CHAPTER XI. 1778. Apathy of the separate perhaps of living in ease and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so great a revolution, in the effecting of which, the greatest abilities, and the most honest men, our American world affords, ought to be employed. "It is much to be feared, my dear Sir, that the States, in their separate capacities, have very inadequate ideas of States. the present danger. Many persons removed far distant from the scene of action, and seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their wishes, conceive that the contest is at an end, and that to regulate the government and police of their own State is all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a thunder-clap, that is little expected. I do not mean to designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections upon any one. public believe (and, if they do believe it, the fact might almost as well be so), that the States at this time are badly represented, and that the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through the discord and party views of some individuals. That they should be so, is to be lamented more at this time than formerly, as we are far advanced in the dispute, and, in the opinion of many, drawing to a happy period; we have the eyes of Europe upon us, and I am persuaded many political spies to watch, who discover our situation and give information of our weaknesses and wants." The conquering The conquest of Canada was always a favorite project Project for with Congress; and at this time, when the British forces Canada. were divided by being employed against the French in the West Indies, it was thought that a good opportunity offered itself for turning the arms of the United States against that province. After the termination of the affair at Long Island, the Marquis de Lafayette went to Philadelphia, and obtained a furlough from Congress, with the intention of returning to France on a short visit. In concert with him a plan was formed of an attack on Canada, which was to be the principal object of the ensuing cam CHAPTER paign, and the basis of which was a coöperation with a French fleet and army. Lafayette was to have full instructions for arranging the matter with the court of Versailles, aided by the counsel and support of Dr. Franklin, then the American plenipotentiary in France. XI. 1778. Plan of a combined attack on Canada. Opposed by Washington. Political reasons for ing Canada. The plan was on a very large scale. Attacks were to be made by the American army at three points far distant from each other, namely, Detroit, Niagara, and by way of the Connecticut River; while a French fleet should ascend the St. Lawrence, with four or five thousand troops, and act against Quebec. The scheme was discussed, matured, and approved with much unanimity in Congress, and then sent to Washington with the request that he would communicate his sentiments. He replied in a long despatch, entering minutely into the subject, and showing that the plan was impracticable; that it required resources in troops and money, which were not to be had; that it would involve Congress in engagements to their ally, which it would be impossible to fulfil; and that it was in itself so extensive and complicated, as to hold out no reasonable hope of success, even with all the requisite means of pursuing it. Would she not be eager If it should be conquered claim it at the peace as Such was his opinion in a military view. But the subnot attack- ject presented itself to him in another aspect, in which he thought it deserved special consideration. Canada formerly belonged to France, and had been severed from her in a manner, which, if not humiliating to her pride, contributed nothing to her glory. to recover this lost province? with her aid, would she not rightfully belonging to her, and be able to advance plausible reasons for such a demand? Would not the acquisition itself hold out a strong temptation? The territory abounded in supplies for the use of her Islands, it opened a wide field of commerce with the Indian nations, it would give her the command of posts on this continent independent of the precarious good will of an ally, it would put her in a condition to engross the whole trade of XI. 1778. conquered, Canada, if would reFrance at a peace. vert to treaty of Newfoundland, and above all, it would afford her facilities CHAPTER for awing and controlling the United States, "the natural and most formidable rival of every maritime power in Europe." He added, "France, acknowledged for some time past the most powerful monarchy in Europe by land, able now to dispute the empire of the sea with Great Britain, and, if joined with Spain, I may say, certainly superior, possessed of New Orleans on our right, Canada on our left, and seconded by the numerous tribes of Indians in our rear from one extremity to the other, a people so generally friendly to her, and whom she knows so well how to conciliate, would, it is much to be apprehended, have it in her power to give law to these States." These sentiments, he said, did not grow out of any distrust of the good faith of France in the alliance she had formed. On the contrary, he was willing to entertain and cherish the most favorable impressions, in regard to her motives and aims. "But," he added again, "it is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it. In our circumstances we ought to be particularly cautious; for we have not yet attained sufficient vigor and maturity to recover from the shock of any false step, into which we may unwarily fall. If France should even engage in the scheme, in the first instance, with the purest intentions, there is the greatest danger, that, in the progress of the business, invited to it by circumstances, and perhaps urged on by the solicitations and wishes of the Canadians, she would alter her views." In short, allowing all his apprehensions to be unfounded, he was still reluctant to multiply national obligations, or to give to any foreign power claims of merit for services performed beyond what was absolutely indispensable. not satisfac The observations and reasonings of the Commander-in- Objections chief were so far operative on Congress, as to induce them tory to Conat once to narrow their scheme, though not entirely to gress. CHAPTER give it up. XI. 1778. Washington attends Congress. Views of the French in regard to Canada. They participated in the general opinion, that the war with France would necessarily employ the British fleet and troops in other parts of the world, and that they would soon evacuate the towns on the seacoast of the United States. In this event, they thought an expedition against Canada should still be the object of the campaign, and that preparations should accordingly be made. They requested General Washington to write to Dr. Franklin, and the Marquis de Lafayette, who was then at Boston, ready to depart for Europe, and state to them such details as might be laid before the French court, in order that eventual measures might be taken for coöperation in case an armament should be sent to Quebec from France. The plan in this shape, however, was not more satisfactory to him, than in its original form. He saw no reason for supposing the British would evacuate the States, and he believed a system of operations built upon that basis would fail. At any rate he was not prepared to hazard the responsibility of drawing the French government into a measure so full of uncertainty, and depending on so many contingencies. The army being now in winter quarters, and his presence with it not being essential, he suggested the expediency of a personal interview with the members of Congress, in which his sentiments could he more fully explained than by writing. This proposition was approved. He arrived in Philadelphia on the 24th of December, and, after several discussions between him and a committee of Congress, the Canada scheme was wholly laid aside. It is a remarkable fact, as connected with the above government suspicions on political grounds, that the French government was decidedly opposed to an expedition against Canada. The French minister in the United States was instructed, before he left France, not to favor any projects of conquest; and it was the policy of the court of Versailles, that Canada and Nova Scotia should remain in the power of Great Britain. The reasons for this policy may It is to CHAPTER not be obvious; but the fact is unquestionable. XI. 1778. |