that the legislature would enact laws preventing appeals from final judgments, and that, therefore, this provision was inserted, giving a guaranty of the right of appeal from such judgments, thus leaving to the legislature the right to enact laws allowing appeals from interlocutory orders. Especially is this so when we consider the fact that nearly every state in the Union allows appeals from final judgment, and restricts or prohibits appeals from interlocutory orders as being against the policy of the law. The framers of the constitution could not have anticipated that the legislature would do an unreasonable thing, and thus take away the right of appeal from a final judgment, when that right has grown to be almost inherent, and yet use words sufficient to authorize it to do that which in most states is considered questionable, and by eminent law writers to be against the policy of the law. In granting the right of appeal from all final judgments the people intended to grant the right of appeal from all final judgments only. The supreme court, being a creature of the constitution, has only such powers as are therein conferred upon it. The only jurisdiction that is conferred by the constitution upon the supreme court in appeal cases is appeals from final judgments. There is no express declaration that appeals will not lie from judg ments other than final judgments. But the court considcrs the affirmative declaration, as used in the section, that "from all final judgments of the district court, there shall be a right of appeal to the supreme court," as manifesting the intent of the framers of the constitution to except from the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court appeals from the district courts, other than appeals from final judgments. This intention and implication is founded on the manifest intent of the framers of the constitution, and upon the general rules of construction that the expression of one thing in the constitution implies the necessary exclusion of things not expressed. We are of the opinion that when the framers of section 9 used the terms "from all final judgments of the district court there shall be a right of appeal to the supreme court," they intended to deny the right of appeal to the supreme court in all other cases, although no express terms of negation were used, and that so much of subdivision 3 of section 3635, Comp. Laws Utah 1888, authorizing appeals from orders granting an injunction, is abrogated and annulled by this section of the constitution. Durousseau v. U. S., 6 Cranch 307; Ex parte Attorney General, 1 Cal. 85; Ex parte McCardie, 7 Wall. 506; U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 723; 725; Suth. St. Const. §§ 325-327; Fowler v. Scully, 72 Pa. St. 456; Cooley, Const. Lim. pp. 78-105; Story, Const. §§ 413-453; State v. Hallock, 14 Nev. 202; Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 251; Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 401; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Potter's Dwar. St. 674, 675. The policy of the laws of the several states and of the United States is to prevent unnecessary appeals. It is not the policy of courts to review cases by piecemeal. The interests of litigants require that cases shall not be prematurely brought to the highest court. The errors complained of may be corrected in the court in which they originated; or the party injured by them might, notwithstanding the injury, have final judgment in his favor. If a judgment interlocutory in its nature were the subject of appeal, each of such judgments rendered in the case could be brought before the appellate court, and litigants harassed by useless delay and expense, and the courts burdened with unnecessary labor. Freem. Judgm. § 33. The reason of the rule is obvious. A party against whom an interlocutory order is made may have all his wrongs redressed and his rights protected upon a final hearing, and therefore he has no ground of complaint. If these rights are not protected on a final hearing in the trial court, the error can be corrected on appeal from the final judgment. We conclude that an appeal from an order pendente lite granting a temporary injunction is not an appeal from a final judgment, and that such an order is not a final judgment, from which an appeal will lie to this court, under section 8 of the constitution. Artman v. Manufacturing Co. (Neb.) 20 N. W. 873; Baker v. White, 92 U. S. 176; Telegraph Co. v. Locke, (Ind. Sup.) 7 N. E. 579; Hume v. Bowie, 148 U. S. 245; Freem. Judgm. § 34; Bank v. Jenkins, 109 Ill. 219; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3; Hill v. Railroad Co., 140 U. S. 52. See Stewart v. Masterson, 131 U. S. 151; Walker v. Oliver, 63 Ill. 200; Brown v. Edgerton (Neb.) 16 N. W. 474; Tinly v. Martin, 80 Ky. 463; Truett v. Rains, 17 S. C. 451; Ray v. Northrup, 55 Wis. 396; Bolles v. Stockman, 42 Ohio St. 445; Dows v. Congdon, 28 N. Y. 122. It is contended that the appellants' right of appeal is guarantied under the statute. A citizen has no vested right in statutory provisions and exemptions. A statutory right to have cases reviewed on appeal may be taken away by a repeal of the statute, even as to cases which have been previously appealed. In this case the constitution has taken away the right of appeal from an interlocutory order granting the temporary injunction appealed from. Cooley, Const. Lim. pp. 471-473; Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398; Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506. The appeal from the order granting the injunction is dismissed, with costs. ZANE, C. J., concurs. BARTCH, J., disqualified to sit in the case. 14 169 15 172 M. EASTMAN, APPELLANT, v. A. R. GURREY, RESPONDENT. 15 367 14 169 20 472 14 169 22 460 14 169 30 451 APPEAL-ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT-FINALITY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VESTED RIGHTS. 1. The plaintiff recovered judgment in an action of ejectment against defendant. The judgment, on motion for a new trial, was set aside and vacated, and a new trial granted. From the order setting aside and vacating the judgment, plaintiff appealed. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment not being final, it is not within the constitutional right of appeals. Held, affirming North Point Consol. Irr. Co. v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, that, as the appeal was not from a final judgment of the district court, it is prohibited by implication under section 9, art. 8, Const., and by the application of the maxim, “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." The constitution has taken away the statutory right of appeal from the order vacating and setting aside the judgment appealed from. By using the terms, "from all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the supreme court," in connection with the balance of the section, the framers of that instrument intended to deny the right of appeal to the supreme court in all other cases arising under that clause, although no express term of negation was used. 2. The policy of the laws of the several states and of the United States is to prevent unnecessary appeals. Interests of litigants require that cases shall not be prematurely brought to the higher court, nor by piecemeal, and litigants harassed by useless delay and expense, and the courts burdened with unnecessary labor. 3. A citizen has no vested right in the statutory privilege or exemptions. A statutory right to have any particular question reviewed on appeal may be taken away by a repeal of the statute. (No. 734. Decided Oct. 29, 1896.) Appeal from the district court, Third judicial district. Hon. John A. Street, Judge. Ejectment by M. Eastman against A. R. Gurrey. From an order vacating a judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order setting aside the judgment was not final. Appeal dismissed. C. S. Varian and Ricy H. Jones, for appellant. T. Ellis Browne and Bennett, Harkness, Howat & Bradley, for respondent. MINER, J.: It appears from the record in this case that the plaintiff recovered judgment in the district court in an action in ejectment against the defendant in February, 1896. This judgment was afterwards set aside and vacated, and a new trial granted, on motion of the defendant. The appellant appeals from the order vacating and setting aside the judgment. The respondent now moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies to this court from an order vacating and setting aside the judg ment, under section 9 of article 8 of the state constitution, and that such order was not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie to this court. The same principle is involved in this appeal as in that of North Point Consol. Irr. Co. v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 14 Utah 155. That case involved the constitutional right of appeal from an order granting an injunction pendente lite. The decision in that case, on principle, is decisive of this. content ourselves with a reference that case as applicable in this. This case, as that, involves the construction of sections 4 and 9 of article 8 of the constitution. Section 9 provides that, "From all We shall therefore to the reasoning in |