancouver's Island, as thus defined :

Starting from the north in the parallel 48° 50' north, and the meridian 1230. longitude, west from Greenwich, (as laid down in the accompanying chart,) the mid-channel line would proceed due south, passing half way between Patos Island, on the east, and the east point of Saturna, on the west, to the centre of Douglas Channel, half way between Waldron and Orcas islands. Thence sweeping round to the southwest, southeast, and south, between San Juan, on the west, and the islands of Orcas, Shaw, and Lopez, on the east, the line would rejoin the 123° meridian, as soon as the safety of navigation would permit, ať about one mile to the southward of the Salmon Bank, on the parallel 48° 28′ north, and continue due south along this meridian until it falls into the common mid-channel course through Juan de Fuca Straits.

It will thus be observed that the meridian of 123° is assumed as the boundary, and is only departed from when forced to do so by the physical interference of the islands.

This middle channel, though inferior in some respects to the Haro Channel or to Rosario Straits, is described by Captain Richards as being perfectly safe for steamers, and also, under ordinary circumstances, navigable for sailing vessels. Her Majesty's government, however, do not consider this point as of much importance, since their proposition only extends to making this channel the line of boundary, and they do not propose to alter in any way that stipulation of the treaty which secures to the shipping of both countries the free navigation of the whole of the channels and of the straits-a stipulation advantageous to both parties, and which Her Majesty's government cannot doubt that the government of the United States will agree with them in thinking, must, under all circumstances, be maintained.

It appears to Her Majesty's government that a boundary line traced through the above-mentioned central channel likewise recommends itself for adoption as being in accordance with the principles which regulated the division between the two countries of the islands in the river Saint Lawrence.

Her Majesty's government further submit to the Cabinet of Washington whether, to a view to mutual convenience, it might not be desirable that the small promontory known as Point Roberts should be left to Great Britain. The point is of no intrinsic value to either government; but its possession by the United States will have the effect of detaching an isolated spot of small dimensions from the more convenient jurisdiction of the British colony. As the gov

ernment of the United States will obtain, under the proposal now made, the more valuable portion of the islands in the straits, Her Majesty's government consider that the retention of Point Roberts can hardly be an object with them. There is one other consideration to which I would wish to draw the attention of the government of the United States. In the discussions between Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, which resulted in the treaty of 1842, the American plenipotentiaries argued upon the relative importance to the two countries of the territory then in dispute. Her Majesty's government admitted the value of that argument, and acted upon it. The same language was employed in 1846, upon the Oregon question, and on both occasions the United States obtained the larger portion of the territory in dispute, their plenipotentiaries successfully arguing that it was of greater value to the United States than it could be to Great Britain.

Upon the present occasion this state of things is reversed. The adoption of the central channel would give to Great Britain the island of San Juan, which is believed to be of little or no value to the United States, while much importance is attached by British colonial authorities, and by Her Majesty's government, to its retention as a dependency of the colony of Vancouver's Island.

Her Majesty's government must, therefore, under any circumstances, maintain the right of the British Crown to the island of San Juan. The interests at stake in connection with the retention of that island are too important to admit of compromise, and your lordship will consequently bear in mind that whatever arrangement as to the boundary line is finally arrived at, no settlement of the question will be accepted by Her Majesty's government which does not provide for the island of San Juan being reserved to the British Crown.

Your lordship will bring to the consideration of this question the same conciliatory spirit and frank and straight forward bearing which have distinguished you on previous occasions; and I am happy to think that in the President and Secretary of State of the United States you will find statesmen animated by the same honorable dispositions.

Her Majesty's government hope that the American government will appreciate the arguments you are instructed to employ and the spirit in which you will advance, them, and Her Majesty's government will not permit themselves to believe that the negotiation can, under such circumstances, fail of a successful issue.

It may be proper, however, that you should make the government of the United States understand that this proposal of compromise which you are thus instructed to lay before them is made without prejudice to the claim, which Her Majesty's government consider themselves justified in maintaining, to the Rosario Channel as the true boundary between Her Majesty's possessions and those of the United States. They offer the compromise in the hope that its acceptance by the government of the United States may obviate any further discussion on the subject; but if it is rejected they reserve to themselves the right to fall back on their original claim to its full extent.

You will read this despatch to General Cass, and will leave with him a copy of it.

I am, &c., &c., &c.,

Lord LYONS, &c., &c., &c.

J. RUSSEL.

Sir Richard Pakenham on the Water Boundary under the Oregon treaty of 1846. I have examined the papers put into my hands, by Mr. Hammond, relating to the line of boundary to be established between the British and the United States possessions on the northwest coast of America, and I have endeavored