must be the most easy and unrestrained. It is manifest that, in the common course of life, there is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is called interest; it is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty and what is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness and satisfaction. Self-love then, though confined to the interest of the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course of life. But, whatever exceptions there are to this, which are much fewer than they are commonly thought, all shall be set right at the final distributions of things. It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing finally over good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect mind.

The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be thus summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of man is adapted to some course of action or other. Upon comparing some actions with this nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to it; from comparison of other actions with the same nature, there arises to our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The correspondence of actions to the nature of the agent renders them natural: their disproportion to it, unnatural. That an action is correspondent to the nature of the agent, does not arise from its being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the strongest; for it may be so, and yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of the agent. The correspondence therefore, or disproportion, arises from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in nature and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward principles. Some then are in nature and kind superior to others. And the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to the higher principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary to it. Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man, because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated; but becomes unsuitable, if either of those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future, and the

whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his own interest and happiness.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON

(1694-1747)

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING MORAL GOOD AND EVIL*

SECTION I OF THE MORAL SENSE BY WHICH WE PERCEIVE VIRTUE AND VICE

I. THAT the perceptions of moral good and evil, are perfectly different from those of natural good, or advantage, every one must convince himself by reflecting upon the different manner in which he finds himself affected when these objects occur to him. Had we no sense of good distinct from the advantage or interest arising from the external senses, and the perceptions of beauty and harmony; our admiration and love toward a fruitful field or commodious habitation, would be much the same with what we have toward a generous friend or any noble character; for both are or may be advantageous to us; and we should no more admire any action, or love any person in a distant country or age, whose influence could not extend to us, than we love the mountains of Peru, while we are unconcerned in the Spanish trade. We should have the same sentiments and affections toward inanimate beings, which we have toward rational agents; which yet every one knows to be false. Upon comparison we say, "Why should we admire or love with esteem inanimate beings? They have no intention of good to us; their nature makes them fit for our uses, which they neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational agents: they study our interest, and delight in our happiness, and are benevolent toward us."

We are all then conscious of the difference between that love and esteem, or perception of moral excellence, which benevolence

* From F. Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. In Two Treatises: I. Concerning Beauty or Order and Design: II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil. 1st ed., London, 1725; 2d ed., ib., 1726; 3d ed., ib., 1729; 4th corr. ed., 1738.

excites toward the person in whom we observe it, and that opinion of natural goodness, which only raises desire of possession toward the good object. Now, "What should make this difference, if all approbation, or sense of good be from prospect of advantage? Do not inanimate objects promote our advantage, as well as benevolent persons who do us offices of kindness and friendship? Should we not then have the same endearing sentiments of both? or only the same cold opinion of advantage in both?" The reason why it is not so must be this, "that we have a distinct perception of beauty or excellence in the kind affections of rational agents, whence we are determined to admire and love such characters and persons."

Suppose we reap the same advantage from two men, one of whom serves us from delight in our happiness, and love toward us; the other from views of self-interest, or by constraint: both are in this case equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other perceptions of moral actions than those of advantage; and that power of receiving these perceptions may be called a moral sense, since the definition agrees to it, viz.: a determination of the mind to receive any idea from the presence of an object which occurs to us, independent on our will.

This perhaps will be equally evident from our ideas of evil done to us designedly by a rational agent. Our senses of natural good and evil would make us receive with equal serenity and composure, an assault, a buffet, an affront from a neighbour, a cheat from a partner, or trustee, as we would an equal damage from the fall of a beam, a tile, or a tempest; and we should have the same affections and sentiments of both. Villany, treachery, cruelty, would be as meekly resented as a blast, or mildew, or an overflowing stream. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these occasions, though there may be equal natural evil in both. Nay, actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest anger and indignation, if they evidence only impotent hatred or contempt. And on the other hand, the intervention of moral ideas may prevent our hatred of the agent, or bad moral

apprehension of that action, which causes to us the greatest natural evil. Thus the opinion of justice in any sentence, will prevent all ideas of moral evil in the execution or hatred toward the magistrate, who is the immediate cause of our greatest sufferings.

II. In our sentiments of actions which affect ourselves, there is indeed a mixture of the ideas of natural and moral good, which require some attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the actions which affect other persons only, we may observe the moral ideas unmixed with those of natural good or evil. For let it be here observed, that those senses by which we perceive pleasure in natural objects, whence they are constituted advantageous, could never raise in us any desire of public good, but only of what was good to ourselves in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve an action because of its promoting the happiness of others. And yet as soon as any action is represented to us as flowing from love, humanity, gratitude, compassion, a study of the good of others, and a delight in their happiness, although it were in the most distant part of the world or in some past age, we feel joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise its author. And on the contrary, every action represented as flowing from hatred, delight in the misery of others, or ingratitude, raises abhorrence and aversion.

It is true indeed that the actions we approve in others, are generally imagined to tend to the natural good of mankind, or of some parts of it. But whence this secret chain between each person and mankind? How is my interest connected with the most distant parts of it? And yet I must admire actions which are beneficial to them, and love the author. Whence this love, compassion, indignation, and hatred toward even feigned characters, in the most distant ages and nations, according as they appear kind, faithful, compassionate, or of the opposite dispositions, toward their imaginary contemporaries? If there is no moral sense, which makes rational actions appear beautiful or deformed; if all approbation be from the interest of the approver, "What's Hecuba to us or we to Hecuba?" (Hamlet.)