RICHARD CUMBERLAND (1631-1718) A TREATISE OF THE LAWS OF NATURE Translated from the Latin* by CHAPTER I. OF THE NATURE OF THINGS ALTHOUGH the Sceptics and Epicureans of old denied, and others of similar principles still persist in denying that there are any laws of nature, nevertheless, on all sides it is agreed what is intended by those terms. All understand thereby certain propositions of unchangeable truth which direct our voluntary actions in the choice of good and in the refusal of evil; and which impose upon us an obligation to regulate our external actions, even without civil laws, and apart from all considerations of those compacts which constitute civil government. That some such truths are, from the nature of things in general and of human nature in particular, necessarily suggested to the minds of men, and are by them understood and remembered whilst their faculties continue unimpaired, and that therefore these truths have there a real existence this is what we affirm, and our adversaries expressly deny. In order that the nature of these propositions may more plainly appear, it is necessary that we first examine the nature of things in general, then that of mankind, and lastly that of the good, in so far as relates to our question. We must afterwards show what kind of propositions direct the actions of men, and carry along with them naturally the force and obligation of laws, inasmuch as they point out what is necessary to be done to attain the end which nature has determined men to pursue. Lastly, that there are such laws will sufficiently appear from * From De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica. London, 1672. Reprinted, with verbal changes, from R. Cumberland's A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, translated by John Maxwell, London, 1727. the certainty and necessary influence of those causes which produce them. § II. It ought not to seem strange to any, that it is here said, that the nature of things in the universe ought first to be considered, because the various faculties of man, which have need of many things for their preservation and improvement, and which are excited by all of them to action, cannot be otherwise understood. For how can any one understand what is most agreeable or most hurtful to the human mind or body, unless he consider so far as it is possible, all those causes, remote as well as near, which first formed and now preserve man, and may hereafter either support or destroy him? Nor is it possible to determine what is the best thing a man can do in each instance, unless the effects, remote as well as near, which may result in every variety of circumstances, be foreseen and compared among themselves. But the consideration of the causes on which men are dependent, and of those effects which may be produced by the concurrence of their own powers with such causes must necessarily lead every man to consider not only other men, wheresoever dispersed, and himself as a small part of mankind, but also to contemplate this entire frame of nature, and to recognize God, as its first founder and supreme governor. These things being considered in the best manner possible, certain general propositions of the reason may be learned by which can be determined what sort of human actions chiefly promote the common good of all beings, especially of such as are rational, and wherein each man's proper happiness is contained. And we shall hereafter see that in such conclusions, provided they be true and necessary, the law of nature is contained. § III. Nevertheless the nature of our undertaking does not require that we should take a detailed view of all kinds of beings. It is sufficient for us in the beginning of this undertaking to have admonished the reader that the whole of moral philosophy and also the entire science of the laws of nature are ultimately resolved into natural observations known by the experience of all men, or into conclusions recognized as true natural philosophy. But natural philosophy in the large sense in which it is here used does not only comprehend all those phenomena of natural bodies which we know from experiment, but also inquires into the nature of our souls, by means of observations made upon the mind's operations and characteristic perfections, and at length leads men by the chain of natural causes to the knowledge of the first mover, acknowledging him to be the cause of all necessary effects. For the nature, as well of the creatures as of the creator, suggests all those ideas from which the laws of nature are formed, and reveals the truth of those laws as practical propositions; but their full authority is derived from the knowledge of the creator. All this requires however to be explained a little more at length in this place. § IV. Although there are innumerable ideas that a contemplation of the universe may furnish us, to form the content of the particular propositions, which are to regulate our customs, I have, nevertheless, thought proper to select only a few, and those the most general, to explain in some measure that general description of the laws of nature which I proposed at the beginning of this chapter and which are contained a little more manifestly in one proposition, that is the fountain of all natural laws. This fundamental proposition is: The greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all, constitutes the happiest state of all in general and of each in particular, as far as is in their power to procure it; and is necessarily requisite in order to attain the happiest state, to which they can aspire; and therefore the common good of all is the supreme law. The sense of this proposition is first rightly to be explained; secondly, it is to be shown how it may be learned from the nature of things; and lastly, I hope it will plainly appear from what follows in this treatise, that it has the force of a law, and that all the laws of nature flow from it. The reader must observe that I nowhere understand by the term benevolence that languid and lifeless volition of theirs which effects nothing of what one is said to desire, but that force only whereby we execute as speedily and thoroughly as we are able what we heartily desire. We must likewise also comprehend in this word that affection by reason of which we desire things agreeable to our superiors, which is more particularly designated as piety towards God, love towards our country, and respect towards our parents. I chose moreover to make use of the word benevolence, rather, than that of love, because, by virtue of its component parts, it implies an act of our will joined with its most general object, the good, and is never taken in a bad sense as the word love sometimes is. I have said the greatest benevolence, because I would express the entire or adequate cause of the greatest happiness. By the word all I understand the entire body of rational beings, considered together, having regard to one end, which I there mention by the name of the happiest state. By the term rational being I beg leave to understand God as well as man; and I do so upon the authority of Cicero, whom I think I may safely take for a guide as to the proper use of a Latin word. For in his book on The Laws he uses reason as common both to God and men, and he says that wisdom, which all ascribe to God, is nothing other than "reason in perfection." I have used the words constitutes the happiest state of all, to intimate that benevolence is both the intrinsic cause of present, and the efficient cause of future happiness, and is a necessary requisite in both. I have added as far as is in their power, to imply that the assistance of things external is often not in our power, although they are requisite to the happiness of the animal life; and that no other assistance to a happy life is to be expected from the laws of nature and moral philosophy than precepts about our actions, and concerning those objects of our actions which are in our own power. Consequently although it happens that different men, according to their different abilities of mind and body, nay, that the same men, in different circumstances, are not equally able to promote the public good, nevertheless, the law of nature is sufficiently observed, and its end obtained, if every one does what he is able according to his present circumstances. V. I must now show, both how the ideas contained in the foregoing proposition necessarily enter into the minds of men, and how they are necessarily connected when they are there; in other words, how they make a true proposition, which we shall afterwards prove to be practical, and to have the force of a law. It is well known by the experience of all men that those ideas or thoughts which the logicians call simple apprehensions are excited in two ways in the mind of man: First, they are caused by the immediate presence of the object and the impression it makes upon the mind. In this way the mind becomes conscious of its own operations, and also of the motions of the imagination, or of the objects it presents to us, and thus by analogy also one judges of what passes in the minds of other rational beings, both God and men. Secondly, they are occasioned by means of our external senses, nerves, and membranes, and in this way we perceive other men, and the rest of this visible world. Thus it is apparent that the terms of our proposition become known, partly by internal, partly by external sensation. But what benevolence is, and what are its degrees, and consequently what is the greatest benevolence of each, we do not understand otherwise than by the mind reflecting upon itself. There is moreover need of no other aid, for such is the constitution of the mind that it cannot but be thoroughly sensible of its own actions and affections, as these things are the most intimately united with itself. It must be acknowledged, however, that it is to the assistance of our outward senses that we owe the knowledge of the external advantages which benevolence distributes amongst all. In the same manner it is by our inward sense that we learn the nature of reason, and in consequence thereby apprehend what is meant by rational agents as mentioned in the subject of the proposition. That there are others besides ourselves who have the use of reason, we gather by observations made by our external senses. The knowledge of the causes constituting anything, whether intrinsically, or in the way of an efficient, we derive generally by the assistance of our outward senses, and by reasoning founded on appearances. The inner nature of our soul, and the active powers by which it determines the voluntary motions of our bodies in pursuit of apparent good, the mind itself perceives partly by reflection upon itself, and partly by the aid of the senses, whereby is revealed the effects consequent upon the command of our will. Lastly, we come to the knowledge of |