A syntactical question (exigor portorium) is touched upon in 15, 14.

A curious and interesting, though not a very large, section of the Noctes Atticae is that which deals with points of textual criticism. Two notices under this head are expressly said to be taken from Probus: 1, 15, §18, on loquentia and eloquentia, and 13, 21, on urbes and urbis in Vergil. Others are so similar to these in manner and treatment that it is natural to refer them to the same scholar. An appeal is constantly made to good manuscripts against bad; for instance, in 1, 7 to the Tironian recension of Cicero; in 1, 16, §15, and 9, 14, to good copies of Cicero; in 1, 21 and 9, 14, to an autograph copy of Vergil, or copies known to have been in his house; in 2, 14 and 10, 13 to good manuscripts of Cato; similarly to good copies in 5, 4 of Fabius Pictor, in 6, 20 of Catullus, in 9, 14; 20, 6 of Sallust, in 18,5 of Ennius. Probus, as we know from his short memoir by Suetonius, gave an immense amount of attention to the collection of good manuscripts of classical authors. The notes just mentioned are very much what he might be supposed to have written, and are, moreover, marked, on the whole, by the same trenchant and positive style.

The remaining sections of the Noctes Atticae hardly admit of any logical arrangement. One set of chapters' may perhaps be noted as chronicling mirabilia or remarkable natural phenomena; another consists of notes on remarkable events. A third group may, for want of a better expression, be said to contain res memoria dignas. A fourth consists of anecdotes." Sometimes the true authority is certainly given; in one case it is Sotion's képas 'Apaλoeias, in another the liber rerum memoria dignarum of Verrius Flaccus ; and these or similar works, such as the marтodami ioropia of Favorinus, may have been the sources of the whole.

The foregoing rough analysis is offered as an aid towards ascertaining the principles which underlie the apparent chaos of the Noctes Atticae, and the probable character and periods of the authorities from whom Gellius mostly derived his knowledge.

13, 6; 8, 4; 9, 4; 10, 2; 10, 12; 16, 15.

23, 15; 4, 5; 7, 17; 15, 10; 15, 16 (3, 15 and 15, 16 seem to come from some book on remarkable deaths; see Pliny 7, 180, where Verrius Flaccus is mentioned as having chronicled a good many).

31, II; 4, 13; 5, 9; 5, 14; 6, 6; 6, 8; 9, 7; 10, 17; 12, 7; 13, 7; 15, 7; 16, 3; 16, 11; 16, 19; 17, 15; 17, 16; 17, 17; 20, 7; 20, 8.

1, 5; 1, 8; 3, 4; 3, 5; 3, 13; 3, 17; 5, 2; 5, 5; 6, 1; 6, 5; 8, 9; 8, 3; 10, 6; 10, 18; 11, 8; 11, 9-10; 12, 6; 13, 4; 15, 2; 15, 17; 15, 31.

II; 9,

The element of purely miscellaneous information, of information which defies rational arrangement, has turned out to be compare tively small. and to include not much more than an eighth part of the whole work. A large part of the Noctes Atticae is given to philosophy, including under that term logic, ethics, speculative and practical, and natural science; a fraction to rhetoric, something to literary criticism, a respectable quota to history and Roman antiquities, more than a quarter of the whole to lexicography and etymology, and something considerable to grammar and textual criticism. Thus the bulk of the work is taken up with the subjects which formed the main elements of a liberal education in the second century: philosophy, rhetoric, history, literature, and philology. Whether any of Gellius's authorities are older than Varro is very doubtful. We cannot fail to be struck with the fact that large as is the amount of discussion and information bearing upon philosophical questions, that devoted to lexicography, grammar, and criticism of text and style, by far outweighs it both in quantity and in value. The phenomenon is typical of the state of Italian taste and feeling. More than ever before, the attention of the Roman litterati is turned to questions of mere form. The genius of classical Italy is dead, and, if Renan may be believed, the distinctive character of the ancient world is passing away. Philosophy is fashionable at court and in the higher ranks of society, but its creative impulse has long been spent, and it has become mainly, if not entirely, a means of enforcing ethical principles in the relations of public and private life. A knowledge of Greek and Roman history is indeed expected, but it is to be employed partly as an instrument for the moral training of the young, partly as an accomplishment for the superficial uses of riper years. Of writing history in the great manner there seems to be no idea. Turning to rhetoric and literary criticism, we find that its masters have become pedants, with little further claim to distinction than that conferred by the hold which they have gained over their wealthy or aristocratic pupils, to whom they repeat the dicta of earlier masters. The Hellenic and Italian elements of literature are inextricably blended, not as in the classical period, when the study of Greek seemed only to intensify the natural characteristics of Italian genius, but in a colorless, insipid, featureless unity. Favorinus, Herodes Atticus, Marcus Aurelius prefer Greek to Latin as a channel of expression. The effort to form a new Latin style, which, beginning in the first century A. D., culminated in the prose of Seneca and Tacitus, has

exhausted itself, and only the antiquarian impulse retains any life. There is as little notion of forming a genuine literary style, as there is in the nineteenth century of inventing a new form of architecture. The question is not how to say a thing in the best way, but what Cato or Gracchus or Cicero said. To read Fronto or Gellius, one would suppose that no one had written since Horace. The age has no vigor of its own, but builds the sepulchres of the prophets, and waits for inspiration to rise from their dust. Grammar is merely a study of ancient forms, and even advocates in the courts are represented as anxious to air their antiquarian knowledge by puzzling the presiding praetor with obsolete expressions met with in the pages of forgotten authors. Such is the impression of the age in which he lived, presented by a man of cool head, sober judgment, and moral heart, but devoid of imaginative power. Had Gellius been a man of genius, he would, it may easily be supposed, have painted a more vivid and interesting, but not so sober and realistic a picture.

HENRY NETTLESHIP.

II. ON THE FINAL SENTENCE IN GREEK.'

Professor Schanz is moving steadily forward on the lines which are to converge, seven or eight years hence, in his Historical Syntax of the Greek Language from Homer to Aristotle. He has divided the preliminary work among the members of his Grammatical Society; and while the Beiträge will contain, from time to time, treatises on post-Aristotelian Greek, the main object is to work up the material for the period designated. We have already had a valuable and interesting paper by Keck, on the dual in the Greek orators, and a treatise on #piv by Sturm, which was duly reviewed in this Journal (IV 89). The other subjects announced as already in hand are the development of the consecutive sentence, history of où μn, origin and development of the substantive sentence, the temporal sentences with ews, the figura

1 Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache. Herausg. v. M. Schanz. Heft 4, Band II. Heft I. Entwickelungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze, von Dr. Philipp Weber. Erste Abtheilung: Von Homer bis zur Attischen Prosa. Würzburg, A. Stuber's Verlag, 1884.

2 The usual treatment of ws leaves so much untouched that it has seemed worth while to present here a brief synopsis of the usage, which, it is hoped, may suggest something to Professor Schanz's workers, though the presentation is not strictly historical:

έως, Ep. εἴως οι εἶος (εἴως rejected by Curtius, Leo Meyer, and others; εἶος suggested by Herm, and Buttm., defended by Leo Meyer; nos required by A. Nauck and by Curtius, who derives we from Fog by transfer of quantity, while Delbrück derives both os and έws from For; wg is an iambus only in Od. 2, 78, elsewhere it must be treated as a monosyllable, e. g. Il. 17, 727; Od. 2, 148, or as a trochee (ɛios or joç), Il. 1, 193; 10, 507. In the Asiatic Aeolic and Doric the form is às (Ahrens, Dial. Aeol., p. 102; Dial. Dor., p. 200). A. Relative particle of time corresponding to rews, Il. 20, 42; Od. 4, 90; Ar. Pax 32; Tоopa, Il. 15, 390; Od. 12, 327; other correlatives: v Toro, Xen. Cyr. 6, 1, 1; μÉxpɩ TOérov, Dem. 18, 48; Lys. 12, 37. It contains the notion of temporal limit expressed as to duration by "so long as, while" (Lat: quamdiu), as to termination by "until, till"; comp. the uses of dum, donec, quoad (Gell. N. A. 6, 21). “While' now means only during the time when,' but in Elizabethan [and dialectic] English, both while and whiles meant also up to the time when" (Abbott).

I. "so long as” (Lat, quamdiu), action co-extensive. a. imperf. indic. (1) actual occurrence in the past: où d'elwg uèr citov ¿yn mal olhos épurpor

etymologica in Attic prose, the absolute participles ¿góv, etc., use of the prepositions in the ten orators, the impersonal verbs, the development of the future idea, history of the substantivized in

=

Tóḍpa Boûv àñéxovto, Od. 12, 327; cf. 17, 358 (in this sense often answered in apodosi by a demonstr. adv., by Téws, Teiws, Od. 4, 90; by róópa, Od. 12, 327; II. 18, 15; 20, 41; Tóópa dé, Il. 10, 507; II, 412, etc.; by dé alone, Il. 1, 193; Od. 4, 120); Hdt. 2, 57; Aesch. Pers. 710; Soph. El. 951; Lys. 17, 3; 19, 46; Attics generally. νώνυμος ἀς Οινόμαος άρχε, Pind. Ο. 10, 51. (2) by attraction. So in a clause dependent on an unfulfilled condition: ὑπῆρχεν ἂν αὐτοῖς—πάσχειν μηδὲν ἕως τῆς θαλάσσης ἦρχον [Xen.], R. A. 2, 14. b. pres. subj. w. ἄν (of the future): ¿wç àv Çÿjtε,“ so long as" you live, Plat. Conv. 192 E; Aesch. Ag. 1435; Ar. Thesmoph. 582; Lycurg. c. Leocr. 146; Attics generally. c. pres. opt. as required by general rules of dependence; so after infin, and åv (= opt. and åv), Plat. Theaet. 155 A. II. "while," Lat. dum Ev (actions not co-extensive). I. temporal w. imperf. indic.: εἴως ὁ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα τόφρα δ' Αθήνη ἱσταμένη προσέφη Διομήδεα διον, 11. 10, 507, 8; cf. II, 411, 12, 15, 539; Xen. Cyr. 6, 3, 1; εwc ȧv, w. subj., Ib. 6, 3, 21. 2. ἕως sometimes passes over into a causal or semi-causal sense (comp. öre and óórɛ), "while, now that, since." So especially w. pres. indic.: Er is often added and forms of the copulative verb are not unfrequently omitted: οὐκ ἀλέγω, εἴως μοι ἐχέφρων Πηνελόπεια ζώει, Od. 17, 390; Eur. Or. 238; wç d' ¿t' čμḍpwv eiuí, Aesch. Cho. 1026; Ar. Eq. III; Xen. Cyr. 3, 3, 46; Dem. 9, 70; Ewę έTI Eлiç, Thuc. 8, 40. III. "until, till," Lat. donec. I. as a temporal conjunction. a. with indic. chiefly aor. (1) of an actual occurrence in the past: θῦνε διὰ προμάχων εἕως φίλον ώλεσε θυμόν, Il. 11, 342; cf. Od. 5, 123 and Attics; Aesch. Pers. 428. 464; Andoc. I, 134; Lys. 1, 15; Xen. Cyr. 6, 3, 15; 7, 1, 34; Id. Hell. 1, 1, 29; 6, 4, 36; Dem. 18, 48, etc. (2) by assimilation after indic. w. åv, in an unreal condition (action not accomplished): ἡδέως ἂν Καλλικλεί διελεγόμην ἕως ἀπέδωκα, I should gladly have gone on conversing, “till” I had . . . Plat. Gorg. 506 B; cf. Crat. 396 C ; Ar. Pax 71. So after infin, and av (= indic. and ăåv) [Dem.] 49, 35; after ¿xpv, Lys. 22, 12. For foc av w. indic. see Lys. 15, 6 (åv om. by Dobree). (3) the imperf. is rare. In ἕως ἀπῆν, Xen. Cyr. 3, 3, 4, ἀπῆν may be aoristic; in ταῦτ' ¿Toiεi kwç dididov, Xen. Cyr. 1, 3, 8, "so long as " and "until" meet. b. Ews av (είως κε) w. subj. (chiefly aor.) of the future: μαχήσομαι . . εἴως κε τέλος πολέμοιο Kixeiw, Il. 3, 290, 1; cf. 24, 183; Attics generally, we av dósŋ, Lys. 12, 37; [Xen.] R. A. 2, 5; Isoc. 4, 165. So after historical tenses by repraesentatio, Xen. Hell. 5, 3, 25; Id. Cyr. 5, 1, 3. (1) omission of Kɛ, ɛloç ikntai, Il. 13, 141, 2. (2) omission of av chiefly in tragic poetry, with or without final coloring: wc μáns, Soph. Aj. 555; Trach. 148; Phil. 764; O. C. 77. The pres. subj. is not common : οὐκ ἀναμένομεν ἕως ἂν ἡ ἡμετέρα χώρα κακῶται (= ἕως ἂν ἴδωμεν κακουμév), Xen. Cyr. 3, 3, 18. For aipwot, Thuc. 1, 90, Classen reads apwo, but see Shilleto. c. is w. opt. (chiefly aor.). (1) after an historical tense corresponding to ἕως ἂν after a principal tense. Attics: έφασαν συνεκπλευσεῖσθαι ¿ws тà прázuara Karaoтain, Lys. 13, 25; cf. Ar. Ran. 766; Xen. Hell. 3, 2, 20, etc. In the Od. ¿o w. opt. has more or less finality, "against the time when, in order that," 4, 800; 5, 386; 6, 80; 19. 367. (2) by attraction (assimilation), Xen. Cyr. 1, 3, 11; Plat. Resp. 6, 501 C. The pres. opt. is not common: w

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