THE CONVENTION.

I.

AND now it becomes necessary to ask, What was the political condition of the colonies when the struggle for independence at last was over? In the language of Washington, success had but afforded the United States "the opportunity of becoming a respectable nation." Feeble indeed had been the chain which had bound them together as united states during the conflict; its strongest links were an innate hatred of tyranny, and the external pressure which forced them to coalesce. Not the least marvellous feature in the story of the Revolution, is its ultimate triumph under a system so weak and inadequate as that furnished by the old articles of confederation. In other hands than those of Washington as commander, and Morris as financier, it may well be doubted whether the hour of triumph would then have come. To the latter of these patriots less than justice has been done by some of his own countrymen, while the intelligent and observant foreigner who has told, in Italian, the story of the struggle, with a true appreciation of his worth, has said, "the Americans certainly owed, and still owe, as much acknowledgment to the financial operations of Robert Morris, as to the negotiations of Benjamin Franklin, or even to the arms of Washington."

When the contest began, it was at once seen that a recognized union of some kind among the colonies was essential. From New Hampshire to Georgia there was indeed the same proud spirit, which refused to brook oppression; brave hearts were every where roused to resistance, and strong arms were every where ready to strike: but concentrated and harmonious purpose and action were indispensable. The sagacious mind of Franklin saw this at once; nor was he now for the first time alive to this necessity. If he had not originated, he had at least sketched a plan of union for the colonies, in the convention of colonial delegates at Albany, in 1754; and this, as the historian has remarked, "was the first official suggestion of what grew afterwards to be our present federal Constitution." That plan was rejected by the colonies: the time for it was not yet; but at last the auspicious period had arrived once more to propose a recognition of the great principle of confederated unity.

As early, therefore, as the summer of 1775, Dr. Franklin submitted to Congress articles of confederation, and, in a certain contingency, of perpetual union among the colonies: these were not then finally acted on. Had they, however, been adopted, they would have united the colonies in a simple league only, until the terms of reconciliation proposed by the previous Congress, in a petition to the king, should be agreed to, until reparation should be made for injuries done to Boston and Charlestown, until restraints upon commerce and the fisheries should be removed, and until all British troops should be withdrawn from America. In the event of refusal by the crown in these particulars, the confederation would have been perpetual, but not otherwise. In truth the feeling of a majority of the colonists was to endure as long as possible, before a final rupture; and much the larger portion of the congress itself would have rejoiced in an honorable reconciliation. Some,

however, there were, who deemed the hope of such an event entirely delusive, and indulged in no visionary expectations of magnanimity, forbearance or equity from the mother country.

The proposition for a confederacy remained unacted on until June, 1776, when the pressure of events forced it into notice. Congress had then reached the resolution of declaring America independent, which was afterwards embodied in the memorable document of the fourth of July, 1776. This resolution imposed upon that body the necessity of such a compact, as well for mutual aid as for obtaining foreign assistance.

On the eleventh of June, therefore, the very day that followed the adoption of the resolution to declare independence, a committee was appointed to frame articles of confederation. The task allotted them was one of delicacy and difficulty. On the twelfth of July they reported a plan consisting of twenty articles. In that day, the men to whom were intrusted the destinies of the country, had no scruple, when they deemed it needful for the country's good, to keep secret their doings, until the proper time for disclosure came. They did not affect the dangerous liberalism of that mad generosity which would transact all public business, even that purely executive, with open doors; and thus communicate, without scruple, the most important matters of state to foreign powers, which, in their negotiations with this country, take good care never to reciprocate such uncalculating prodigality of communication. They knew that there was a book which taught them there was a time to be silent, as well as a time to speak. It did not shock the republicanism of these early senators of our country, to print but eighty copies of their plan of confederation, and to bind themselves, their secretary, and their printer, alike, to an inviolable silence as to the contents of the paper, and to lay all under an injunction to furnish no person with a copy.

Had they pursued any other course, in all human probability the effort at confederation would have failed entirely for there were conflicting interests to be reconciled, so diverse from each other, and habits of thought and action so very different, among the men there assembled, from the north and from the south, that these, added to the gloomy aspect of American affairs, would have been quite sufficient, had the public been invited to partake in the discussion, effectually to close the door against the possibility of calmly and wisely reconciling differences. As it was, though the plan was submitted in July, 1776, it was not until after repeated deliberations that it was finally adopted, in November, 1777.

And what was the plan? It was a league of sovereign states, and nothing more. We can but sketch an outline. It recognized no national existence of the colonies, as one great country, united under one permanent form of government. True, the thirteen states took the style and title of "the United States of America," but it was only to enter "into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever." And it was under no stronger bond than this voluntary agreement, that our fathers went through the war of the Revolution.

As to the details, or mode of operation under this agreement, a few particulars will suffice. Each state expressly retained its sovereignty, in all respects, where it had not expressly delegated it to the Congress, and had its own chief magistrate and government. Each state raised its own troops, and appointed all its regimental officers, the whole to be clothed, armed and equipped, at the expense of the United States. And when the Congress had declared

the proportions of taxes to be paid by the several states for prosecuting the war, each by its own legislature was to lay and levy these taxes, thus merely declared by Congress, which possessed no power of coercing their payment by distress or otherwise.

As to the Congress, each state might send its delegates, not less than three nor more than seven, chosen annually, with a power of recall, at any time, and the right to substitute others: each state had one vote in the Congress.

The powers of Congress were such only as were necessary for carrying on the contest. Thus, to this body belonged exclusively the right to make war or peace, to receive ambassadors, to contract foreign alliances, to make treaties, provided that no commercial treaty should abridge the power of the state legislatures to impose upon foreigners such imposts and duties as their own people were subject to, or to enforce an absolute prohibition, if they saw fit, of the import or export of any species whatever of goods and commodities. They had power also to commission all field officers above the rank of colonel, to determine what number of land forces was necessary, and to make requisitions on each state for its proportion; and they might issue letters of marque, and build and equip a navy.

There were other powers, but this enumeration will serve to show the relative general position of the Congress and the states; and it will be seen that in the two great elements for prosecuting a war, men and money, as to the first, Congress could do no more than fix the quota of a state and make a requisition on its authorities, the disregard of which it could neither punish nor remedy; and as to the last, Congress could indeed say what was the proportion of each state, but had no power to enforce its payment. The utmost that it could do for the practical accomplishment of objects the most important was to recommend and entreat.