designated as the age of "Symbolatry," of "creed bondage, "of "Lutheran patristics," of "Protestant scholasticism, "' of Dogmatic traditionalism," of "death orthodoxy,' of "theorizing system" of "ecclesiastico-confessional," of "polemico-dogmatic interpretation." 1

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Once more the fires were rekindled by religious leaders in England, Germany, and France, and since then they have been burning with less heat, perhaps, but certainly shedding more light on the path along which humanity is slowly trudging toward the distant goal. In religion as in government, "experience hath shown," to conclude with the immortal words of our Declaration of Independence, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."

Christianity was a religious Declaration of Independence against Jewish sacerdotalism and formalism, Protestantism was another such Declaration against Catholic sacerdotalism and formalism, and since then there has happily been a gradual, healthy evolution which is full of promise for the future.

1 Ibid., p. 360.

CHAPTER V.

THE INTELLECTUAL ELEMENT IN RELIGION.

In the preceding chapters, while treating primarily of the emotions, it was impossible to entirely eliminate the intellectual element. Indeed, looked at from a different point of view, much that was there written might with almost equal propriety be included in this chapter. The emotional life is so wrapped up with the intellectual and volitional that it is only by artificial abstraction and a schematism that is too often misleading, that we can separate them.

In the discussion of the definitions of religion it was pointed out that the emotions alone could not entirely account for religion. The animal or human mother loving her offspring, for example, the husband his wife, the youth his mistress, the child feeling its dependence upon its parents, fearing the dark, pitying a sick or wounded animal, amazed and bewildered at the conjuror's tricks, etc., are no more religious in the strict sense of the term than are the philanthropists and moralists who labor in the interest of their unfortunate fellow beings, or the church-goers who conform outwardly to all the forms aud ceremonies, but who are inwardly dead or indifferent to religion. "But Israel," said Paul," which followed after the law of righteousness hath not attained to the law of righteousness because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law." And Luther, in anger, pronounced the writings of St. James an "epistle of straw" because the latter considered good works more valuable than mere faith.

Again, reason and its products,-theology, creeds, and dogmas-do not constitute the whole of religion. Religion may be, and often is reasonable, but it does not therefore follow that reason is religion or even the beginning of religion. Reason is one and only one of the many streams which feed the great ocean; it is not the ocean itself.

The mathematician who has succeeded in solving a difficult problem, the philosopher who has struggled with the

great Mystery and attained a Weltanschauung, the scientist who labors patiently in his laboratory in the pursuit of truth, are, as pure and simple mathematicians, philosophers, or scientists, not religious. There is, of course, a sense in which no one is more religious than the enthusiastic seeker after truth, but such a one is no longer a mere thinking machine but a human being with a will and feelings, interests and ideals, as well as a logical mind. logical mind. It is still a mooted question whether Buddhism should be called a religion or a philosophy. The enthusiastic Buddhist is undoubtedly religious, the lukewarm or indifferent one is more philosopher than religionist. Mr. Benjamin Kidd even goes so far as to say that, "a rational religion is a scientific impossibility, representing from the nature of the case, an inherent contradiction of terms. This, however, is an extreme and untenable view due, perhaps, to Mr. Kidd's narrow conception of religion. We believe, on the contrary, that the religion of the future will be rational and even scientific; science itself will become religious, and a mere collection and enumeration of dry facts will be but a means to a higher religious end. The old slogan "Science for science sake" is now rapidly becoming absurd, and in its stead the loftier ideal, science for a fuller and better life's sake, is being gradually substituted. That a new dispensation is not far distant there can be but little doubt.2

Returning to religion we repeat that it is a well-balanced, psycho-physical reaction in which all the soul elements participate. The emotions stimulate the intellect and give the will work to do, and these in their turn regulate the emotions and keep them within their proper bounds. Like the wheels of a clock, each in performing its own task helps the others to do the same.

This brings us to the question, What is the intellect's rôle in religion? or in other words, What are the functions of knowledge and belief? But before we can answer this question we must first know what belief is. Belief may be tentatively defined as the voluntary acceptance of, or acquiescence in, a statement or theory without having or demanding sufficient proof of its verity; or, as the Apostle defined it, it is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of

1 Social Evolution.

2 See Pres. G. Stanley Hall, Science, Oct. 14, 1904; also his new Journal of Religious Psych. and Education, Vol. 1, No. 1.

things not seen." We know, for instance, that two and two are the same as four, that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and other mathematical axioms, but we do not know with equal certainty that the nebular hypothesis or the atomic theory is true; that there is such a substance as ether; or, as Kant showed in the Critique of Pure Reason, that there is an external world, that we possess a soul, or that there is a God. We can only believe these assertions to be true; we cannot know or prove them to be true. There is, however, sufficient evidence to warrant our holding these beliefs as such until they are proven to be erroneous. The nebular hypothesis and the atomic and ether theories harmonize well with our present knowledge of the universe and its laws, and the belief in a soul and a God is, for the most of us, at least, a psychical necessity. The Practical Reason must postulate them in order to function normally, because so many of our hopes and so much of our lives are built upon them. We could not live happily without them. Our passional nature wills to believe these postulates, and the intellect is powerless to prevent us.

Normal belief, however, must be in harmony with the other beliefs which the individual and his clan or race entertain. That is, it must have some semblance of truth as they understand it, or as Prof. James would say, the hypotheses must be live ones. For a scientist to believe in evolution six days in the week, and in the early chapters of Genesis on the seventh, is as irrational as it would be for a Jew or Mohammedan to deny and profess Christianity for similar periods of time. One group of beliefs must not contradict. or do violence to another group, otherwise there will be mental instability and confusion issuing into anarchic conflicts and disorders which mean insanity. Religious beliefs must be consistent and congruous with the other beliefs the individual entertains.

Again, for an adult living in a modern civilized community to believe that the earth is flat, four cornered, and stationary, when he who runs may read the truth, is as abnormal, if not more so, as it would have been for one living in the days before Copernicus to believe the reverse. tion now naturally arises, What shall we say of Copernicus himself? Was he abnormal? Most certainly he was in the eyes of his contemporaries, and if we take them as a standard, as we should, we must render the same verdict. We

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now know that he was far in advance of his time, and therefore prefer to regard him as supernormal-a genius; but the generation which gave him birth could not judge him other than they did. The human mind is fallible, of course, and ever growing; what is considered abnormal to-day may b considered perfectly normal a century or a decade hence, and many of our present day cranks' and 'faddists' may occupy prominent niches in some future hall of fame. But this knowledge of our fallibility does not deter us from forming opinions to-day. And our opinions are true ones for the time being, for truth itself is dynamic not static, a growth subject to the laws of evolution.1

It will be seen that we consider normal what was considered such by the race and age which gave it birth, so long as their beliefs did not lead to practices detrimental to the physical and psychical health of the people who entertained them. It is unfair and unscientific to arbitrarily assume any age or religion as a standard by which to measure all other ages and religions. Noah, it is said, was a just man and perfect in his generation, and therefore he found grace in the eyes of the Lord. The same Noah to-day would certainly be considered far from perfect, and might be imprisoned for some of his deeds, but it would be unjust to judge him according to our present standards. Unfortunately this patent fact has too often been overlooked by Christian writers, and consequently their painstaking and scholarly works have but little scientific value. They seem to blame the ancient Egyptians, Chaldeans, Greeks, Chinese, and others because they were not Christians; are unable to enter into sympathetic rapport with their views and practices, and therefore fail to properly evaluate the productions of these ancient, non-Christian peoples.

We have already indirectly shown how a pathological condition of the emotions influences the intellect and the will and is instrumental in bringing about pathological beliefs and practices. There remains to be treated here another class of beliefs which we may consider pathological, namely, the religious beliefs of early medieval, and we might almost add, modern Christendom concerning disease.

These beliefs and practices obtained among all primitive

1 See a good essay on Reason in Religion by C. C. Everett in his Essays, Theological and Literary, pp. 1-29, and Schiller's chapter on Truth in his New Humanism.