And on the earth remain’d the earthly pomp
Bebind, nor follow'd him who was departing ;
While on the seraph pinions of the hymn
T'he unfetter'd soul soar'd upward to high heaven,
And sought the bosom of eternal mercy!

I call this, mother, back to thy remembrance
That thou may'st judge if, in an hour like this,
One worldly wish could lipger in my heart;
Yet did the mystic power which rules our fate
Select that moment, on this darken'd heart
To pour young love's first radiance-how it happ'd
In vain I ask myself!
Isabella.

Say on, and tell
Thy tale to its conclusion.
Don Cesar.

Whence she came,
Or how she came, I know not ;-as 1 turn'd
My eyes, I found her standing by my side,
And sudden in my being's core I felt
The power of her near presence-it was not
The witching magic of her gentle smile,
Nor the warm charm that hover'd on her cheek,
No, nor the splendour of her godlike form,
That shed their holy influence on my heart.
There was no sound of words; our souls did seem
To fuse in mystic union as my breath
Mingled with hers—she was a stranger, yet
I felt she was my nearest, dearest friend,
And the fix'd thought flash'd into instant birth,
“Her must I love, or no one else on earth !"
Don Manuel (eagerly). There shone the holy spark of heaven's

own light,
Which searching to its centre fires the soul
When hearts meet hearts, and with resistless might

Freedom, and choice, and thought, and will control.
Man cannot loose the magnet chain that round
Those born to bless each other Heav'n hath bound.
My brother's charmed eloquence dispels
The cloud that on my mind's veil'd vision dwells ;
His suhtler terms my shapeless thoughts define,

And his heart ulters all that glows in mine.' Confused, and taken by surprise, Beatrice has been unable to reveal to Don Cesar her attachment to Don Manuel; and the Prince, after a stormy avowal of his passion, leaves her, announcing to his attendants

Henceforth entreat her as my destined bride,
And your anointed princess ; honour her
With all attendance that becomes her rank.
I will return anon to bear her home,

lo state beseeming her and worthy me.' He does return; but it is to find Beatrice in the embrace of his action against Mr Hansard. The defendant pleaded that the charges made in the alleged libel were true; as he might have pleaded had he published under no authority or pretended authority at all. He satisfied the jury of this fact, and had a verdict accordingly. But he first of all set up another defence : he stated that the House of Commons, whose printer and publisher he was, had authorized him to sell the libel in question; and that therefore, whether true or false, scandalous or harmless, he was protected by the lawful authority of his employers, who had a right to publish whatever they chose, respecting any person, and in any way.

The Judge, before whom this most grave and momentous affair came, was the Lord Chief Justice of England; and, acting under the obligations of his oath, in the conscientious discharge of his duty, he gave that judgment which he deemed the law required that judgment which, if the law had unhappily been against the liberties of the people, he would have been bound to give, and would have given, as every one who knew him knew full well : but the law, speaking through him, was in favour of these liberties; and he gave that judgment from the bench, which, at the bar, or in the senate, or on the hustings, he would at all times of his honest and brilliant career, have rejoiced to defend; and the title and the station of Chief Justice lent new force, without giving a new direction to that indomitable love of popular rights, and that steadfast resistance of unlawful power, which had already illustrated the name of Denman.

As soon as a pretension, which he considered to be monstrous and intolerable, was set up on the part of the House of Commons, he did not hesitate or delay pronouncing his judgment; and, least of all, did he seek to shelter himself behind the authority of others by reserving the point for the consideration of the Court. He at once declared his opinion in these memorable words :—'I

entirely disagree from the law laid down by the learned counsel ' for the defendant. I am not aware of the existence in this

country of any body whatever that can privilege any servant of theirs to publish libels of any individual. Whatever arrange'ments may be made between the House of Commons and

any publisher in their employ, I am of opinion that the publisher · who publishes that in his public shop, and especially for money,

which may be injurious, and possibly ruinous to any of the King's * subjects, must answer in a court of justice to that subject, if he 'challenge him for a libel; and I wish to say so emphatically and distinctly; because I think that if upon the first opportunity that arose in a court of justice for questioning this point, it were left . unsatisfactorily explained, the Judge who sat there might become an accomplice in the destruction of the Liberties of the

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Art. XI.- A Letter to the Right Honourable the Speaker of

the House of Commons, containing a Narrative of the Circumstances connected with the Proceedings against C. Bolton, Esq. of Hull and others, for a Breach of Privilege in commencing and prosecuting an action against the Warden of the Fleet Prison, for suffering R. C. Burton, Esq. M.P. to go out of his custody in obedience to an order of the House. By A. RossER. London: 1821.*

TN March, 1836, the House of Commons, upon the Report of a

Committee, adopted certain resolutions for the publication and sale of its Reports, Votes, and others Papers. The substance of these resolutions was, that Messrs Hansard, the printers of the House, should conduct the sale—that the price to the public should be a halfpenny per sheet--and that twelve and a half per cent discount should be allowed to the Trade.

This plan was forthwith acted upon; and there was thus established, if not as a branch of the House of Commons, yet certainly under its direction, a shop and a traffic of bookselling. Whatever evidence was given before any committee-none of it upon oath-much of it matter ofopinion, hearsay, conjecture—little of it resembling that which goes by the same name in Courts of Justice;—whatever allegations were set forth in petitions, not even pretending to be evidence, and, if necessary, behind the back of those to whose character and conduct they related—were thus, if ordered to be printed, as they all are in common course, sold to the public at the rate of three halfpence, for a pamphlet, wbich common venders of such wares cannot afford to sell under two shillings or half-acrown; and a discount.' was allowed to the Trade' (we cite the words of the House itself), 'in case the price should be found so high as to prevent the dealers pushing the sale.'

A party was attacked in one of these publications; and he brought

his action against Mr Hansard. The defendant pleaded that the charges made in the alleged libel were true; as he might have pleaded had he published under no authority or pretended authority at all. He satisfied the jury of this fact, and had a verdict accordingly. But he first of all set up another defence : he stated that the House of Commons, whose printer and publisher he was, had authorized him to sell the libel in question; and that therefore, whether true or false, scandalous or harmless, he was protected by the lawful authority of his employers, who had a right to publish whatever they chose, respecting any person, and in any way.

The Judge, before whom this most grave and momentous affair came, was the Lord Chief Justice of England; and, acting under the obligations of his oath, in the conscientious discharge of his duty, he gave that judgment which he deemed the law required that judgment which, if the law had unhappily been against the liberties of the people, he would have been bound to give, and would have given, as every one who knew him knew full well : but the law, speaking through him, was in favour of these liberties; and he gave that judgment from the bench, which, at the bar, or in the senate, or on the hustings, he would at all times of his honest and brilliant career, have rejoiced to defend; and the title and the station of Chief Justice lent new force, without giving a new direction to that indomitable love of popular rights, and that steadfast resistance of unlawful power, which had already illustrated the name of Denman.

As soon as a pretension, which he considered to be monstrous and intolerable, was set up on the part of the House of Commons, he did not hesitate or delay pronouncing his judgment; and, least of all, did he seek to shelter himself behind the authority of others by reserving the point for the consideration of the Court. He at once declared his opinion in these memorable words:-*I

entirely disagree from the law laid down by the learned counsel • for the defendant. I am not aware of the existence in this

country of any body whatever that can privilege any servant of theirs to publish libels of

any
individual.

Whatever arrangements may be made between the House of Commons and any • publisher in their employ, I am of opinion that the publisher

who publishes that in his public shop, and especially for money, ' which may be injurious, and possibly ruinous to any of the King's subjects, must answer in a court of justice to that subject, if he challenge him for a libel; and I wish to say so emphatically and distinctly; because I think that if upon the first opportunity that arose in a court of justice for questioning this point, it were left * unsatisfactorily explained, the Judge who sat there might become an accomplice in the destruction of the Liberties of the

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this precedent as equally calculated to illustrate the question with the others cited in the Report; and may the more be unable to understand why it should bave been omitted in that repository of the learning on this subject.

The resolutions of the House, moved upon this Report, and which indeed embodied the opinion of the Committee, were as follow :... 1. That the power of publishing such of its reports, votes, • and proceedings as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the public interests, is an essential incident to the constitutional

functions of Parliament; more especially of this House, as the representative portion of it.

12. That by the law and privilege of Parliament, this House • has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine upon the * existence and extent of its privileges; and that the institution 'or prosecution of any action, suit, or other proceeding, for the • purpose of brioging them into discussion or decision before any

court or tribunal elsewhere than in Parliament, is a high breach of such privilege; and renders all parties concerned therein • amenable to its just displeasure, and to the punishment consequent thereon. * 3. That for any court or tribunal to assume to decide upon matters of privilege inconsistent with the determination of either • House of Parliament, is contrary to the law of Parliament, and is a breach and contempt of the privileges of Parliament.'

It is by no means hypercritical to observe upon the inconsistent and inexplicit language in which these most important propositions are couched. This is no matter of mere verbal criticism; it demonstrates at the very least that sufficient attention was not bestowed upon the subject : it may possibly be thought to prove something more; for it certainly begets a suspicion that no great pains were taken to form very accurate notions upon

the matters affirmed. The first resolution asserts the right of publishing only one class of papers—reports, votes, and proceedings which the House shall deem necessary or conducive to the public interests. Can this be the meaning of the House? Can it possibly be intended to restrict the publication only to this one description of proceedings; or can it be supposed that any class of proceedings is excluded ? Possibly the real intention was to affirm the right of publishing whatever the House deemed it necessary or expedient to publish. Most probably this was the thing meant to be asserted; but most certainly it is not the thing asserted. Again, the second resolution affirms that the institution or prosecution of proceedings for the purpose of bringing the privileges of the House into discussion, is a breach