"No, by Jupiter; not even, as I think, a comparatively small portion of them." "It is not therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things?" "No, indeed." "Every man is wise, therefore, in that only of which he has a knowledge?" "So it seems to me."

8. "Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus," said he, "inquire what is GOOD?" "How?" said Euthydemus. "Does the same thing appear to you to be beneficial to everybody?" "No." "And does not that which is beneficial to one person appear to you to be sometimes hurtful to another?" "Assuredly." "Would you say, then, that anything is good that is not beneficial?" "I would not." "What is beneficial, therefore, is good, to whomsoever it is beneficial?" "It appears so to me," said Euthydemus.

9. "And can we define the BEAUTIFUL in any other way than if you term whatever is beautiful, whether a person, or a vase, or anything else whatsoever, beautiful for whatever purpose you know that it is beautiful?" "No, indeed," said Euthydemus. "For whatever purpose, then, anything may be useful, for that purpose it is beautiful to use it?" "Certainly." "And is anything beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use it?" "For no other purpose," replied he. “What is useful is beautiful, therefore, for that purpose for which is it beautiful?" "So I think," said he.

10. "As to COURAGE, Euthydemus," said Socrates, "do you think it is to be numbered among excellent things?" "I think it one of the most excellent," replied Euthydemus. "But you do not think courage a thing of use for small occasions." "No, by Jupiter, but for the very greatest." "Does it appear to you to be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous things, to be ignorant of their character?" "By no means." "They, therefore, who do not fear such things, because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?" "Certainly not; for, in that case, many madmen and even cowards would be courageous." "And what do you say of those who fear things that are not formidable?" "Still less, by Jupiter, should they be called courageous." "Those, then, that are good, with reference to formidable and dangerous things, you consider to be courageous, and those that

are bad, cowardly?" "Certainly." II. "But do you think that any other persons are good, with reference to terrible and dangerous circumstances, except those who are able to conduct themselves well under them?" "No, those only," said he. "And you think those bad with regard to them, who are of such a character as to conduct themselves badly under them?" "Whom else can I think so?" "Do not each, then, conduct themselves under them as they think they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Do those, therefore, who do not conduct themselves properly under them, know how they ought to conduct themselves under them?" "Doubtless not." "Those then who know how they ought to conduct themselves under them, can do so?" "And they alone." "Do those, therefore, who do not fail under such circumstances, conduct themselves badly under them?" "I think not." "Those, then, who do conduct themselves badly under them, do fail?" "It seems so." "Those, therefore, who know how to conduct themselves well in terrible and dangerous circumstances are courageous, and those who fail to do so are cowards?" "They at least appear so to me," said Euthydemus.

12. Monarchy and tyranny he considered to be both forms of government, but conceived that they differed greatly from one another; for a government over men with their own consent, and in conformity with the laws of free states, he regarded as a monarchy; but a government over men against their will, and not according to the laws of free states, but just as the ruler pleased, a tyranny; and wherever magistrates were appointed from among those who complied with the injunctions of the laws, he considered the government to be an aristocracy; wherever they were appointed according to their wealth, a plutocracy; and wherever they were appointed from among the whole people, a democracy.

13. Whenever any person contradicted him on any point, who had nothing definite to say, and who perhaps asserted, without proof, that some person, whom he mentioned, was wiser, or better skilled in political affairs, or possessed of greater courage, or worthier in some such respect [than some other whom Socrates had mentioned], he would recall the whole argument, in

some such way as the following, to the primary proposition: 14. "Do you say that he whom you commend, is a better citizen than he whom I commend?” “I do say so." "Why should we not then consider, in the first place, what is the duty of a good citizen?" "Let us do so." "Would not he then be superior in the management of the public money who should make the state richer?" "Undoubtedly." "And he in war who should make it victorious over its enemies?" "Assuredly." "And in an embassy he who should make friends of foes?" "Doubtless." "And he in addressing the people who should check dissension and inspire them with unanimity?" "I think so." When the discussion was thus brought back to fundamental principles, the truth was made evident to those who had opposed him.

15. When he himself went through any subject in argument, he proceeded upon propositions of which the truth was generally acknowledged, thinking that a sure foundation was thus formed for his reasoning. Accordingly, whenever he spoke, he, of all men that I have known, most readily prevailed on his hearers to assent to his arguments; and he used to say that Homer had attributed to Ulysses the character of a sure orator, as being able to form his reasoning on points acknowledged by all mankind.

WELL then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of evil-doers ever acting vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises, for had they been whole 'villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been wholly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?

* From Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία. Reprinted from The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1871; 3d rev. ed. 1892, vol. iii.

I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I do not understand, he said.

Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear, except with the ear?

No.

These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs? They may.

But you can cut off a vine-branch with a carving-knife or with a chisel and in many other ways?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I said that the end of anything was that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.

And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?
True.

And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?