we undersell all the world at this moment, when our taxes are so enormous, and our access to the market so variously impeded, we should have little to fear from the free competition of France, although all its cannon were melted down into steam-engines, and all its swords beaten out into axles. By making peace, too, even with the intention of renewing the war at a convenient opportunity, France will eventually be feduced into pacific habits, and lofe many of thofe advantages which the now enjoys as a belligerent. To improve her commerce, as the rival of ours, and the bafis of her future navy, must be the first great object of her ruler; but a commercial people, and, above all, a people juft beginning the tempting career of commercial profperity, muft naturally be averfe to war; and, most of all, to war with the greatest maritime power in the world. The war and the confcription, we are credibly informed, are very far from being popular in France at this moment; but if the war were once terminated by an honourable peace, and the people begun to be occupied in peaceful purfuits, it would not be eafy to make them fubmit to this returning plague, nor very fafe, perhaps, for their ruler to compel them, It is likewife deferving of confideration, that the longer we can protract the period of peace, the more we get over, in fafety, of the life of that extraordinary individual, with whom, it is extremely probable, that much of the rancour, and much of the power by which we are endangered, will die. But it is of ftill more confequence to obferve, that the longer we can postpone the crifis of our conteft, the weaker and the lefs provided we shall find our adversary for the encounter; and this not merely from the difufe and diftafte for war which the experience of peace will produce, but from the rapid decay of thofe advantages which the now poffeffes as a new government. Already the throne of Bonaparte begins to be furrounded by court-favourites, and princes and dignitaries of all defcriptions; and the accefs of merit to his imperial patronage, will probably foon be as difficult as it is to other thrones. The eminent perfons who forced themselves into notice in the tumultuary times of the revolution, muft difappear in no long period; and the genius and form of the exifting government, is by no means calculated to fupply their place, except, perhaps, during the opportunities and cafualties of an actual campaign. If a more liberal and patriotic fyftem, therefore, be adopted in England, while a more jealous and exclufive policy is daily gaining ground in France, it is not difficult to conjecture what the refult will be, nor in how fhort a time the fituation of the combatants may be in this refpect entirely reversed. There are many other confequences of peace which might be anticipated All anticipated with nearly equal probability. Those in particular that relate to the revival and recruiting of the other Continental powers; the probable difunion of the tributary fovereigns by which France has now furrounded herself; and the difmemberment of many parts of her overgrown and difcordant dominions. thefe events at least, it is easy to see, are rendered much more improbable by the continued preffure of war; and though most likely, and indeed almoft certain in themselves, can fcarcely be expected to occur till peace have reftored to the fyftem, its natural fprings of development. We have no longer room, however, to enlarge upon thefe, or any other confiderations; and fhall conclude with one general remark. Peace is in itself fo great a good, and war fo great an evil, that whenever we are not able to forefee exactly all the confequences of either, we may fafely prefume, that all that are unknown of the one will be good, and all that are unknown of the other will be evil. In most human affairs, however, the confequences which are not foreseen are more important than those that can be predicted. Hiftory and experience illuftrate this fufficiently as to the prefent parallel, and fhow that the most fuccefsful war is ufually productive of lofs and difafter, even to the victorious party, while peace fcarcely ever fails to fupply a thousand advantages that had not been calculated upon, and to repair, with incredible celerity, the wounds which hoftility had inflicted. Among the chief bleflings of peace, we think, is its tendency to generate a spirit of peace; a fpirit which cannot be generated, we believe, in any other way, and which, in an advanced ftate of fociety, and after a long experience of the miferies of contention, may perhaps prolong into habitual amity those hoftile truces and breathing-times to which nations have lately limited their intervals of war. Without indulging in fuch anticipations, however, we may be permitted to fay, that Europe now ftands in need of refreshment and repofe; that the experiment of war has been carried quite far enough to show that its further prosecution would be ruinous; and that with regard to this country in particular, whofe only remaining object of war must be fecurity, that object will be rendered Enfinitely more attainable by a peace, even of temporary endurnce, than by an obftinate perfeverance in measures of hoftility. We exprefs thefe opinions with the lefs hesitation, because it rather appears that they concur with those which our enemy has formed on the fubject. If peace were to do fo much good to tim, and fuch injury to us, as is alleged by the advocates for war, it is fingular that he fhould have appeared fo much more zeluctant than any adminiftration of ours has yet been to enter into terms terms of pacification. It is a strong ground for believing that peace would be advantageous to us, that our wily and perfevering enemy has uniformly refused to confent to it. This is an evil to which we must fubmit, and against which we muft ftruggle as valiantly as we can; but it is painful to think how many there are among ourselves who fecond thefe purposes of the enemy, from mifguided zeal and mistaken patriotifm, and labour to perpetuate that hoftility from which he alone has hitherto derived any advantage. We cannot obtain peace, to be fure, by wifhing for it, or even by offering it; but it is fomething to be prepared to receive it, if the offer fhould be made to us; and, at all events, it is of confequence that the grounds of our election fhould be fully and generally confidered, before the time calls on us for an immediate determination. ART. II. Remarks on the Husbandry and internal Commerce of A We should have thought the whole treatife eminently calculated to excite and to reward the public attention; but fince we are obliged to content ourselves with a portion of those interesting fpeculations, we have no hesitation in giving the preference to that with which we are here prefented. Mr Lambert was a highly refpectable merchant of Calcutta; a man endowed with uncommon fagacity, and bred up in mercantile habits. • Merchants,' fays Dr Smith, during their whole lives engaged in plans and projects, have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the greater part of country gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercifed rather about the intereit of their own particular branch of bufinefs, than about that of the fociety, their judgments, even when given with the greatest candour, is much more to be depended upon, with refpect to the former ་ former of thofe two objects, than with regard to the latter. 2 We are deeply impreffed with the force of this obfervation. The candour and veracity of Mr Lambert were far above fufpicion; but, in the plans occafionally fubmitted by that gentleman to the confideration of the Government-General, we always difcovered a more accurate perception of the interefts of the Calcutta mer. chants, than of thofe of the natives, of the Eaft India Company, or of England. But are thefe interests really diftinct? That of the Calcutta merchants (a body which comprifes men of the higheft worth) may be allowed to be, in fome refpects, irreconcilable with that of the Company but may it not be correctly affirmed, that the permanent advantage of Bengal, of the Company, and of England, refts on the fame foundations, flows from the fame principles, and muft be promoted by the fame meafures, in fo far as they are connected? Is it not true, that a ftep which must prove prejudicial to one of the three, would ultimately produce confequences injurious to the others; and that the permanent advantage refulting to each, from cooperating towards the general profperity, is more than fufficient to compenfate what each must relinquish to obtain that end? To these questions we reply with a decided conviction in the affirmative: but the arguments whence we deduce these conclusions are founded on many general, and many local considerations, to which our limits do not admit even of adverting. A more favourable occasion may possibly soon present itself in the discussion of a momentous question of general policy. We shall, then, after doing justice to the eminent perspicuity and talent displayed by the Director, who drew up the report on that important subject, take occasion to prove that, in all human probability, the measure he deprecates would prove still more suddenly, and more fatally injurious to the British interests in India, than even he anticipated. Our arguments will be founded on considerations derived from the internal polity of that country, which have never hitherto been brought under review, on account, probably, of the great development they would require, to persons unacquainted with the peculiar state of society which prevails in our Indian dominions. We are confident that our suggestions will receive the approbation of the persons most competent to form a correct judgment, viz. the gentlemen by whom the charge of administering justice, or collecting the revenues of districts placed under their superintendance, has been exercised, We shall also expect the assent of those who have weighed, with judicious scrutiny, the causes of the phenomena we admire; of a country amply peopled with hardy and intelligent inhabitants,. quietly quietly submitting to a sway exercised by a handful of strangers, cordially espousing their interests, and sacrificing their lives on the field of battle for the support of their authority. To that numerous and ingenious portion of the community, however, who think that the state of society in other countries, either is, or ought to be, precisely what they see it at home, our arguments, we are afraid, will appear altogether contemptible; though some of them, to adopt the language of Mr Bruce, may even have travelled as far as Paris. In this patriotic class, we suspect we must rank the valiant General Craddock; though we lament that a laudable predilection in favour of leathern caps, should have led to such an effusion of human blood. The work before us, indeed, invites to no such discussions. Distinguished equally by conciseness and perspicuity, it presents important facts, and avoids general reasonings. On controverted. points, the opinions of the author are rather implied than expressed; and although, if we have correctly seized his notions, we can by no means subscribe to all his conclusions, we render a willing testimony to the ability and industry with which he has prosecuted his researches, as well as to the honourable motives which suggested them. Just before the year 1794 (when this work was published), a measure of incalculable magnitude had been put in execution, involving the interests of every class of persons in India. A measure equally urged by the Board of Controul, and by the Court of Directors, from considerations of benevolence and justice, and supported, as they imagined, by policy, as well as propriety. A measure which constituted the great object of the successive administrations of the Marquis of Cornwallis, and of Lord Teignmouth; and where plans, dictated by benevolence, were to be executed, it would have been difficult to have selected more zealous or more intelligent agents. The partisans of the permanent settlement of the revenues were disposed to date the renovation of Bengal from the era of its introduction: less sanguine observers harboured doubts of its efficacy. It would have afforded us infinite gratification, to find from the statements of Mr Colebrooke, that measures suggested by the purest motives had been attended with the desired success; but on this head his readers receive no information; nor do we recollect any passage in this work which appears to be written posterior to 1791; when its merits could not be judged from its effects. Yet some incidental observations lead us to conclude, that the principle on which the permanent settlement was founded, neither coincides with our author's views of justice nor policy. We will now endeavour to exhibit a correct statement of the most important re sults |