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revenue received by the United States Government from public
lands amounted to 3,967,683 dollars; in 1834 it amounted to
4,857,600 dollars; and in 1835 it suddenly rose to treble its
amount during the previous year, or to 14,757,601 dollars;
showing a total rise of about 370 per cent in the brief space of
three years! During the first six months of 1836, the mania
went on increasing in a greatly accelerated ratio ;* and it did not
reach its acme till the 11th of July that year, when the President
issued his famous Circular,-ordering that all payments on account
of public lands should be made in specie only, or in the
the banks where the public lands were situated, and which should
be immediately converted into specie.

Much fault has been found with General Jackson for issuing this order, though, as it appears to us, with very little reason. It must have been evident to the President, and indeed to every man of sense not engaged in the vortex of speculation, that the purchases in question could not terminate otherwise than in bankruptcy and ruin; and the thing most to be regretted is, that the order was not issued twelve months sooner, or before the evil had attained to so frightful an excess. It is, perhaps, true that it brought on the catastrophe some six months sooner than it might otherwise have occurred. But it was quite impossible that the crisis could have been long averted; and by accelerating its arrival before the mania had attained its full developement, the violence of the explosion was necessarily, in some degree, diminished. The real error of General Jackson in his policy as to commercial affairs does not consist in his having issued this order, but in his having sacrificed the Bank of the United States. He always professed, and we believe truly, to be an enemy to the paper system, or at least to its abuse. But instead of attempting to improve it, by exerting the influence of Government to prevent the multiplication of mushroom banks in all parts of the Union, he encouraged them, and exerted himself to suppress the only institution that deserved his patronage,--that was a check on the wild and mischievous proceedings of the others, and on whose stability and good conduct the public might at all times depend. This conduct would be inexplicable, were it not that in America every thing depends on pariy politics,-taking the phrase in its literal and most degrading sense. The Bank of the United States incurred the hostility of the General and the democratic party,

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* During the year ending 1st January, 1837, the revenue from public lands amounted to the immense sum of 23,048,029 dollars, or nearly seven times its amount in 1833.

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because it was supposed to be attached to the opposite or aristocratical party. But for this circumstance, the contest between the Government and the Bank never would have been heard of; and the latter, as it deserved, would have been patronised by the President; and the multiplication of other banks of issue bave been discouraged or prevented.

But, be this as it may, the Circular of the 11th of July was a death-blow to that mania for speculation which had previously been raging in various parts of the Union. The Banks in the Western and South-western States, where the public lands are principally situated, fearing a drain for bullion, began immediately to refuse their custoinary discounts, and to contract their engagements. It also became necessary for them,- for the speculators who had purchased public lands,—and also for the settlers who intended to occupy the latter, to provide themselves with an increased amount of specie; and, in consequence, it was conveyed away in large quantities from the Atlantic cities to the West. All parts of the Union werethus simultaneously involved in difficulties. The facilities which the Atlantic cities had previously possessed for making payments in Europe, were considerably narrowed by the forced efflux of specie to the Western States. This, however, was not the worst feature of the altered state of things. Owing to the difficulty of procuring pecuniary accommodations in the States bordering on the Mississippi,—and the fact, that almost all the interior merchants and dealers had either speculated in public lands, or in canal and railway shares, whence they could not withdraw their capital except at an enormous loss,-most of them became unable to remit to the Atlantic cities for the goods they had so largely purchased from them; and this failure of internal remittances necessarily incapacitated all but the very richest merchants in the cities in question from remitting to Europe. The destruction of confidence and credit, with the interruption or rather total cessation of business in all parts of the Union, were the necessary results of this state of things. And thus it is, that the abuse of banking and credit in America itself, without the assistance it received from Europe, could not have failed to produce a very severe revulsion.

II. But, however signal the folly and overtrading of the Americans during the last two or three years, they have hardly exceeded, if they have not been surpassed, by wbat has occurred amongst ourselves. We have seen the enormous increase of the imports into the United States during the six, and especially the three years ending with 1836; and we have further seen that the exports from the United States by no means corresponded with the amount of imports—the latter having exceeded the former no revenue received by the United States Government from public lands amounted to 3,967,683 dollars; in 1834 it amounted to 4,857,600 dollars; and in 1835 it suddenly rose to treble its amount during the previous year, or to 14,757,601 dollars; showing a total rise of about 370 per cent in the brief space of three years! During the first six months of 1836, the mania went on increasing in a greatly accelerated ratio ; * and it did not reach its acme till the 11th of July that year, when the President issued his famous Circular,--ordering that all payments on account of public lands should be made in specie only, or in the paper of the banks where the public lands were situated, and which should be immediately converted into specie.

Much fault has been found with General Jackson for issuing this order, though, as it appears to us, with very little reason. It must have been evident to the President, and indeed to every man of sense not engaged in the vortex of speculation, that the purchases in question could not terminate otherwise than in bankruptcy and ruin; and the thing most to be regretted is, that the order was not issued twelve months sooner, or before the evil had attained to so frightful an excess. It is, perhaps, true that it brought on the catastrophe some six months sooner than it might otherwise have occurred. But it was quite impossible that the crisis could have been long averted; and by accelerating its arrival before the mania had attained its full developement, the violence of the explosion was necessarily, in some degree, diminished. The real error of General Jackson in his policy as to' commercial affairs does not consist in his having issued this order, but in his having sacrificed the Bank of the United States. He always professed, and we believe truly, to be an enemy to the paper system, or at least to its abuse. But instead of attempting to improve it, by exerting the influence of Government to prevent the multiplication of mushroom banks in all parts of the Union, he encouraged them, and exerted himself to suppress the only institution that deserved his patronage,-that was a check on the wild and mischievous proceedings of the others, and on whose stability and good conduct the public might at all times depend. This conduct would be inexplicable, were it not that in America every thing depends on party politics,—taking the phrase in its literal and most degrading sense. The Bank of the United States incurred the hostility of the General and the democratic party,

During the year ending 1st January, 1837, the revenue from public lands amounted to the immense sum of 23,048,029 dollars, or nearly seven times its amount in 1833.

to be unnecessary to require any such collateral security from American houses of undoubted wealth and known prudence in the conduct of their affairs; and if one English house thought this unnecessary in the case of Messrs A. of New York, another thought it unnecessary in the case of Messrs B. of Boston, and so on; till at length the practice was in all cases resisted by the Americans as illiberal and invidious, and abandoned by the English as useless. The consequence was, that American houses of little standing or capital were able to obtain credits here, and frequently to an immense amount, without any collateral security whatever. This is what is technically called the 'open credit system,' and a most dangerous one it undoubtedly is. After it had been once established, we need not certainly wonder, -knowing the speculative disposition of the Americans, and the extraordinary facilities for obtaining loans that recently prevailed in all parts of the Union,-at the immense amount of their imports, or at the difficulties in which the parties in England who gave them credits are now involved.

The bills drawn by the American agents on and accepted by the English houses, were, as already stated, at four months; and as the goods paid for by means of these bills were sent to America generally within a month, and sold within two, there was ample time for remitting funds to England before the bill became due. And it was the belief that the bills were all issued in bona fide transactions, and that they would be provided for by the sale of an equivalent amount of produce, that seems to have rendered them peculiar favourites with the money-dealers and private bankers, by whom they were regarded as an approved species of paper.

But, exclusive of the obvious tendency of this system to foster overtrading, it was defective in another particular not so easily discovered It began to be no unusual thing for an American house which had obtained a credit for four months upon Messrs A. of London, to pay it off by getting a similar credit upon Messrs B., and then extinguishing this by a new credit upon Messrs C., and so on. This abusive practice was not, of course, resorted to by the first-rate American houses; and the more prudent and cautious of the English houses set their faces against it; but it was frequently practised without their knowledge, and some of the otbers being less scrupulous, a great amount of what was really accommodation paper got into the circle, and not being distinguishable from that which was legitimate, was as readily discounted.

It is a curious and not very easily explained circumstance, that, notwithstanding the intense competition that prevails in this counless than L. 12,000,000 sterling, in 1836 only. Such being the case, it is plain that, during the last two or three years, America must have incurred, partly on stocks, bonds, &c., and partly and principally on bills and open accounts, an immense debt to the foreigner, or rather to England; we being almost the only party to whom she is under heavy obligations. This arises out of the singular circumstance, that almost the whole trade of the Union with England, as well as with India, China, and South America, has been latterly carried on upon credits obtained in England. And before proceeding farther, it may be as well, perhaps, to show the nature of those credits, and how they arose.

The export of British manufactures to the United States was formerly effected by English houses executing orders for the Americans, and transmitting the invoices and bills of lading to their agents in America; to be delivered on their receiving bank bills on Europe or other approved securities for the amount. Formerly, also, when the Americans sent ships to China and India, they put on board in the United States dollars, ginseng, and other commodities suitable for the Canton and Calcutta markets; and the ships not unfrequently touched at England in their way, and took on board British produce suitable for the same markets. These were safe and legitimate methods of carrying on trade, and had they been persevered in, or had no shipment been made, except upon security of the bills of lading, no great overtrading could have arisen.

But the increase of the trade,--the growing wealth and confidence placed in the American houses, and the natural wish of the latter to avail themselves, in as far as possible, of the command of British capital, which bore a much less rate of interest than American capital, -gradually introduced, during the last eight or ten years, and ultimately established, a more convenient and cheaper, but far less safe mode of carrying on the trade. This was brought about by the importing houses in America establishing agents in the manufacturing districts of this country, and also in the Continent, China, &c., for the purchase and shipment of products for the United States. The houses that had appointed such agents obtained, at the same time, a credit in their favour upon some one or other of the great Anglo-American houses in London or Liverpool, who allowed the agent to draw upon them for the amount of the credit by bill at four months. On the first introduction of this new system, it was customary for the English houses which had given the credits, to get the bills of lading and invoices, and to transmit them as formerly to their agents in America. But over-confidence and competition were not long in occasioning a departure from this system. It seemed

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