we shall confine ourselves to those branches of knowledge which are realities and not illusions,-those, namely, which are conversant wholly with phenomena, and which are advanced by means of a further acquaintance with those fixed and unalterable laws which regulate the universe. But is this really so? or how can we possibly know that fixed and unalterable laws regulate the universe? I know no more wonderful fact in the whole history of philosophy, than the simple, easy, natural, unsuspicious manner, in which M. Comte, after having declaimed and argued against all à priori ideas, subsides as a matter of course into the à priori idea of fatalism. What, let me ask, do we know about fate, on his principles, any more than about God? about fixed and unalterable laws of phenomenal succession, any more than about regular and undeviating principles of moral government? So necessary to all science is the assumption of some first principle; and so stupid and contemptible may be the intellectual exhibition presented by the most powerful minds, when influenced by the narrow bigotry of unbelief.

Waiving however the argumentum ad hominem,' it is really of great importance seriously to consider the question, whether we have any means of knowing, what all experimentalists assume without proof as a locus standi, that nature proceeds, not in a capricious and arbitrary course, but on definite and established laws; laws which may accordingly be a subject for investigation and for gradual discovery. Now whether or no we have at present any really sufficient proof of this, it is virtually confessed by Mr. John Mill himself, the prominent champion of experimental science and of free inquiry, that when first physical investigation began, there was not sufficient proof; he confesses that the proof, which we now have, is owing to the discoveries made by those, who believed the principle before it was proved. Let this be observed: physical science, the very result and energizing testimonial, as it is generally considered, of the principle of free inquiry, could not have had existence except for

P Logic, vol. ii. pp. 114, 15.

the principle of faith belief without proof is the very basis on which it has been reared.

But have we now sufficient proof of this, and of what nature? From the progress which physical science has made under the assumption of this principle,-from the very great number of seemingly unconnected facts which it has succeeded in grouping together, and of apparent exceptions to general laws which it has been able to explain,-let us grant it to have been made in the highest degree probable, that from remote antiquity up to this time there have been established laws of nature. Now does this, by itself, warrant so much as even the faintest presumption, that such law will continue, and so consequently that physical science can at any given moment be prosecuted with reasonable hope of a true result? Surely as useless as would be the experience of external phenomena, unless we had the à priori idea of space wherein to locate them,-just so unavailable for any practical conclusion would be the knowledge of past uniformity, except for the à priori idea we possess, that consistency, harmony, regularity, are in themselves heavenly and majestic qualities, and specially appropriate to the works of God. Suppose two persons, one having an ear for music, and the other totally destitute of it, were both listening to a symphony; the former would consider himself warranted in confidently expecting the continuation of harmony, while the latter would be in no way surprised by a sudden change into the most barbarous and clashing dissonance. And, in like manner, the most constant experience of undeviating regularity in the course of nature up to this time, would be no ground whatever for expecting its continuance, except to those who should perceive something of itself more admirable in order than in disorder, in harmonious government of the whole than in the chance and random dispersion of parts. Will it be said, that this natural judgment of mankind would be itself one of the premises on which free inquiry would ground its con

This illustration is borrowed and adapted from Archbishop Whately in his notes on King's 'Predestination'.

clusion? I ask, how is it to be shewn, that such a judgment has any real value or authority? Grant us indeed the principles of Theism, or the trustworthiness of conscience, and the whole is plain enough; but excluding these, how can we possibly form even a conjecture whether this sentiment, however universal, may not have its origin in these very fixed laws of the universe, or in the accidental disposition of phenomena, or in the handywork of some lying spirit who implants it in order to deceive?

Have we now carried to its extreme point the scepticism in which free inquiry must plunge us? By no means. For what warrant have we for trusting our mental faculties, unless there be one in their number which is cognizant of eternal truth? To take one instance, where the conception of the difficulty will be less bewildering perhaps than in otherson what ground do we trust our memory? There is no one thing' on such a principle of which we are absolutely certain, except our present consciousness. That doubtless admits of no error; that at this moment of time I am writing, that my mind is occupied with certain ideas, that when I look at my desk I perceive the colour of green, that on looking up I receive an immediate impression which I take to be that of distance, that I believe in a certain chain of events as being those of my past life,-all this is the mere statement of a matter of fact; but when I proceed beyond this, when I think that those events really had existence, when, e. g., I call to mind that an hour ago I was taking a walk and pursuing a certain train of thought, much more when I infer from past remembrances that walking is good for health, and also for thinking, and so on, for anything that the argument from experience has to tell me to the contrary, how can I know that I am not the victim of some miserable and complete delusion? how can I know that an hour since I was not seated on Mount Vesuvius, or carried beyond the bounds of space and time?'P Grant indeed the doctrines of Theism, and we cannot be wrong in trusting the faculties which God has given us ; but then these docPOn Mill's Logic,' p. 371.

9 See Newman's University Sermons, p. 351.

trines, as I just now argued, depend, for their establishment, on the renouncement pro tanto of free inquiry, and on the adoption of the principle of faith. And this brings me to the climax of the argument. If faith be admitted, the whole structure of Catholic doctrine rests on a basis which cannot be shaken; and if it be denied, we have no reason for believing so much, as that we were in existence one minute ago.

3. It is very plain then that the principle of private judgment, of proportioning belief as far as possible to evidence,— cannot be accepted as a full account of the process which leads to moral and religious truth. That it has a place, and that an important one, I am far from denying; but it has not the chief place. And so long as it is acknowledged that no sight in the world is more contemptible than a boaster who fails egregiously in those very qualities which have been his boast, it must also be acknowledged that those who have allowed themselves in a spirit of scoffing derision at the 'credulity' of Catholics,-while their whole studies have taken for granted the trustworthiness of our intellectual faculties and the permanence of the laws of nature,—that these men are far more appropriate objects of contempt and ridicule, as having professed free inquiry to be their very forte: or rather that they would be objects for this, 'except that on so awfully serious a subject the sense of the lamentable overpowers that of the ridiculous.' M. Comte sneers at M. de Maistre, half-bitterly, half-compassionately, for invoking the Blessed Virgin; what prevents Christians from returning in kind his self-complacent arrogance, except that on the one hand religion inculcates humility, and that on the other hand Atheism is so fearful an exhibition of Satan, that we may not ridicule even its intellectual blunders ?

Let me now endeavour to sketch in its elements the antagonist principle of faith, to shew its reasonableness, and to trace the progress by which it leads to truth.

In the British Critic I have advocated in some detail the position, that a habit of acting throughout the day under a sense of responsibility, of doing what we think right because we think so, that this habit, as it grows up within us, in an

illimitably increasing extent purifies and illuminates the conscience. Over and above this, it has another very important effect; that of humbling the mind, and disposing it to look in all directions for external guidance. A study of the visible universe tends to engender pride: for we obtain a continually deeper knowledge of the laws by which it is governed; and we are thus able to influence or make use of it more efficaciously for our own purposes, by summoning the phenomena, as it were, before the tribunal of our intellect, collecting and weighing evidence, balancing probabilities, and pronouncing a verdict according to the result of our inquiry. The visible world seems placed around us, as it were, for the very purpose of being made subject to our arbitrary and despotic investigations and researches: we examine what part of it we please, and when we please; every day we receive fresh indications of the supremacy of the intellect and the sovereignty of man. But a course of moral action leads us to know the existence of realities and of essences, as opposed to mere shadows and phenomena; it leads us to know that, wholly without those limits of space and time which bound the intellect, there exists an Objective Somewhat,—call it, if you please, Moral Truth; that the real form and lineaments of this Somewhat are absolutely beyond the reach of our faculties; that we cannot possibly know more of it here on earth, than that (in all probability) infinitely small part, which happens to come in contact immediately or mediately with our own conscience; lastly, that our knowledge however of that part may increase with rapidly advancing progress, in proportion as we bring the

On Mill's Logic,' pp. 397-406. A mind, habitually and honestly conforming itself to its own full sense of duty, will at length enjoin or forbid with an authority second only to an inspired oracle.' Newman's University Sermons, p. 22.

How far the instinctive reliance which all persons have, good or bad, in the permanence of the laws of nature, throws discredit on the theory which I have thrown out, that the proof of them depends on moral considerations,- this is a question which most certainly requires discussion: I only wish that I had the space here to consider it.

t See Letters of "Catholicus" passim,