nations and the duty of the United States as a neutral power. He will accordingly feel how little foundation there is for his remark, that "those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of sending Mr. Dudley Mann on such an errand, should, independent of considerations of propriety, have borne in mind that they were exposing their emissary to be treated as a spy." A spy is a person sent by one belligerent to gain secret information of the forces and defenses of the other, to be used for hostile purposes. According to practice, he may use deception, under the penalty of being lawfully hanged if detected. To give this odious name and character to a confidential agent of a neutral power, bearing the commission of his country, and sent for a purpose fully warranted by the law of nations, is not only to abuse language, but also to confound all just ideas, and to announce the wildest and most extravagant notions, such as certainly were not to havo been expected in a grave diplomatic paper; and the President directs the undersigned to say to Mr. Hülsemann, that the American government would regard such an imputation upon it by the Cabinet of Austria, as that it employs spies, and that in a quarrel none of its own, as distinctly offensive, if it did not presume, as it is willing to presume, that the word used in the original German was not of equivalent meaning with "spy" in the English language, or that in some other way the employment of such an opprobrious term may be explained. Had the Imperial government of Austria subjected Mr. Mann to the treatment of a spy, it would have placed itself without the pale of civilized nations; and the Cabinet of Vienna may be assured, that if it had carried, or attempted to carry, any such lawless purpose into effect, in the case of an authorized agent of this government, the spirit of the people of this country would have demanded immediate hostilities to be waged by the utmost exertion of the power of the republic, military and naval.

Mr. Hülsemann proceeds to remark, that "this extremely painful incident, therefore, might have been passed over, without any written evidence being left on our part in the archives of the United States, had not General Taylor thought proper to revive the whole subject, by communicating to the Senate, in his message of the 18th (28th) of last March, the instructions with which Mr. Mann had been furnished on the occasion of his mission to Vienna. The publicity which has been given to that document, has placed the Imperial government under the necessity of entering a formal protest, through its official representative, against the proceedings of the American government, lest that government should construe our silence into approbation, or toleration even, of the principles which appear to have guided its action and the means it has adopted." The undersigned reasserts to Mr. Hülsemann, and to the Cabinet of Vienna, and in the presence of the world, that the steps taken by President Taylor, now protested against by the Austrian government, were warranted by the law of nations, and agreeable to the usages of civilized states. With respect to the communication of Mr. Mann's instructions to the Senate, and the language in which they are couched, it has already been said, and Mr. Hülsemann must feel the justice of the remark, that these are domestic affairs, in reference to which the government of the United States cannot admit the slightest responsibility to the government of his Imperial Majesty. No state, deserving the appel

lation of independent, can permit the language in which it may instruct its own officers, in the discharge of their duties to itself, to be called in question under any pretext by a foreign power.

But even if this were not so, Mr. Hülsemann is in an error in stating that the Austrian government is called an "iron rule," in Mr. Mann's instructions. That phrase is not found in the paper; and in respect to the honorary epithet bestowed in Mr. Mann's instructions on the late chief of the revolutionary government of Hungary, Mr. Hülsemann will bear in mind that the government of the United States cannot justly be expected, in a confidential communication to its own agent, to withhold from an individual an epithet of distinction, of which a great part of the world thinks him worthy, merely on the ground that his own government regards him as a rebel. At an early stage of the American Revolution, while Washington was considered by the English government as a rebel chief, he was regarded on the Continent of Europe as an illustrious hero. But the undersigned will take the liberty of bringing the Cabinet of Vienna into the presence of its own predecessors, and of citing for its consideration the conduct of the Imperial government itself. In the year 1777, the war of the American Revolution was raging all over these United States. England was prosecuting that war with a most resolute determination, and by the exertion of all her military means to the fullest extent. Germany was at that time at peace with England; and yet an agent of that Congress, which was looked upon by England in no other light than that of a body in open rebellion, was not only received with great respect by the ambassador of the Empress Queen, at Paris, and by the minister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany (who afterward mounted the Imperial throne), but resided in Vienna for a considerable time; not, indeed, officially acknowledged, but treated with courtesy and respect; and the Emperor suffered himself to be persuaded by that agent to exert himself to prevent the German powers from furnishing troops to England to enable her to suppress the rebellion in America. Neither Mr. Hülsemann nor the Cabinet of Vienna, it is presumed, will undertake to say that any thing said or done by this government in regard to the recent war between Austria and Hungary is not borne out, and much more than borne out, by this example of the Imperial Court. It is believed that the Emperor Joseph the Second habitually spoke in terms of respect and admiration of the character of Washington, as he is known to have done of that of Franklin; and he deemed it no infraction of neutrality to inform himself of the progress of the revolutionary struggle in America, or to express his deep sense of the merits and the talents of those illustrious men who were then leading their country to independence and renown. The undersigned may add, that in 1781 the courts of Russia and Austria proposed a diplomatic congress of the belligerent powers, to which the commissioners of the United States should be admitted.

Mr. Hülsemann thinks that in Mr. Mann's instructions improper expressions are introduced in regard to Russia; but the undersigned has no reason to suppose that Russia herself is of that opinion. The only observation made in those instructions about Russia, is, that she "has chosen to assume an attitude of interference, and her immense preparations for invading and reducing the Hungarians to the rule of Austria, from which they desire to

be released, gave so serious a character to the contest as to awaken the most painful solicitude in the minds of Americans." The undersigned cannot but consider the Austrian Cabinet as unnecessarily susceptible in looking upon language like this as a "hostile demonstration." If we remember that it was addressed by the government to its own agent, and has received publicity only through a communication from one department of the American government to another, the language quoted must be deemed moderate and inoffensive. The comity of nations would hardly forbid its being addressed to the two imperial powers themselves. It is scarcely necessary for the undersigned to say, that the relations of the United States with Russia have always been of the most friendly kind, and have never been deemed by either party to require any compromise of their peculiar views upon subjects of domestic or foreign polity, or the true origin of governments. At any rate, the fact that Austria, in her contest with Hungary, had an intimate and faithful ally in Russia, cannot alter the real nature of the question between Austria and Hungary, nor in any way affect the neutral rights and duties of the government of the United States, or the justifiable sympathies of the American people. It is, indeed, easy to conceive, that favor toward struggling Hungary would be not diminished, but increased, when it was seen that the arm of Austria was strengthened and upheld by a power whose assistance threatened to be, and which in the end proved to be, overwhelmingly destructive of all her hopes.

Toward the conclusion of his note Mr. Hülsemann remarks, that "if the government of the United States were to think it proper to take an indirect part in the political movements of Europe, American policy would be exposed to acts of retaliation, and to certain inconveniences, which would not fail to affect the commerce and industry of the two hemispheres." As to this possible fortune, this hypothetical retaliation, the government and people of the United States are quite willing to take their chances, and abide their destiny. Taking neither a direct nor an indirect part in the domestic or intestine movements of Europe, they have no fear of events of the nature alluded to by Mr. Hülsemann. It would be idle now to discuss with Mr. Hülsemann those acts of retaliation, which he imagines may possibly take place at some indefinite time hereafter. Those questions will be discussed when they arise; and Mr. Hülsemann and the Cabinet at Vienna may rest assured, that, in the mean time, while performing with strict and exact fidelity all their neutral duties, nothing will deter either the government or the people of the United States from exercising, at their own discretion, the rights belonging to them as an independent nation, and of forming and expressing their own opinions, freely, and at all times, upon the great political events which may transpire among the civilized nations of the earth. Their own institutions stand upon the broadest principles of civil liberty; and believing those principles and the fundamental laws in which they are embodied, to be eminently favorable to the prosperity of states, to be, in fact, the only principles of government which meet the demands of the present enlightened age, the President has perceived, with great satisfaction, that, in the constitution recently introduced into the Austrian empire, many of these great principles are recognized and applied, and he cherishes a sincere wish that they may produce the same happy effects throughout his

Austrian Majesty's extensive dominions that they have done in the United States.

The undersigned has the honor to repeat to Mr. Hülsemann the assurance of his high consideration. DANIEL WEBSTER.

THE CHEVALIER J. G. HULSEMANN, Charge d'Affaires of Austria, Washington.

Chevalier Hülsemann, under date of March 11th, 1851, briefly replied to this "famous dispatch" from Mr. Webster, and in it stated that the opinions of his government remain unaltered in respect to the mission of Mr. Mann; but that it "declines all ulterior discussion of that annoying incident,” from unwillingness to disturb its friendly relations with the United States. Mr. Webster, in his rejoinder to this communication, said that the government of the United States was equally disinclined to prolong the discussion, but declared that their principles and policy are fixed and fastened upon them by their character, their history, and their position among the nations of the world; and it may be regarded as certain, that those principles and this policy will not be abandoned or departed from until some extraordinary change shall take place in the general current of human affairs."

AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN BEHALF OF THE HUNGARIAN EXILES, WITH A SKETCH OF THE VISIT OF KOSSUTH TO THE UNITED STATES.

On the termination of the Hungarian War, in August, 1849, Louis Kossuth, who had been governor of Hungary, and was the one ruling and directing spirit of the Hungarian cause, with a party of officers and others fled across the Turkish frontier, and threw himself on the hospitality of the Sultan, who promised them a safe asylum.

Russia and Austria demanded that the fugitives should be given up; and for some months it was uncertain if the Turkish government would dare to refuse. At first a decided negative was given; then the Porte wavered, and it was officially announced to Kossuth and his companions that the only means for them to avoid a surrender would be to give up the Christian religion and become Mohammedans, and thus take advantage of the Moslem law, that any fugitive embracing that faith can claim the protection of the government. Kossuth refused to purchase his life at such a prico. Finally Austria and Russia were induced to modify their demand, and merely insist upon the detention of the fugitives.

Early in the year 1851, Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, directed Mr. Marsh, our minister at Constantinople, to urge the Porte to suffer the exiles to come to the United States. A similar course was pursued by the British government. It was finally promised that these requests should be complied with at the expiration of the period of the detention agreed upon by the Sultan, when the exiles would be free to depart to any part of the world. Our government at once placed the United States' steam-frigate Mississippi at the disposal of Kossuth, who accepted the offer and embarked with his suite on the 12th of September, 1851. They arrived at Marseilles on the 25th, when the French government refused permission to Kossuth to pass through France to England, where he wished to leave his children for their education, prior to visiting the United States. On the 5th of October, Kossuth, with his wife, three children, and eleven of his suite, left

the Mississippi at Gibraltar and embarked on an English passenger-steamer for Southampton, while the Mississippi, with the remainder of the exiles, forty-two in number, sailed for New York.

Early in December, Kossuth and his suite arrived at New York in the steamer Humbolt, from England. The enthusiasm with which he was received was never equaled in our country on any occasion within this century. It arose from the extraordinary ability of the man, and the character of the heroic struggle in which he had been engaged.

On his entrance into New York, as the guest of the city, he was greeted by thousands upon thousands of the people, whose wild excitement was such that it seemed as if even the loudest huzzas were insufficient to give vent to their emotions. He reviewed the troops, and there was a large civil and military procession in his honor. For the few subsequent days he was waited upon at his rooms by numerous deputations from societies, and from cities, inviting him to visit them. On the 12th, the corporation of New York entertained him at a splendid banquet, in which he made a long and able speech, explanatory of the objects of his visit to the United States. The point of his address, and of his speeches generally throughout the country, was to urge this government to combine with that of England in a protest against the intervention of Russia in the affairs of Hungary. He argued that this would be sufficient to effect the object-that Russia would be overawed to continue at peace, and thus his country would be enabled to gain her independence of Austria. On the 15th, the banquet of the press was given him at the Astor House; and on the succeeding day the military of New York, about six thousand strong, received him at Castle Garden. The bar of the city gave him a banquet on the 19th, and on the 20th he pronounced a farewell address to the ladies, at Tripler Hall. Passing through Philadelphia and Baltimore to Washington, he was received in those cities with similar honors and enthusiasm. At the Federal city, Kossuth called upon President Fillmore, with his suite, and read a short address, to which the President replied. Congress, who had passed an almost unanimous resolution welcoming him to the capital and the country, on the 7th gave him a banquet. His speech on this occasion was "a terse and most eloquent, sketch of the position of his country." Speeches in reply were made by Messrs. Cass, Douglass, and Webster-the latter expressing his high admiration for their guest, and declaring his opinion that Hungary was admirably fitted for republican institutions, and his wish for the speedy establishment of her independence. The others affirmed their desire that the United States should protest against Russian intervention.

In the course of the next few weeks, Kossuth visited Annapolis, Harrisburg, Pittsburg, Cleveland, and Columbus, and was received by the legislatures of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Ohio. The same unbounded enthusiasm greeted him. On the 9th of February he reached Cincinnati, where he remained several weeks, receiving deputations, making speeches, etc. He solicited and received, in the whole course of his tour, large sums of money, as contributions to assist in a second proposed attempt to establish Hungarian Independence. He declined at this point to receive any more public entertainments, on the ground that it involved a waste of money,