BARUCH DE SPINOZA THE ETHICS Translated from the Latin * by R. H. M. ELWES PART I. CONCERNING GOD DEFINITIONS I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent. II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body. III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. V. By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself. VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite — that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality. Explanation. — I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes * Opera posthuma, Amsterdam, 1677; Opera, ed. C. H. Bruder, Leipzig, 1843-46 (Ethica ordine geometrica demonstrata, vol. i. pp. 143-416). Reprinted here from Spinoza's Works, translated by R. H. M. Elwes. London, George Bell and Sons, 1884; rev. ed., 1906. may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation. VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action. VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal. Explanation. - Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end. AXIOMS I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else. II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself. III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow. IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence. PROPOSITIONS PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications. Proof. This is clear from Defs. iii. and v. PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common. Proof. - Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other. PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other. Proof. If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q. E. D. PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications. Proof. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.), — that is (by Defs. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q. E. D. PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. Proof. If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications, as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.), it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly (Defs. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another, that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q. E. D. PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another sub stance. Proof. It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, i. e. which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the other. Q. E. D. Corollary. Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Defs. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q. E. D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance. PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance. Proof. Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop. vi.), it must, therefore, be its own causethat is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature. PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite. Proof. There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q. E. D. Note I. As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite. PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect. Proof. This proposition will be clear to everyone who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q. E. D. Corollary I. Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect. Corollary II. - It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not through an accident of his nature. Corollary III. - It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely first cause. PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Proof. We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.) that without God nothing can be nor be conceived; but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Q. E. D. Corollary I. — It follows: 1. That there can be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own nature, moves God to act. Corollary II.-It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q. E. D. Note. Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature - that is, which are in his power, |